Valuing farm input handbook. by University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Department of Agricultural Economics & University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Cooperative Extension Service

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS BRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
AGRICULTURE
I The*
I he person (hailing this material is responsible for
its reliirn to the librar\ from which it was withdrawn
on or before the Latest Date stampid below.
Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for discipli-
nary action and may result in dismissal from the University.
To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
OtCoO^B
MAY 2 1 1990
AGRICULTURE LIBRARY
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/farmeconomicsfac8687univ


r.^-^i m.r
BB FARM ECONOMICS
Facts and OpinionsHiitlon StrviM
l/ersity of Illinois
^Irbana Champaign
KPARTM[NT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS 61801
AGRICULTURE LlBRARf
86-lAVhich Illinois Dairy
HERTZBERG — NEW METHOD, INC. EAST VANDALIA ROAD, JACKSONVILLE, ILL. 62650
LOT AND TICKET NO
CLOTH COLOR
\
HIMiHItHHIi
Soybeans
Milk
Veal calves
jsm SPECIAL WORK AND PREP
FRONT COVER
PAGES LAMINATED
HAND ADHESIVE
FOREIGN TITLE
LINES OF LETTERING
MAP POCKET PAPER
MAP POCKET CLOTH
SPECIAL WORK
REMOVE TATTLE TAPE
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
J. iu
5.75
7.00
11.60
12.20
11.00
32.00
37.00
42.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
lililiilili
-J 1 u
5 75
7 k2
11 10
12 20
in 00
32 00
37 00
H2 00
52 50
72 50
92 50
January 1986
vive?
TION OF
iry farms
ejected
the
rent
0. ")0,
5.10
5.90
7.86
10.10
12.20
14.50
32.00
37.00
42.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
89
2.25
2.75
3.61
5.25
6.00
8.34
9.10
12.20
14. 50
32.00
37.00
42.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
STATE • COUNTY • LOCAL GROUPS -U S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
THE ILLINOIS COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT

2^2^l 'AT
o( Illinois
Champaign
FARM ECONOMICS
Facts and Opinions
KPIkRTM[NT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS 61801
ir^'
86-lAVhich Illinois Dairy
AGRtCULTURE imm
JIJI n a 10QQ
fanuary 1986
vive?
HERTZBERG — NEW METHOD, INC. EAST VANDALIA ROAD, JACKSONVILLE, ILL. 62650
TITLE NO
0069.0600
ACCOUNT NO.
07200- .1.1.:
-il FARM << ECQHOhlCS •« ini
LOT AND TICKET NO
HON OF
iry farms
rejected
T the
erent
50,
'rt i
—28 3:i58.1«F22y»
-8?^
H!MiMi;[ii;ii
THRU SEW ON TAPE
misM
Dybeans
eal calves
SPECIAL WORK AND PREP
FRONT COVER
PAGES LAMINATED
I THICKNESS
HAND ADHESIVE
FOREIGN TITLE
LINES OF LETTERING
MAP POCKET PAPER
> POCKET CLOTH
SPECIAL WORK
REMOVE TATTLE TAPE
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
5.75
7.00
11.60
12.20
lil.OO
32.00
37.00
1*2.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
5.75
7.12
11.10
12.20
1i<.00
32.00
37.00
H2.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
5 90
7 86
10 10
12 20
11 50
32 00
37 00
U2 00
52 50
72 50
92 50
989
2.25
2.75
3.61
32.00
37.00
12.00
52.50
72.50
92.50
STATE -COUNTY -LOCAL GROUPS -.US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
ILLINOIS COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT
DISK-D90050a REC.-15^ FnNT-4/216 PAGt- 123
L8PGfi
F-0069.C600 072()0-1SS 13 CR 02- 47 iM RUSH
43-11 FARM ECONOMICS * FACTS AND OPI NICKS * *
^
42-22 ( INCORRl-CTLY BOUND W/ANOTHER TTTLE.NO CHAiOE )43-24 iD8h-81* '
42-28 338.1*F229*
lS86-}37* AGXl
FOIL- WHITE
0083 PLEASH RHBIND* H 3/g
tl
€ 1/2 U-2 3/8
L8PGA
F a9-'i lii^
as FARM ECONOMICS
Facts and Opinions
Iftritlvi
liation S«
|»ersity ol Illinois
IJrbana Champaign
KPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS 61601
AGRICULTURE imm
JUL 6 1988 January 1986
«»l*»wtRS»TY Uf lUINOIS
86-lAVhich Illinois Dairy and Cattle Feeding Farms Can Survive?
Farm Economics Facts and Opinions 85-16
examined the impact of commodity
prices, tenure pattern, and financial
leverage on the future survival and
prosperity of Illinois cash-grain and
hog farms. In this article, we con-
tinue that analysis by projecting the
financial situations of two other major
types of Illinois farms: dairy an;}^
feeder cattle farms.
THE PROJECTED ECONOMIC SITUATION OF
DAIRY FARMS
To examine the ability of dairy farms
to prosper and survive, we projected
their financial situations over the
next four years under three different
initial debt-to-asset ratios (20, 50,
and 70 percent) and three different
sets of commodity prices. Table 1
Table 1. Commodity Prices Used to Project the Financi.
Dairy Farms
Condition of Illinois
Levels of
commodity
prices
Year
Commodity 1986 1987 1988 1989
dollars
Corn Weak 2.15 2.15 2.20 2.25
Moderate 2.60 2.65 2.70 2.75
High 3.03 3.21 3.40 3.61
Soybeans Weak 5.30 5.10 5.10 5.25
Moderate 5.75 5.75 5.90 6.00
High 7.00 7.U2 7.86 8.3-^
Milk Weak 11.60 11.10 10.10 9.10
Moderate 12.20 12.20 12.20 12.20
High lU.OO IJJ.OO U.50 TJ. 50
Cull cows Weak 32.00 32.00 32.00 32.00
Moderate 37.00 37.00 37.00 37.00
High U2.00 1J2.00 i\2.00 1J2.00
Veal calves Weak 52.50 52.50 52.50 52.50
Moderate 72.50 72.50 72.50 72.50
High 92.50 92.50 92.50 92.50
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shows the commodity prices used for
these three economic scenarios.
The simulated dairy farm has 289 till-
able acres, with 51 acres owned and 235
acres rented on a 50-50 crop-share
basis. Of these acres, 1 61 are planted
in corn, 90 in hay, and 38 in soybeans.
The farm operator is assumed to own all
dairy facilities and to milk a herd of
56 cows with an annual milk production
of 11,356 pounds per cow. All calves
not kept for replacement heifers are
sold at 200 pounds.
Costs of production are based upon av-
erages for northern and central Illi-
nois dairy farms in the Farm Business
Farm Management Association (FBFM).
For the scenarios with weak and moder-
ate prices, it was assumed that the
costs of production and the value of
land remained at their 1985 level.
Interest rates were assumed to be 12.5
percent for both operating and capital
loans throughout the next four years.
Yields were assumed to average 130
bushels per acre for corn, 15 bush«,ls
per acre for soybeans, 5 tons per acre
for hay, and 18 tons per acre for corn
silage.
For the scenario with high commodity
prices, all previous assumptions were
used except that land values were as-
sumed to grow 6 percent annually be-
cause of the much higher commodity
prices. In addition, costs of produc-
tion were assumed to increase 3 percent
annually.
Results of the dairy farm simulation
are reported in Table 2. According to
the scenario with weak prices, a dairy
farmer with an initial debt-to-asset
ratio of 20 percent generates a small
positive amount of net farm income in
the first two years, but this income
becomes negative in the last two years.
Over the four-year period this farmer's
net worth will decline moderately, but
the debt-to-asset ratio will drop.
With an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
50 or 70 percent, however, this same
size farm will experience a negative
and rapidly deteriorating net farm
income and show a significant drop in
net worth. Equity capital is totally
eliminated under a scenario with weak
prices for a dairy farmer with an ini-
tial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent.
Under the scenario with moderate
prices, a dairy farmer with an initial
debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent gen-
erates moderate levels of net farm in-
come and experiences some growth in net
worth. An initial debt-to-asset ratio
of 50 percent will produce a small pos-
itive amount of net farm income in all
years, but not enough to keep from
eroding the initial equity position.
Liabilities, however, decrease somewhat
faster than net worth; therefore, the
debt-to-asset ratio will decline
slightly over the period. The highly
leveraged operator experiences a sig-
nificant drop in net worth because of a
large negative net farm income each
year. It is unlikely that this opera-
tion will survive many more years under
this scenario.
For the scenario with high prices, a
dairy farmer with an initial debt-to-
asset ratio of 20 to 50 percent gener-
ates good profits and strong growth in
net worth. Likewise, the highly lever-
aged operator generates modest levels
of net farm income and a strong growth
in equity primarily because of the in-
flating value of land assumed under
this scenario.
THE PROJECTED ECONOMIC SITUATION OF
FEEDER CATTLE FARMS
To examine the ability of feeder cattle
farms to prosper and survive, we pro-
jected their finanacial situations over
the next four years under alternative
price scenarios and initial debt-to-
asset ratios. The simulated feeder
cattle farm has 558 tillable acres,
with 190 acres owned and 368 acres
rented on a 50-50 crop-share basis. Of
these acres 123 are planted in corn, 87
in soybeans, and 18 in hay. The farm

Table 2. Projected Financial Situations of Illinois Dairy Farms
Initial debt-to-asset ratio
Scenario 20 percent 50 percent 70 percent
WEAK PRICES
Net farm Income
1986
1987
1988
1989
Net worth
Initial
1986
1987
1988
1989
Endi ng
debt -to-asset ratio
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income
1986
1987
1988
1989
Net worth
Initial
1986
1987
1988
1989
Ending
debt -to-asset ratio
HIGH PRICES
Net farm income
1986
1987
1988
1989
Net worth
Initial
1986
1987
1988
1989
12,962
6,61^2
(3,07U)
(5,8'<5)
325'.375
323.337
317,361
303,971
288,056
percent
(2 290)
(9 188)
(20 960)
(26 215)
203 359
186 069
166 188
135 528
99 283
percent
(12,158)
(20,927)
(33.817)
(10, 710)
122,015
91,557
63,630
19,813
(30,897)
110 percent
22,731 7,179 (2,689)
20,838 5,929 (5,510)
19,290 1,151 (8,315)
^1.515 10,301 (1,026)
325,375 203,359 122,01 5
333.106 195,838 101,326
338,302 190,861 88,733
315,921 185,017 70,106
357,613 185,057 56,380
7 percent 11 percent 82 perc
12,737 27,185 17,317
39,707 27.299 15,860
10,921 30,133 18,028
11,987 37,810 21,218
325,375 203,359 122,015
359,858 222,590 131,078
383.361 239,561 110,326
113.377 262,783 151,019
115.281 289,119 172,783
Ending
debt-to-asset ratio 5 percent 17 percent 19 percent

operator is assumed to own all live-
stock facilities and to feed out 300
feeder cattle annually. The costs of
production are based upon averages for
Illinois feeder cattle farms in the
FBFM record-keeping program. Crop pro-
duction costs, yields, and interest rates
are comparable to those used in the dairy
farm simulations. Prices for corn and
soybeans in these simulations are the
same as those reported in Table 1. Cat-
tle prices used for the three economic
scenarios are listed in Table 3f and the
results of the feeder cattle farm simula-
tions are reported in Table k.
Overall, the projected economic situa-
tion of the average feeder cattle farm
in Illinois is not good. Under the
scenarios with weak and moderate
prices, all of the simulated farms ex-
perience negative net farm income over
the four-year period. This causes a
significant drop in net worth, with the
highly leveraged operator becoming in-
solvent in the third year. The opera-
tors with an initial debt-to-asset
ratio of 20 and 50 percent still have
some net worth because their beginning
equity position was so strong. In all
situations, the debt-to-asset ratio
increases because additional borrowing
is required to cover the losses as well
as family living expenses.
According to the scenario
prices, the farmer with an
debt-to-asset ratio of 20
have a modest net farm inc
year. Coupled with the in
of land, this income will
strong growth in net worth
the debt-to-asset ratio,
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Table 3- Cattle Prices Used to Pr<f3ect the Financial Condition of Illinois Feeder
Cattle Faras
Commodity
Levels of
commodity
prices
Year
986 1987 1988 1989
Feeder cattle
Market cattle
Spread
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
Weak
Moderate
High
60.00
62.00
60.00
55.00
60.00
70.00
(5.00)
(2.00)
10.00
doll ars
63.00 66.00
61J.00 67.00
62.50 6'J.OO
57.50 60.00
62.50 65.00
72.50 75.00
(5.50) (6.00)
(1.50) (2.00)
10.00 11.00
64.00
6i).00
62.00
58.00
63.00
73.00
(6.00)
(1.00)
11.00

Table ^. Projected Financial Situations of Illinois Cattle Farms
Initial debt-to-asset ra tio
Scenario 20 percent 50 percent 70 percent
dollars
WEAK PRICES
Net farm incorae
1986 (i»5.975) (79,638) (102,080)
1987 (it9.955) (87,826) (113.073)
1988 (52,720) (95.325) (123,728)
1989 (5H,^39) (102,369) (131.322)
Net worth
Initial 7l8,lijb 118,837 269.302
1986 657,165 351.199 152,222
1987 597,210 256,373 29.119
1988 534,190 151,018 (101.579)
1989 J<70,051. 38,679 (218,901)
Ending
debt-to-asset ratio 38 percent 95 percent 133 percent
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income
1986 (25,965) (59.628) (82.070)
1987 (2H,330) (62.200) (87,117)
1988 (23#597) (66.202) (91,605)
1989 (19.8'<6) (67,776) (99.729)
Net worth
Initial 718,11)0 118,837 269.302
1986 677,175 371.209 172.232
1987 612,815 302,009 71.785
1988 609.218 225, 807 (29.820)
1989 579,102 118,031 (139.519)
Ending
debt-to-asset ratio 21 percent 81 percent 1 1 8 percent
HIGH PRICES
Net farm Income
1986 18,839 (11,821) (37.266)
1987 23,698 (13.198) (38.115)
1988 30,017 (8,837) (37.210)
1989 31.318 (5,185) (37,138)
Net worth
Initial 718,110 118,837 269,302
1986 718,553 115.587 213.610
1987 783.657 150,258 223.031
1988 827,533 160,671 205.011
1989 872,618 175,908 188.328
Ending
debt-to-asset ratio 8 percent 16 percent 79 percent
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Although It is not illustrated in the
above examples, the ability of farm op-
erators to achieve above average yields
and below average costs of production
is also critical for their survival and
prosperity. Although farmers may be
able to do little about the general
level of prices, they can improve their
marketing skills to achieve above aver-
age prices". Clearly, efficiency is one
key to surviving and prospering in pro-
duction agriculture.
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86-2/Food Security Act of 1985 &
Crop Production and iVIarlieting Plans for 1986
Althcfu^ you may have already taken steps to carry out your long-run
crop plans, it could be profitable to take a careful look at prices and
costs and the provisions of the new farm program — The Food Security Act of
1985 — to see whether some changes should be made in your cropping program
for 1986.
1986 Program Provisions for Feed Grains & Wheat
The recently passed Food Security Act of 1985 covers the 1986-1990
crcps. Ihe new act continues target price deficiency incoine supports,
diversion payments for set aside acres, ccaranodity loans and purchase
agreement features of peist acts. Essentially, the new act provides guide-
lines for gradually reducing the previous 1981 Act income and price supports
for major commodities, feed grains, wheat, soybeans, rice, cotton, peanuts,
sugar and dairy products — to market clearing price levels.
TABLE 1. Program Provisions and Payment Rates, 1986
Com Sorcrtium Barley oats Wheat
Required acreage reduction (% of base) 17.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 22.5
PIK diverted acreage (% of base) 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Maximum permitted acreage (% of base) 80 80 80 80 75
Cash land diversion (% of base) NA NA NA NA 10
Target price $3.03 $2.88 $2.60 $1.60 $4.38
Nine-month loan price 1.92 1.82 1.56 .99 2.40
Maximum deficiency payment rate 1.11 1.06 1.04 .61 1.98
Advance deficiency rate
Cash .31 .29 .28 .135 .55
PIK .10 .10 .095 .045 .18
Cash diversion payment rate .. $2.00
PIK diversion rate .73 .65 .57 .36 1.10
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The final pixivisions to be placed in effec± for geiining eligibility for
target price deficiency payments, diversion payments, and loans for each
specific comiicdity in 1986 are not ccnplete. At this time the Secretary of
Agriculture has announced the following intentions vMch can serve as a
basis for planning:
TARGET FKECES AND LOAN FRICES. For 1986 crop, the target prices will be
$3.03 for com and $4.38 for wheat, the same levels as 1985. Loan prices
will be $1.92 for com and $2.40 for v*ieat. Soybean loan price continues at
$5.02 price level but may be reduced by 5% to $4.77 if Secretary deems it
necessary. Deficiency payment rates are calculated as the difference
between the target price and the first five month average price received for
the conmodity. This payment applies to the effective yield production on
program acres planted. Producers may request 40 percent of the ej^jected
total deficiency in advance. Seventy five percent of this advance will be
in cash at time of sign-up and 25 percent in generic payment in kind
certificates that may be redeemed between May 1 and S^^tember 30. The vcilue
of advance payments per bushel of program production for com are $.31 cash
and $.10 PIK; for v^eat $.50 cash and $.18 PIK. To encouirage further
reduction in the production of program crops, the 1985 Act authorizes 92% of
full deficiency payments for producers v*io reduce acres of program crop
grown frcan 8 to 50% of permitted acres and plant those reduced acres with a
non-program or conserving crcp.
DIVERSICW PAYMEbTTS. Participants in 1986 feed grain and wheat programs will
receive PIK (payment in kind) payments for diverting 2.5 percent of their
feed grain and v^eat bases. The PIK certificates will be generic rather
than commodity specific. Producers v*io have price support loans on any
commodity are required to make loan collateral available to satisfy the in-
kind payments. The payment rate for the 2.5 percent paid diversion will be
$.73 per bushel of program yield for com and $1.10 per bushel of program
yield for vAieat. The payment rate for the additional paid diversion option
for winter wheat producers is $2 per bushel. Producers are eligible to
receive 100 percent of the diversion payments at sign 153.
ACREAGE AND YIELD BASES. The Act provides for the develcpnnent of acreage
base for all crops grcwn on the farm. The acreage base for determining
acreage reduction and payments for 1986 feed grain and vAieat crops is the 5-
year average 1981-1985 acres planted or considered planted, but not greater
than 1984-1985 average. The yield base is the average of 1981-1985
effective yields for each farm with the hi^ and lew year yields dropped.
REDUCED AND DIVERTED SET ASIDE ACRE REQUTREMENTS . To be eligible for target
price deficiency payments, diversion payments and commodity price si^port
loans for wheat, you must reduce acres of vtieat planted for harvest by 25
percent. The first 22.5% of the reduction is an unpaid acreage reduction.
The remaining will be a payment in kind diversion payment for idling 2.5
percent of the base. An additioncil 10 percent of the base may be diverted
and receive a land diversion payment at rate of $2 per bushel of program
yields on these acres.
-3-
Ihe feed grain program participants must reduce acreage by 20 percent.
Ihe first 17.5 percent of the reduction is an impaid acreage reduction.
There is a PIK diversion payment for diverting 2.5 percent of the base.
There is no paid land diversion for com, sor^um or other supported feed
grain crops in 1986.
The eligibility requirements for land to be set aside and the cover
crops to meet program requirements are likely to be the same as those for
1985 and previous programs. Winter vheat land diverted for the ceish payment
may be harvested for hay or silage. Grazing of conserving acres will be
permitted after the March-August non-grazing period.
CROSS OCMPLIANCE. Limited cross ccarpliance is required for participation in
the 1986 programs for feed grains and v*ieat by the strict language in the
1985 Act. Limited coirpliance means that to qucilify for program benefits of
one commodity, the producer must restrict plantings of eill program crops to
the base acres for those crops. Congress may amend the 1985 Act to remove
the cross conpliance provision requirement for participation.
PA^iMENr LEMrrATION. The deficiency and diversion payments will be limited
to $50,000 per person. Increases in deficiency payments due to cuts in the
loan rates below $2.40 for com and $3.00 for v4ieat are not subject to the
$50,000 limit.
SIOJ UP DATES. Wheat and feed grain sign up will be March 3 through
April 11.
CCMPARING CROP ALZERNAITVES. As a guide to selecting crcp combinations that
might optimize net crop returns in your farming operation, the contributions
of individual crcps at varying yields and prices are presented in Table 3.
An itemization of costs of producing alternate crops is presented in Table
2. The net return over variable cost indicates, in general, the effects of
acreage shifts without making a conplete budget of the v^ole cropping
system. For instance, a cortparison of the net return of $114 over Vciriable
costs from a 130-bushel com crcp sold at harvest for $2.00 per bushel with
a net return of $145 for a 45-bushel soi*iean crcp sold at harvest for $5.00
per bushel suggests that you shift some acres frcm com to soybeans if you
are not peirticipating in the reduced acreage program for com.
Similarly, in evciluating possible participation in 1986 program for
com, you should canpeire expected net returns frcm crcp production of one
acre of com if you don't participate with net returns from the conposite
com acre beise of .8 acre of com production, the deficiency payments on
.175 acre reduced and .025 acre with PIK diverted payment. Similarly,
corrpare the returns frcm not participating in the wheat program with the
combined returns from production, deficiency, PIK diversion and land
diversion.
-4-
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Table 3. Comparison of Crop Returns per Acre, 1986
Harvest Crc^
Production Price Returns Net Returns
or Base or Rate or Variable Over Vari-
Acres (bu. or ton) per Unit Payment Costs able Costs
.
CORN (Not participate) 1 90 $2.00 $180.00 $120.00 $ 60.00
Participate
Com .8 72 2.00 154.00 96.00
RAP deficiency .175 69.2 .90 62.30 3.50
PIK diversion (80*) ,025
1
2.1 .73 1.50
216.30
.50
100.00Conposite 116.30
CORN (Not participate) 1 130 2.00 $220.00 S146.00 $114.00
Participate
Com .8 104 2.00 208.00 117.00
RAP deficiency .175 100 .90 90.00 3.50
PIK diversion .025
1
3.1 .73 2.30
$300.30
.50
$121.00Conposlte $179.30
CORN (Not participate) 1 130 2.30 $310.50 $146.00 $164.50
Participate
Com .8 104 2.30 239.20 117.00
RAP deficiency .175 100 .60 60.00 3.50
PIK diversion .025
1
3.1 .73 2.30
$301.50
.50
$121.00Conpasite $180.50
CORN (Not participate) 1 130 2.60 $338.00 $146.00 $192.00
Participate
Com .8 104 2.60 270.40 117.00
RAP deficiency .175 100 .30 30.00 3.50
PIK diversion ,025
1
3.1 .73 2.30
$302 . 70
.50
$121.00Conposite $181.70
CORN (Not participate) 1 170 2.00 $340.00 $173.00 $167.00
Pewticipate
Com .8 136 2.00 272.00 138.40
RAP deficiency .175 130.8 .90 117.70 3.50
PIK diversion ,025 4.1 .73 3,00
$379.00
.50
$142.40Conposite $250.30
SOYBEANS 1 30 5.00 S150.00 $ 69.00 $ 81.00
45 225.00 80.00 145.00
60 300.00 91.00 209.00
WHEAT (Not participate) 1 54 2.40 $129.60 $ 30.00 $ 99.60
Participate
Mheat .65 35.1 2.40 84.25 19.50
RAP deficiency .225 33.8 1.80 60.75 4.50
PIK diversion .025 1.3 1.10 1.43 .50
Land diversion .10
1
5.2 2.00 10.40
$156.83
1.00
S 25.50Composite $131.33
DOUBLE CROP SOYBEANS 1 20 5.00 $100.00 $ 62.00 $ 38.00
WHEAT & DC SOYBEANS
Not participate 1 $229.60 $ 92.00 $137.60
Participate
Caiposite 1 $221.83 $ 65.80 $156.03
OATS 1 60 $1.00 $ 60.00 $ 52.00 $ 8.00
80 1.00 80.00 55.00 25.00
100 1.00 100.00 60.00 40.00
HAY 1 3.0 $60 $180.00 $ 72.00 S108.00
4.5 60 270.00 97.00 173.00
6.0
rtilizer.
60 360.00
machinery repairs and
127.00
fuel, dry
233.00
^ Includes seed, pesticides, fe ing costs.
and interest on operating capital only
The effect of participation in the 1986 feed grain and v*ieat programs
on farm returns depends vpon several factors. Ihree major factors are: 1)
expected market prices, 2) expected yields relative to program yields, and
3) the extent to which expenditures can be reduced by idling acres. Other
factors are the level of payments for idled acres, the opportunity returns
from land set aside for reduced and diverted acre program requirements, and
the value of advance payments in meeting cash flew needs. And in case of
vAaeat, another factor is the effect of participation on double crop returns.
The effect of varying levels of prices on net returns for 130 bushel
com is shown in Table 3. For the cotparisons of participation vs.
nonparticipation in the feed grain and v*ieat programs, it is assumed that
the ejqjected yield is 4.0% greater than the effective program yield used for
ccsrputing deficiency and diversion payments. The market prices for
determining deficiency rates are assumed to be approximately 15 cents
greater than harvest time prices.
At low price levels, net returns from participation exceed those from
nonparticipation. As prices received increase, the net returns for
participation remain unchanged because increases in value of production are
offset by Icwer deficiency payments. As market prices approach the target
price levels, returns for nonparticipants exceed participants because they
have larger quantities of grain to sell at higher prices.
At harvest delivery prices currently being offered to producers of $2
for com cind $5 for soybeans, a conposite com base acre under participation
in feed grain program iretums more than the return from an acre of so^^Deans.
The possibility of double cropping v^eat Icind with soybeans reduces the
advcintage of peirtipating in the vtieat program. However, the cross
conplicince requirements between program crcps grcwn on the farm requires
that producers ccmpare the coiibined net returns for participation on both
com eind vAieat crops.
Livestock producers considering participating in the program should
corrpare quantity of feed grains that cculd be raised on the idled acres
required for participation with the amount of feed grains that could be
purchcised with with sum of the expected deficiency and diversion payments
plus the crcp costs saved by the idle acres.
Producers should carefully budget alternatives to their situation
using worksheet AE-4543 Income Possibilities: Participation vs. Non-
Pzurticipation in 1986 Government Program for Com or Wheat. Copies of
this worksheet are available in county Extension Offices.
R. A. Hinton
Extension Specialist
Farm Management
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INCOME POSSIBILITIES WORKSHEET
Participation vs. Non Participation In 1986 Government Program for CORN
PARTICIPATC NOT PARTICIPATE
Eacanple My Farm E>cample My Farm
PROGRAM INFORMATION
1. Com acreage base 100 A.
2. Permitted com acreage (line 1 x .8) 80 A. 100 A.
3. RAP set aside acres (line 1 x .175). 17.5 A. XXXXX
4. PIK diversion acres (line 1 x .025). 2.5 A.
5. Program yield 125 bu.
6. Program production (line 2 x line 5) 10,000 bu. XXXXX
7. Expected yield 130 bu. 125 bu.
8. Expected production (line 2 x line 7)10,400 bu. 12,500 bu.
EXPECTED GROSS INCOME
9. Expected grain return
a. harvest sales 2,100 bu.
X SI. 90 =
$3,990
b. loans 10,400 bu.
X SI. 92 =
$19,968
c. stored sales or gain on loan . . 10,400 bu. 10,400 bu.
X $.25 = X $2.17 =
$2,600 $22,568
10. PIK diversion (line 4 x line 5 x
$-73) 228 XXXXX
11. Deficiency payment (line 6 x $3.03
- 5 mo. vrice ^S.IZ or max. $1.11). 9,000 XXXXX
12. Int. on harvest grain sales or loan
(line 9a or 9b x 12iK x 9/12) .... 1,797 359
13. Interest on advance deficiency
(line 6 x S.41 + line 10 x 12:^). . . 519 XXXXX
14. TOTAL GROSS INCOME EQUIVALENT AT
LOAN MATURITY (SUM LINES 9-13) . . . $34,112 $26,917
EXPECTED CASH EXPENSES
PROGRAM CROP
15. Fertilizer (line 2 x S58/A.) .... $ 4,640 $ 5,800
16. Seed, pest, etc. (line 2 x S45/A.) . 3,600 4,500
17. Machinery fuel S repairs
($34/A. X line 2) 2,720 3,400
18. Drying and storage
(line 8 X $.22/bu.) 2,288 2,750
COVER CROP
19. Seed and crop
(line 3 + line 4 x S8/A.) 160 XXXXX
20. ^fechlne^y fuel & repairs
(line 3 + line 4 x $12/A.) 240 XXXXX
OTHER CASH EXPENSES AND WITHDRAWALS
21. Interest on crop expenses
(sum lines 15 -20 x 12* x 6/12) ... 819 987
22. Interest on redeemed loan
(line 9b X 8% X 9/12) 1,198 XXXXX
23.
24. TOTAL CASH EXPENSES
(sum lines 15-23) $15,665 $17,437
INCOME ABOVE EXPENSES
(LINE 14 MINUS LINE 24) $18,448 S 9,480
NET ADVANTAGE FOR PARTICIPATION
(Column 1 minus Column 2) S 8,968
Prcpurcd by R.A. llinlon, Extension Specialist, Farm Uonoijcmenl. UnlTcrsltj of IlUnois at Urbttna-CtiampoJtn
AE-4543 Rertscd 19B6. The OUools CoopcrnUre Extension Scrricr r— ^t '--' -,.,! -r r -: • :-!• ! -i
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86/3 MHAT CAN BE DONE WITH LAND CONTRACTS?
From our survey and from a review of land transfers in Illinois, we have found that
25 to 35 percent of all bona fide farmland sales are financed on a contract between
the seller and the buyer. In the balance of the sales a commercial lender provides
part of the financing with funds secured by a mortgage on the property and mortgage
note. The latter transactions are described as cash or "cash to mortgage" sales.
Most contracts for sale require a smaller down payment than is required by commer-
cial lenders. The contract down payment probably ranges from 10 to 30 percent. The
seller has the incentive to accept less than 30 percent down in order to spread cap-
ital gains over the period of payment; otherwise the full capital gain would be due
the year of the sale. The incentive for the purchaser is the lower cash down pay-
ment and, often, a lower interest rate. In contract sales, payments on the principal
frequently have been small--as if amortized over 25 years or more--but the balance
for the full principal is due in a much shorter period of time, typically in S to
10 years. The final payment is referred to as a "balloon" payment because it is
much larger than the preceding payments. Some buyers accept the shorter term on a
contract because at the time of the sale they believe that when the balloon payment
is due they will have paid enough of the principal to get a commercial mortgage.
Other buyers expect the value of the land to inflate. When values inflate rapidly,
the balance due on the contract may become a small enough proportion of the new
value of the property so that a commercial loan can be obtained to pay the bal-
ance of the contract.
Unfortunately, it has not worked out this way for many buyers. Having bought land
on contract in the late 1970s or early 1980s, they now find that the balance due is
more than the land is worth in today's market. Some buyers cannot pay the 5- or 10-
year contracts coming due or already due. Other contract buyers are finding it dif-
ficult or impossible to continue meeting the scheduled payments.
In most cases sellers do not want the land back or they would not have sold it in
the first place. Buyers do not want to lose the land because it has already cost
them a significant amount of money--their initial down payment and subsequent pay-
ments over the years. Furthermore, they have probably integrated the land into
their farming operations and perhaps even expanded their farm machinery or labor
force to handle the extra acreage. Therefore, both the sellers and the buyers are
motivated to sit down across the kitchen table and work out arrangements to adjust
the contract.
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Ihe seller might have been better off to have sold for cash and reinvested the
money (assuming the investment was a good one) , but that past decision cannot
be changed. Probably the lowest contract payment that a seller will now accept
equals the amount he could get in net rent if the land were returned. So the
range for renegotiating payments is from the rent level to the contract level.
Sellers do not like to forgive part of the payment or lower payments unless they
get some compensation in return. This compensation may include increasing the
length of the contract or adding some of the current forgiveness to the end of
the contract. Some contract purchasers have been able to reach an agreement with
sellers in which the contract is lengthened and the current payments are renegoti-
ated to a more manageable level. Some cases have tied future changes in payment
to the land price index or to the index of prices received by farmers. In those
cases, buyers can continue to handle their payments but sellers will share in gains
if and when land prices or commodity prices go up. Another method has been to re-
duce payments to a realistic level, lengthen the contract, and add the amount from
the reduced payments to the remaining principal. Yet another method is simply to
lengthen the contract until the land is paid off.
Generally each contract is different: the personalities, financial positions, and
needs of buyers and sellers are different, as are the degrees of communication be-
tween them. Each case, therefore, must be negotiated on an individual basis. Ne-
gotiating a new contract agreement takes time and requires an understanding of the
positions of both parties. It may be helpful to consult a financial expert who
understands and can calculate the present value of cash flows and future sums. Buy-
ers and sellers should also check the tax consequences of any proposed changes, prob-
ably with a tax accountant. Negotiating a change in a land contract does not always
work, but it is worth a try. Do not wait to negotitate, however, until the contract
is in default.
U>.ru^
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86-4/Farms and Rural Communities
March 1986
The current farm financial crisis has focused attention once again on the impact
agricultural trends have on rural institutions, small communities, and of course,
on farm families themselves. In many respects this is a replay of a familiar
theme in American agricultural history: the survival of fewer and larger farms
with an exodus of farmers and their families, consolidation or disappearance of
many rural institutions, decline in economic activity, and the "death" or decline
of many rural communities. The major differences between now and what happened
earlier this century are that the affected farming base is not nearly as large as
it was and that rural communities are not as syrabiotically tied to agriculture as
they once were. Rural communities have been able to adapt and diversify over the
years, and agriculture is no longer the keystone of the rural economy. As a re-
sult, it is much more difficult to predict the effect of the current farm crisis
on the rural community as a whole. Much will depend on how closely the nonfarra
I
economy is linked to agricultural production and income. This report examines the
relationship between agriculture and rural communities, and some of the ways
changes in agriculture have affected rural Illinois.
I RURAL COMMUNITIES IH HISTORY
Small, rural communities are liberally scattered across the midwestern land-
I
scape. As a region, the Midwest leads the nation with about 6,000 of these com-
I
munities. Illinois, which has close to 900, ranks near the top of the nation in
the number of such communities. The circumstances surrounding their origins
involve a wide range of motivational, historical, and accidental causes. Many
small communities sprang up from a grass-roots desire to keep government small and
more responsive to the public, and to maintain a feeling of community among their
residents. The formation of a new community was one way of ensuring
"smallness." Many other rural communities were the result of numerous speculative
ventures, a population expansion, or the location of transportation routes.
Whatever their origins, a common thread unified rural communities: their intimate
relationship with agriculture. Rural communities arose mainly to serve the hun-
dreds of thousands of farmers and their families across the state. When agricul-
ture was made up of numerous small family farms, and transportation was difficult,
it was inevitable that the life of a community would be closely meshed with its
ability to meet the needs of farm families. Today if they still exist, rural
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communities that are tied solely to agriculture are quickly becoming extinct.
Many farms have disappeared, and the functions of small communities have changed
as a result of increased mobility, better transportation, and employment in off-
farm Jobs.
The plight of many small communities is well known. Technological change in agri-
culture, the introduction of automobiles, and the development somewhat later of a
well-developed road system rendered obsolete many of the functions rural communi-
ties typically performed while the growth of cities exerted a "pull" on the resi-
dents of rural areas. For the better part of the past five decades there has been
a steady stream of migrants from farms and small towns who have gone to work or to
school in the bigger cities of the state and region. For a large part of the
history of Illinois, rural communities have not fared well. For many, decline has
been the order of the day.
It is not true, however, that all rural communities have declined, or been "left
behind." Some have grown because they have had access to transportation; others
because they were located near a city or larger town, or in an attractive, scenic
area of the state. In fact, over the years many rural communities have grown so
quickly that they have become small cities and larger urban towns. Countless
other rural communities have held their own because of state and local efforts to
bring In new employment and to improve the types of services and facilities people
have come to expect as part of everyday life. Remarkably, these rural changes
occurred when off-farm migration was high, when some farms were disappearing, and
other farms were growing in size.
The lists below show some of the major forces affecting rural communities. On the
left are some of the "negative" forces that have weakened rural communities; the
right side shows some of the more "positive" forces that have contributed to their
growth and stability. Not meant to be exhaustive, these lists show that multiple
influences, both "plus" and "minus," have been shaping rural communities In
Illinois and elsewhere.
• Technological change
in agriculture
• Rural
industrialization
• The "pull" of cities
on rural people,
especially youth
• Improvements in the
quality-of-llfe in rural areas
• Changes In rural
consumer preferences
• Improvements In
transportation
• Emphasis on higher
education among rural
youth
Rural
(-) Communities (+)
• Increased importance attached
to recreation and leisure
• Changed perceptions of
urbanltes about rural living
• Creation and decentralization
of institutions of higher
education
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RURAL FARM AND NONFARM POPULATION TRENDS
The trend in agriculture toward fewer, larger farms has been extensively docu-
mented. This trend has resulted in a dramatic decline in the number of people
living and working on farms. Figure 1 shows what has happened since IQtO, when
the farm and rural nonfarra populations were nearly equal in size. Exactly a third
of the number of people living on farms in 1940 did so in 1980. If data for the
last few years were available, they would show even further losses in farm popula-
tion, although these losses would not be as dramatic as those in the 191)03 and
1950s.
tcv^cin,xjf, luiaj. aicao iiavc c A pel' i eiiueu d net in-migration 01 people I rom uroan
areas: between 1970 and 1980 the number of rural people actually increased aft
three consecutive decades or more of decline. The effect of this trend will be
make rural Illinois even more diverse over the years.
It is apparent that the loss of farms and farm people in the rural areas of Illi-
nois has not led to much overall loss in rural population. In fact one might
argue that, demographically, rural Illinois is holding its own over the past
several decades, despite the enormous losses in farms and farm people. Table 1
shows this stability in the rural nonfarm population. The rural population is
I
presently what it was in 1910, 1 iJ percent of the state's population with little
variation from decade to decade.
Table 1. Residential Distribution of Illinois's Population
,
19'^0 to 1980
Residence of
population, Year
percent 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980
Urban
Farm
Nonfarm
7H
12
in
78
9
13
81
6
in
83
13
83
3
11)
IGRICULTURAL IMPACT ON RURAL AREAS
To argue that farm trends have not affected rural areas, or urban areas for that
matter, is to ignore the central fact that the loss of farms involves a lot more
than simply reducing the number of people in the countryside. It involves a re-
distribution of people from farms in the countryside to cities and more densely
populated rural communities--an absolute loss of people In agriculture-dependent
rural areas. The loss of these farms also entails the consolidation of schools,
the loss of businesses serving farmers, the closing of churches, and an "aging" of
the rural population as younger people leave.
2.5
1
;§ 1
c
o
I 1,
Total rural ^^
Rural nonfarm.
Farm
5 -
-
.5 -
1940 1950 1970 19801960
Year
Figure 1. Trends in the composition of rural populations, 1940 to 1980.
Large declines =
Moderate declines
Small declines =
Figure 2. Farm losses, 1950 to 1978 (excluding Cook County)
The lack of data recording many of these effects makes them no less real. The
evidence is all around in the form of closed buildings and businesses, deserted
main streets, and abandoned farms, as well as in the statistics, which reveal that
there are more elderly people and higher levels of poverty in rural areas. In
|i some rural areas of Illinois one in every four or five persons is over 65 years of
age; in some areas a third of all the people live below the poverty level. Many
of these developments can be traced directly or indirectly to changes in agricul-
ture over the past several decades.
Farm losses have influenced the growth and economic life of rural communities.
Unquestionably, over the past several decades many rural communities have lost
population, and in all except a few counties, there have been large-scale losses
in the number of retail establishments. Both of these trends have been paralleled
by a dramatic reduction in farms in all areas of the state (Figure 2). For ex-
ample, between 1950 and 1978 there has been an overall i\() percent reduction in
farms. Likewise, there has been an overall 12 percent decrease in retail estab-
lishments statewide (excluding Cook county).
I
These trends are not in question. What is in question is how closely they are
related to trends in agriculture. Is the loss in farms closely linked to either
population loss in rural communities or declines in retail establishments? The
answer to both questions is that over the thirty years or so covered in our data
there is but a minimal relationship between farm losses at the county level and
either rural community decline or loss of retail establishments. This can be seen
in Table 2 where counties are categorized by the magnitude of their farm losses
(between 1950 and 1978) and examined against changes in retail establishments and
the proportion of rural communities losing population during the last three
decades. Counties with "large declines" in farms had a high percentage of rural
communities losing population between 1950 and 1950, but since then, these coun-
ties have not had substantially different, adverse effects on the decline of rural
I communities. These as well as other data suggest that the magnitude of farm
losses does not have the effect on the loss of population in rural communities
that many assume.
Table 2. Illinois County Farm Losses, Rural Community Decline and Retail Loss
Percent change in Percent of rural communities
County level farm retail establishments, losing population
I
losses, 1950-1978^ 19t8-1977 1950-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980
Large declines (N=16)^ -21 70 38 22
Moderate declines (N=H6) -13 36 29 2H
Small declines (N=39) -15 3^ 28 26
^Excludes Cook county. '
~~~~~
Large declines are greater than 2 percent per year; moderate declines range from
1.5 to 2 percent per year; and small declines are less than 1.5 percent per year.
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A Similar finding comes from our examination of farm losses in relation to changes
in retail establishments in Illinois counties (excluding Cook county). Counties
that had large average annual farm losses also had higher losses in retail estab-
lishments. Again, however, the relationship is not very strong, thus forcing the
conclusion that the magnitude of farm losses over time is not closely linked to
changes in the number of retail establishments. What appears to be related to
gains in retail establishments is either the presence of a large urban center or
the presence of a state university in the county. Fifteen of the sixteen counties
experiencing increases in retail establishments fit one or the other of these
categories.
Forces other than agriculture have come to play an important part in rural
areas. A recent study of rural communities has shown, for example, that contrary
to popular perceptions, few, if any, rural communities have actually "died out."
In fact, there are more rural communities today than thirty years ago, and many
others have grown so fast that they are no longer defined as "rural" by the Census
Bureau. That study also pointed out the influences on rural communities of the
expansion of transporLation--e3pecially the interstate system--the growth of
larger towns in rural areas, and the growth of nearby cities. Rural communities
located near good highways, near larger urban centers, and within easy commuting
distance of cities have fared well over the years.
Agriculture has had an impact on rural communities, their business life, and their
growth, but this impact has been reduced over time because relatively few jobs are
agriculturally related. Of all the leading agricultural states, fewer jobs are
related to agriculture in Illinois than in any other midwestern state. With 22
percent, Illinois ranks next to last in the number of jobs related to agriculture,
surpassing only California, which has 18 percent. Nonfarm jobs greatly outnumber
farm jobs, and even farmers are dependent on the money they make when they are off
the farm. It is one of the small ironies of history that the survival of many
farms has been due to the adaptation and diversification of rural economies in the
face of massive, historic agricultural changes.
Prepared by Andrew J. Sofranko, Professor, Community Development, Agricultural
Economics and Thomas Makowski, Graduate Research Assistant, Agricultural
Economics.
(^<^<^<JCeK.^L,<^C^
^^fjo-^,-,,^
Issued by, R.P. Kesler, Extension Specialist, Farm Management
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86-5/GENERAL ECONOMIC FACTORS THAT AFFECT AGRICULTURE
April 1986
Some of the dark clouds that have been hanging over agriculture are rolling back
as many very positive elements in the general economy begin to affect it.
INTEREST RATES
Recently we have had one of the sharpest declines in interest rates that we can
recall. Government long-term bonds— those that require more than five years to
mature— produced an average yield of 13-7 percent in July of 198'<; last week the
best available government bond yields were under 8.0 percent: this represents a
decline of over iJO percent. Other countries are lowering interest rates. Some
analysts believe that long-terra government bond rates could go as low as 7 per-
cent. There has been a lag in the decline of mortgage rates, but now they are
also dropping, with some already in single digits for the first time since 1979.
A decline in mortgage rates should signal a comparable increase in capital values
if income to the same physical unit of capital--an acre of land, for instance--
remains the same. This decline in interest rates will reduce the cost of farm
operations and of carrying land for those with farm mortgages.
ENERGY COSTS
!j Oil prices have dropped drastically; these pr
the pumps. Bulk fuel in New York is now down
line. Direct suppliers to large-capacity con
55 to 65 cents per gallon. Recent fuel costs
I
1985 were $12 or more, but these costs should
less. This development would also help farme
in the cost of fuel should have other positiv
herbicides, and insecticides should come down
feed stock for the nitrogen and chemical indu
the lower cost of energy as it works its way
cost of transportation is a major expense bot
agriculture, this cost should come down as we
THE RATE OF INFLATION
ices should soon be transmitted to
to 41 cents per gallon on gaso-
sumers are quoting diesel fuel from
per acre on grain farms in 1984 and
drop to around $7 per acre or
rs cut operating costs. The decline
e effects; for example, nitrogen,
in price because oil and gas are th«
stries. Returns should benefit from
through the economy. Because the
h on the input and product side of
11.
During an inflationary cycle, farmers are often better off at the beginning of the
cycle, but as inflation continues, production costs rise and frequently leave
farmers worse off than before. In a more stable economy, the techniques Involved
in managing a business can be applied better. The rate of inflation has now been
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below H percent for four years--froni 1982 through 1985. Some economists are now
forecasting a rate below 3 percent in 1986, due in large part to the drop in the
cost of energy. This drop will benefit the cost side of farm operations. But if
inflation no longer becomes a factor in the psychology of the market, the markets
for machinery, land, and commercial property will be negatively affected because
the hope of further increases in prices will be dashed.
THE GENERAL LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
The number of people employed in the United States has never been higher, and the
rate of participation of the labor force (the percentage of people over sixteen
years old who are fully employed) is over 6^ percent, the highest rate ever. The
number of chronically unemployed (those out of work more than six months) has
declined since the fall of 1985 by 17 percent. For farmers with low incomes and c
resource base that is not large enough to generate higher income, it may be the
best time to seek alternative employment. Most farmers have many marketable
skills and a general reputation for good work habits and honesty. Age may work
against some. Relocation may be necessary. But even though psychologists have
found that changing jobs ranks high along with marital problems and the loss of
close relatives as a source of trauma, a change of jobs sometimes can make every-
one better off. A high level of employment also improves the demand for livestock
and other agricultural products.
THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR AMD THE BALANCE OF TRADE
The current national agricultural policy is predicated partly on the expansion of
grain exports as the value of the dollar declines. The rise of the dollar cer-
tainly worked against the United States in the early 1980s, but the opposite does
not necessarily follow. The value of the dollar has declined about 25 percent
over the past year against most European currencies. It is true that many of
these countries are grain importers, especially of soybeans or soybean products,
and a lower-valued dollar does reduce our prices in their currency; but the
currencies of some of our competitors— the grain-producing countries of Brazil and
Argentina, for instance--are declining against the dollar. This decline makes
prices in their currency higher for their grain exports. We know how difficult it
is for us to reduce production when prices decline. Is it safe, therefore, to
assume that other producers will reduce the supply that they put on the market
when their prices decline? The best scenario we should expect for exports is that
lower prices may increase the total demand over time and that we may be able to
hold our share of that increasing demand.
THE BUDGET DEFICIT
Many people are worried about the budget deficit. Reagonomics is a new name for
the Keyneslan economic policy practiced by Roosevelt and others. A budget deficit
during a period of unemployment pushes the economy toward full employment without
inflation. This is the economic situation that we are experiencing. When we
approach full employment--a3 we are now--def icits raise prices and interest rates,
so the deficit now needs to be reduced. A government surplus without full employ-
ment would cause recessionary conditions, and a rapid change in government spend-
ing, regardless of the level of employment, would probably cause substantial eco-
nomic changes. The deficit, therefore, should be reduced gradually.
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A BLACK CLOUD REMAINS
Agricultural surpluses have been the rule rather than the exception since the
beginning of this nation. Demand has outpaced supply only a few times: the Civil
War, World War I, World War II, and in the 1970s, when the dollar was devalued
against gold from $35 per ounce to $105 and then allowed to float as gold went to
about $150 an ounce within a year. We now seem to be back to the normal situa-
tion: contending with agricultural surpluses. It could be a long time before
demand outpaces supply at prices that will produce a profit for all the resources
now allocated to agricultural production.
Currently, many forces in the U.S. and world economy are very beneficial to agri-
culture: lower interest rates, a low rate of inflation, lower energy costs, a
record high level of employment, a deficit that will probably be reduced to some
extent, and the lower value of the dollar, which will not be a quick fix but over
a period of time should help exports. On the dark side, however, are agricultural
surpluses, which will probably put downward pressure on commodity prices. With
continual genetic improvements of crops and livestock, other improved technology,
and better management of farms, the American farmer will be able to produce an
ample supply of food for a long time to come. In the final analysis, is it not
better to be able to produce too much food than too little so that resources can
be allocated to benefit society in other ways?
Prepared by.
John T. Scott, Jr.
Extension Specialist
Land Economics and Farm Management
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86-6/COST OF GROWING CORN AND SOYBEANS, 1985
In 1985, the total cost per acre for growing corn in Illinois averaged $377 in the
northern section, $378 in the central section with the higher soil ratings, $3'<8
in the central section with the lower soil ratings, and $290 in the southern sec-
tion. The soybean costs per acre were $292, $296, $266, and $2k>i, respectively.
The total crop costs per acre were lower in southern Illinois because that region
has the lowest land cost in the state (see the accompanying table). The total
costs per bushel ranged from $2.21 to $2.52 for corn and from $5.22 to $6.21 for
soybeans. Cost per bushel decreased for corn and soybeans since 198^) because of
the extraordinary high yields obtained in most regions of the state. Variations
in total costs were related to weather factors, yields, and the quality of the
land.
The above figures were obta
by farmers enrolled in the
The samples included only f
nearly level soils in each
Farm located in 22 counties
in the sample for northern
about Mattoon to Alton are
counties make up the sample
tillable acres in northern
soil ratings, 673 acres in
acres in southern Illinois.
ined from Illinois Farm Business Records that are kept
Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association,
arms of more than 260 acres on the more productive and
area of the state; these farms are without livestock.
north and northwest of the Illinois River are included
Illinois. Farms from 36 counties below a line from
in the sample for southern Illinois. The remaining tt
for central Illinois. The sample farms averaged 635
Illinois, 631 acres in the central section with high
the central section with lower soil ratings, and 858
This summary includes some factors that farmers consider as costs of doing busi-
ness, but which some other sole-proprietor businesses may not. These factors are
not used as expense items on income tax returns. Examples include the charge for
labor on work done by the farm operator, a rental charge for use of all the land
(both owned and rented), and an interest charge on equity in the inventories.
NONLAND COSTS
For soybeans, soil-fertility costs were allocated on the basis of phosphorus,
potassium, and lime removals, with the residual cost allocated to corn. The seed,
crop, chemical, and drying expenses also included some commercial drying and stor-
age and the estimated value of home-raised seed. The costs of fuel, machine hire,
and repairing machinery were reduced for income received from custom work. The
labor costs included the cash value of hired labor, plus a charge for available
unpaid labor at a rate of $1,150 per month. The building and storage costs used
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were for repairs and depreciation only. The nonland interest charge in 1985 was
11 percent on the average of half the inventory value of crops at the beginning
and at the end of the year, plus the depreciated value of machinery and buildings,
plus half the total operating expenses. Overhead costs included insurance, utili-
ties, the farm share of automobile expenses, and miscellaneous items. No charge
has been made in this analysis for management. This charge might normally be
about 5 percent of the total cost per bushel, or 15 cents for corn and 30 to 35
cents per bushel for soybeans.
LAND COSTS
These costs included the adjusted net rent and the real estate taxes. Net rent
was represented as the average received by crop-share landlords as reported on
recordkeeping farms for the four-year period from 1981 to 1985. Caution is needed"
in interpreting differences in land costs between areas. In the long run, the
changes in the net rent residual return to landowners should tend to equalize the
total costs of production between areas.
COST PER BUSHEL
Cost per bushel declined in 1985 from 1981 for both corn and soybeans mainly be-
cause of record high yields for both corn and soybeans. Corn yields averaged 13
to 31 bushels per acre higher than the 1982-1985 average; soybean yields averaged
5 to 10 bushels per acre higher. Total costs per acre dropped 1 to 5 percent for
corn and 3 to 7 percent for soybeans.
Current corn and soybean selling prices continue to stay below the average total
cost of production, using 1985 total costs and average yields for the period from
1982 to 1985. For an owner-operator with these yields, it would take from $1.01
to $1.28 a bushel for corn, and from $1.82 to $2.33 a bushel for soybeans to cover
the variable costs listed in the table. But to recover total costs, it would take-
from $2.68 to $2.86 a bushel for corn and from $6.33 to $6.95 a bushel for soy-
beans.
In 1985 record yields in many areas of the state brought the total cost of produc-
tion closer to the market price, especially for corn. Looking ahead, we see that
current market prices are considerably lower than the total cost of production,
based on average yields for the period from 1982 to 1985. There continues to be
pressure to adjust production costs. These adjustments come primarily through
land values because land is a residual claimant of returns over the most relevant
costs. The future could continue to bring pressure for lower land values and
lower cash rents.
To compute the break-even cost per bushel for growing corn and soybeans, individ-
ual tenants and landowners need to divide the costs and yields shown in the table
.
as they are shared by the terms of the lease. As land values drop, the charge foP;
the use of land tends to drop until total costs to produce corn are in line with
expected price levels.
^O^ ^/.^^ D.H. Lattz, Extension Specialist Farm Management
tits Per A cre for Growing Corn and Soybeans in 1985 on Illinois Grain Farms with No Livestock
Corn Soybeans
North Central" Central" South North Central^ Central'' South
uber of farms,
ces in crop. .
.
300
370
512
307
227
331
233
329
300
210
512
283
227
287
233
382
lOLlND COSTS
aiable costs:
Sil fertility
Psticides
Sed
Dying and storage
Rpairs, fuel, and hire.
.
otal, variable costs...
ercent change from 19814
fter nonland costs:
libor
Bildings and storage
Mchinery depreciation...
Nnland interest
Oerhead
jOtal, other costs
otal, nonland costs. . . .
ijercent change from 1981
4D COSTS
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otal land cost
XKL ALL COSTS
' change from 1981.
.
.. yields, bushels per
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idland cost per bushel..
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, all costs per
$ 56
21
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16
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$ 145
$ 28
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35
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^
$ 127
$ 272
-11
$ 377
-1
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$1.81
$2.51
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9
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3'4
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$ 116
$ 262
$20 $ 22
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$ 105 $ 116
$ 378
171
$1.53
$2.21
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$2.23
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33 24 26
$ 80
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$ 27 27 $ 28 $ 27 $ 26
10 10 5 5 5
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8 12 1
1
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11 8
$ 97 i 110 $ 93 $ 85
$ 228 187 $ 180 $ 170 $ 162
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$ 10 20 $ 22 $ 18 $ 10
52 85 91
$ 116
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r
52
$ 62 i 105 i 96 62
$ 290 292 $ 296 $ 266 $ 221
-5 -5 -3 -5 -7
115 17 51 51 38
$1.98 .98 $3.33 $3 .33 $1 .26
$2.52 $6.21 $5.1£ $5.89
ivrage yields for the
l^riod 1982-1985
(("land cost per bushel..
, all costs per
132 in
$2.06 $1.86
125 102
$2.02 $2.21
$2.78 $2.81
12
$1.15
11
$1.09
$6.95 $6.73
$
$6.33
12 33
05 $1.91
$6.79
JC[e1 Below "dash" line, the entries shown are costs based on average yields for the period from
1'
985.
il productivity ratings of 86 to 100.
11 productivity ratings of 56 to 85.
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86-7/The Financial Position of Illinois Farm Operators:
Cost and Returns From Crop and Livestock Enterprises
May 1986
BETTER NET INCOMES SLOW DECLINES IN NET WORTH
Data on net farm income from the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Associa-
tion (FBFM) can be used to estimate changes in net worth. On a cost basis, with-
out considering inflation or deflation of capital asset values, the change is cal-
culated by adding net farm and net nonfarm income as shown in Table 1 and then
subtracting withdrawals for family living and for income and Social Security
taxes. Using this procedure, the net worth of the average Illinois farm operator
increased by $1,240 in 1982, declined by $4,171 in 1983, dropped another $10,551
in 1934, and increased by $4,037 in 1985.
The total decline in net worth on a balance sheet based on fair market value would
be much greater if it included the change in land values during the period from
1982 to 1985. Net worth changes would vary greatly among farms and areas in the
state. This report is based on a summary of 3,980 Illinois Farm Business records,
which are kept in cooperation with the Illinois FBFM Association and the Univer-
sity of Illinois Cooperative Extension Service.
Net farm income is the accrued value of the operator's share of farm production
less total operating expenses, including the amount of interest paid and deprecia-
tion plus gain or loss on machinery or buildings sold. When added to net nonfarm
income, this is the income available for family living expenses, income and Social
Security taxes, long-term debt principal, and savings. Estimates used in Table 1
for net nonfarm income and withdrawals for living expenses and taxes
were based on a sample of 246 central Illinois farm families. The estimates bal-
anced all sources of farm and nonfarm funds with the uses of funds to identify
precise expenditures for these withdrawals. These expenditures were then adjusted
downward by 10 percent to reflect belt tightening that already occurred as an
adjustment to lower incomes and for larger than average farms in central Illinois.
CAPACITY FOR REPAYMENT OF CAPITAL DEBT
The average funds available for repayment of capital debt per farm family for all
3,980 farm operators were estimated at $24,632 in 1982, $20,152 in 1983, $13,851
in 1984, and $27,840 in 1985 (see Table 1). These were the funds estimated to be
available for capital purchases and principal payments on long-term debt. The
table shows actual dollar commitments per farm that were made for capital pur-
chases of machinery, equipment, or buildings. Note that in 1982 and 1983, these
commitments would have almost depleted all of these funds and that in 1983 these
commitments were greater than funds available for capital debt repayment. For the
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The records show funds available for repayment of debts have varied greatly among
areas in the state. Estimated changes in net worth in 1985 showed positively for
central Illinois and negatively for southern and northern Illinois. All areas of
the state except the tip of southern Illinois showed positive changes in net worth
as compared to 1981.
INTEREST PAID AS A PERCEMT OF GROSS
In 198'*, 73 percent of the FBFM farm operators had positive net farm incomes
with cash interest payments less than 20 percent of the gross farm returns. The
27 percent with interest payments exceeding 20 percent of the gross had negative
net farm incomes and could be expected to have problems with cash flow. The 8
percent paying more than 35 percent of the gross for interest had negative net
farm incomes averaging $10,520 per farm. This group could be expected to have
difficulty maintaining a farm business without off-farm income. The percentage of
farms having negative farm incomes in 1985 should be less than in 1981. Net farm
incomes were higher in 1985 than in 1981 because of record yields in many areas of
the state. Highest net farm incomes were reported in the central part of the
state.
Table 1. Estinated Change in Net Worth and Capacity for Repayment of Capital Debt
for 3,980 Illinois Far« Operators
All Illinois counties
1982 1983 1981 1985
Net farm income $19,510 $16,627 $ 8,621 $22,037
+ Net nonfarm income^.... 8,202 6,873 9,208 7,500
- Family living expenses" 22,l80 23,315 21,012 22,000
- Income and Social Security
taxes'' 1,322 3,829 1,311 3.500
Change in net worth $ 1,210 $-1, 171 $-10,551 $ 1,037
Depreciation 23,392 21,326 21,102 23,803
Funds available for capital
debt repayment $21,632 $20,152 $ 13,851 $27,810
Capital purchases $22,835 $19,325 $ 15,711 $13,875
Cash interest paid $20,392 $19,127 $ 18,191 $18,863
"Actual amounts identified from a central Illinois sample of 216 farms for 1982,
1983, 1981; amounts for 1985 are estimated.
^Actual amounts identified from a central Illinois sample of 216 farms for 1982,
1983, and 1981 reduced by 10 percent; amounts for 1985 are estimated.
COST AND RETURNS FROM CROPS
Corn and soybeans are crops that make important contributions to net farm incomes
and the current financial status of farm operators. See Figures 1 and 2 for the
cost and return per bushel of both corn and soybeans produced each year from 1975
to 1985 on 500 central Illinois grain farms with high-quality soils and no live-
stock. In Figure 1, note that the total cost line for growing a bushel of corn
exceeded the average annual Illinois corn price line in five of the nine years
since 1977. The difference between the total of all cost and the total nonland
cost line is the charge for the use of land. The deficits indicate that profits
(returns for risk and management) had to corae from equities in capital, primarily
land, or other unpaid inputs, such as operator labor or debt-free facilities.
These low returns continue to bring down land values and force lower cash rents.
The variable cost line reflects the total of cash expenditures for fertilizer,
pesticides, seed, and drying, which are normally shared according to the terms of
the lease on rented farms, plus the cost of fuel, hire, and repairing machinery.
Other nonland costs include labor, depreciation, interest, buildings, and over-
head.
Total costs per acre in 1985 decreased slightly from these costs in 1984. The
record high yield of 171 bushels per acre on these farms resulted in a much lower
cost of production in 1985 than in 1981. With a normal yield of 141 bushels per
acre on these farms, costs per bushel are now averaging about $1.00 for the vari-
able cost line, $1.85 for the total nonland cost line, and $2.70 for the all cost
line.
Figure 2 shows the cost and return per bushel of soybeans produced on these same
farms from 1975 to 1985. The total cost line has exceeded returns as shown by the
average annual price line each year since 1980 with the exception of 1985. This
development reflects large soybean supplies and weak demand. With a normal yield
of 44 bushels per acre, costs per bushel are now averaging about $1.80 for the
variable cost, $4.10 for the total nonland costs, and $6.75 for the total costs.
Total cost per bushel can be expected to go down as rent for the use of land goes
down.
COSTS AND RETURNS FROM LIVESTOCK
Livestock also have been important to the current financial status of farm opera-
tors. The cost and returns per hundred pounds of pork produced annually from 1975
to 1985 on a sample of 94 farrow-to-finish enterprises with an average of 153 lit-
ters per year are shown in Figure 3. Except for 1982, costs have exceeded returns
each year since 1978. If average producers used large amounts of borrowed capital
and hired labor in the period from 1979 to 1981, they would have had little or no
cash left from this enterprise after paying the costs represented by line C.
Unless it was possible to use savings, to borrow from the equities in the crop
enterprise, or to borrow from a lender during this three-year period, the average
producer would have been forced out of business.
The average returns above the cost of feed and purchased animals from about 2,000
individual annual livestock enterprise records from 1981 to 1985 are shown in
Table 2. This is the return available to pay for labor, machinery, equipment and
building repairs, depreciation, livestock expense, taxes, overhead, and an
interest charge on all capital used. There is no profit until these costs are
Costs and Returns-Corn, Soybeans, and Pork
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Figure 1. Cost and returns per bushel of corn
produced on central Illinois grain
farms from 1975 to 1985. Soil pro-
ductivity rating, 86-100.
Figure 2. Cost and returns per bushel of soy-
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Figure 3. Cost and returns per hundred pounds of pork on farms with under
250 litters from 1975 to 1985.
covered. The returns for the past five years for all enterprises are less than
the total cost of production.
The high interest charges and excess supplies, along with only moderate demand for
livestock products, are important factors that contribute to the negative profit
margins of all enterprises. Livestock producers who use their own capial without
borrowed funds and those producers who are more efficient than the average farmer
have been in the best position to cope with these low prices and high costs.
Table 2. Returns above Cost of Feed and Purchased Aninals to Livestock Enterprise
Units from 1981 to 1985
Farrow Feeder-
to-f inish pig Feeder Dairy
hogs finishing cattle cattleYear herd
per hundredweight per cow
1981 $11.1^5 $4.29 $ S.^il $1,035 $ 1
1982 30.113 iS.iiO 19.65 1,0'43 ^7
1983 12.68 5.26 16.04 885 51
1984 16.72 10.98 20.39 995 21
1985 15.71 7.00 8.86 1,054 5
5-year average $17.60 $8.79 $13-67 $1,002 $25
Nonfeed costs, 1981-1985
Direct cash $ 6.35° $ 4.00^ $12.50° $ 320° $ 29^
Other cost 12.85° 7.00° 15.90° 725° 185'^
Total $19.20 $11.00 $28.40 $1,045 $214
^The feed cost for beef herds includes up to $60 of hay equivalent from salvage
roughage.
"includes veterinary costs, utilities, fuel, equipment and building repair costs,
depreciation, labor, and other nonfeed costs, including interest on feeder live-
stock, from Table 6, Farm Management Manuals from 1981 to 1985.
°Estimates of annual nonfeed costs are based on enterprise cost studies of opera-
tive units from 1981 to 1984.
This report based on the summaries of Illinois Farm Business records reviews the
financial status of Illinois farm operators over the past four years. Average r
farm incomes, although rebounding some in 1985, have been at very low levels in
the 1980s and represent a reduction in net worth gains made in the 1970s. Esti
-6-
mates indicate that between 1 and 6 percent of the farm operators each year for
the next few years may find their net worths too low to be able to stay in busi-
ness because of the lack of operating funds. Each operator, therefore, should
carefully monitor his or her financial position so that business adjustments can
be made in a timely and orderly manner based on an analysis of farm income, cas,.
flow, and net worth statements. Although these adjustments may be painful for
some, they may make farming more productive and profitable in the future.
He H. Lat(t/i
Extension Specialist
Farm Management
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana-Champaign
1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
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86-8/Economic Multipliers and Agriculture
The farm financial crisis has heightened concern about economic conditions in many
areas of Illinois, particularly in those -areas that depend mainly on the "basic"
(export) activity of agriculture. Agriculture is called a basic activity because
most of its output is not consumed within the county: crops are exported and
bring new income into it. The impact of the income received from the export of
crops and livestock spreads to other sectors linked to agriculture if this initial
farm income is respent in the local economy. Employment and income in those
sectors will increase both directly and indirectly by some multiple of the in-
crease in the agricultural sector. One economic tool used to estimate the eco-
nomic effect of changes in basic activities, like agriculture, is a multiplier.
BASIC ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
One way to analyze and understand the economy of rural counties
use the economic base method, which emphasizes the role of expo
generally significant sources of income in these counties. Ace
method, the economy of the county is divided into basic and non
is, those that export and those that serve the local area. It
nized that some sectors are actually mixed: much of their outp
county, but some is exported and draws income into it. Economi
county depends on the export activities of these basic and mixe
Agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and the federal government
considered basic sectors. The federal government is included a
sectors because it brings income into the county through social
government transfer payments. Construction, trade, services (i
and financial services), and state and local governments, are t
mixed sectors.
in Illinois is to
rt activities,
ording to this
basic sectors, that
is commonly recog-
ut remains in the
c activity in a
d industries,
are traditionally
mong the basic
security and other
ncluding insurance
ypically considered
Economic base analysis provides two types of information. The first describes the
structure of the local economy in terms of the distribution of employment or
income by sector, and the proportion of export activity in each sector. This
information helps in understanding the relative importance to a county of various
industries, like agriculture. Comparing the economy of a county--3ector by
sector— to the economies of similar counties reveals the nature and extent of
leakages of income and employment, which can be used in identifying and planning
feasible areas of economic development. The second type of information is a set
of multipliers for individual sectors of the economy.
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ECONOMIC MULTIPLIERS
The flow of money from export sales into an area may either leak from the area or
be respent locally. The portion that is respent for locally produced goods and
services spreads the benefits beyond the initial recipients to other local busi-
nesses. Further economic expansion of both basic and nonbasic area businesses
occurs as these firms and their employees again respend a portion of the money
locally. The total effect of a change in a basic economic activity, therefore, is
some multiple of the initial impact.
Economic multipliers may be derived by measuring economic activity in different
ways, but typically income or employment is used. An income multiplier may be
used to understand the total change in income in a county chat is caused by a
change in income from an export activity, l.ike farming. An employment multiplier
is useful in estimating changes in an area's total employment caused by a change
in employment in a county's export sector.
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of a multiplier. Suppose that iJO percent of all
revenue that a farmer receives from the sale of a crop to a buyer outside the
county is spent locally (within the county where the farm is located). This 40
CHX
Initial impact; $1.00
$1.00
.40
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Figure 1. How local respending multiplies the effect of export tales (from)
Lewis, Eugene, el al., £conom/c Mu/l/p/Zers; Can a Rural Communltf Ust
Thtm? Western Rural Development Center, Oregon Slate University,
WREP 24, Corvallls, 1979)
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percent would be received by firms, banks, and households in the area and by local
governments; the remaining 60 percent would leak out of the county as outside
purchases and investments and as state and federal taxes. Therefore, in addition
to each dollar initially received by the farmer (column A in Figure 1), local
respending generates more business activity in the county (column B). Of this 10
cents, suppose that 16 cents is again respent locally (column C) for additional
inputs by area firms and for goods and services purchased by their employees,
while 2k cents leaks out of the county as purchases of imports--good3 and services
produced outside the county. This respending generates an additional 16 cents of
business activity. The local rounds of respending continue until the amount re-
maining is negligible (columns D, E, and F). The total impact of each intial
dollar received from export sales (the multiplier) in this example is $1.66. This
number is obtained by adding the sum of the successive rounds of respending to the
initial dollar of export. sales ($1.00 + .ko + .16 + .06 + .03 + .01 = $1.66). If
farm sales were to increase, an increase of $1.66 for each dollar of increased
export sales could be expected. Greater local respending (and less leakage) in
any of the rounds would result in a higher multiplier.
Multipliers identify which industries generate the most local income and employ-
ment per dollar received from export sales. They are useful for estimating the
total local effects of a change in economic activity in a sector and can be help-
ful in planning for future demands for services from the private and public
sectors.
Because the amount and pattern of expenditures vary across industries, different
sectors of the economy have different multipliers. Several factors that influence
the size of a sector's multiplier are summarized in the accompanying table. The
size of the multiplier reflects the strength of a sector's linkages to the local
economy but not necessarily the importance of the sector. If the manufacturing
sector has a multiplier of 2.79 and the agricultural sector a multiplier of 1.68,
a greater percentage of income received from the export of manufactured goods is
spent locally. But the multiplier measures only the impact per unit of change.
Despite the larger multiplier for exports of manufactured goods, if agriculture is
much larger than manufacturing in a county, agriculture will be more important in
generating economic activity because of the greater volume of agricultural goods.
For instance, suppose that the agricultural sector of a rural county has an income
multiplier of 1.65 and that its total personal income for a year was $'JiJ , 1 1 2 , 000.
The total income generated in the county from agriculture would be about
$72,784,800 ($44,112,000 x 1.65). Suppose also that the manufacturing sector of
this county has an income multiplier of 2.79 and that income in manufacturing for
that year was $18,530,000. The estimated total income generated in this county
from manufacturing would be $51,698,700. Although the impact on the county of a
dollar spent in manufacturing is greater, agriculture generates more income.
MULTIPLIERS FOB THE ASSESSMENT OF THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHANGE
Multipliers are frequently employed to forecast the effect of a change in the
economic base of a county. For instance, if a county loses 6 jobs in agriculture
when two farms are taken out of production and if its agricultural employment
multiplier is 1.5, the estimated total impact will be a loss of 9 Jobs (6 x 1.5).

Factors Influencing the Size of a Multiplier'
Factor
Relationship to the size of the multiplier
Directly related Inversely related
Sector-related factors
"Leakages"
Degree of labor intensity
County-related factors
Population
Income
Geographic isolation
Highly labor-intensive
industries tend to have
high multiplier values.
Highly populated coun-
ties tend to have
larger, more diversi-
fied economies that
provide more opportu-
nities for local re-
spending.
Counties far from
major trade centers
tend to have relatively
high local purchases
and hence, higher
multipliers.
The higher the tendency
for a sector to pur-
chase inputs from out-
side the region, the
lower the multiplier.
Counties with a high
income tend to import
more than those with a
low income.
Source
:
Counties,
I
1981.
Thomas Mandelbaum, et. al., "Sectoral Output Multipliers for Rural
' Oregon State University Extension Service, EC1166, Corvallis, February
Several problems may arise, however, when economic base multipliers are used to
assess economic impacts. First, as a concept, a multiplier is usually valid only
in the short run. The value of a multiplier is estimated using data from a speci-
fic time period, and it reflects the structure of a local economy at that time.
j
But because technology, demand, and other factors change over time, multipliers
become inaccurate. Furthermore, there is often a lag between changes in basic
activities and their impacts on other sectors, so the full impact of a change may
be felt only in the long run.
I
Second, problems occur when multipliers estimated for a growing economy are used
I to predict changes resulting from economic decline. Multipliers for a declining
sector are frequently smaller than those for one that is growing. The impact of a
change in a declining sector, then, may be overstated if the multiplier for that
sector were estimated while the sector was expanding.
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Third, it is also important to realize that a change in export activity is not the
only factor affecting economic development. For example, in highly populated
counties with diversified economies, and in geographically isolated counties far
from major trade centers, linkages between industries serving local markets tend
to be underestimated so that multipliers are understated.
Economic base analysis provides two types of information: the first helps clarify
the importance of the industries in a local economy and helps plan for its
development by describing its structure. The second, a multiplier, explains how a
basic activity affects the economy of an area. Applied with caution, multipliers
can be used to estimate the total local economic impact of a change in the econ-
omic activity of an export sector and to plan for future demands for services from
the private and public sectors.
Prepared by Judy Hill, Regional Analyst, and David L. Chicoine, Extension
Economist.
..^i. cl^
Submitted by David L. Chicoine, Extension Economist
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86-9/THE WHEAT POLL
DO WHEAT PRODUCERS FAVOR MANDATORY LIMITS ON PRODUCTION?
Edward Smith, Extension Economist-Grain Marl<etlng and Policy
Mechel Paggi, Extension Economist-International Trade
James Richardson, Professor. Texas Agricultural Experiment Station
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• What does the Secretary of Agriculture consider to
be the cost of wheat produaion?
• What quantities of wheat would be sold if prices
were increased to 125% of this cost of produaion?
• How much will production need to be cut to
maintain the price at 125% of the cost ofproduaion?
• What mandatory supply-management options are
available?
• What are the consequences of continuing with the
current farm program?
These are not easy questions to answer. We consider
the following analysis reasonable, given available information.
What is the Cost of Producing Wheat?
There probably are as many answers to this question as
there are wheat producers. USDA, however, is required by
Congress to estimate the cost of producing wheat, feed
grains, cotton, and dairy commodities each year. Based on
previous USDA cost of production estimates, we estimate
Wheat producers in the U.S. will soon receive a ballot
•en USDA asking a question similar to that posed in the
t of this article. The poll is being conducted as one of the
Mirements of the Food Security Act of 1985 (farm bill).
T outcome of the poll, however, does not bind the Secre-
i' of Agriculture to establish mandatory controls.
The 1985 farm bill states, "Not later than July 1, 1986,
:i Secretary of Agriculture shall conduct a poll, by mail
aot, of eligible producers of wheat to determine whether
Liti producers favor the imposition of mandatory limits on
:i production of wheat that will result in wheat prices that
rnot lower than 125% ofthe cost of production (excluding
li and residual returns to management) as determined by
n Secretary." Only those producers who have grown
-iat in at least one crop year from 1981-1985 on a farm
/ha wheat base of at least 40 acres will be eligible to vote.
Although this poll is non-binding, it should not be
i:n lightly. Its inclusion in the farm bill reflects a growing
tnand for mandatory produaion controls by producers in
! wheat industry as well as other producer groups
rstrated by surplus production and low farm prices,
'iducers, therefore, must consider the many consequences
»ore answering this simple question.
This article explores the question of mandatory
iduction controls as well as other supply-management
i:matives and their consequences for wheat producers,
e purpose of this article is to provide wheat producers
• h information that should be considered in their decision
how to vote. Of course, the discussion in this article
uses on the implications of supply control and does not
;gest how a producer should vote in the poll.
fore Making the Decision
Most producers would like to have answers to a
mber of questions before voting "yes" or "no" on
indatory production controls. Some questions to consider
;lude:
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SPECIAL MOTK TO ILLINOIS FARHiaS
About 30,000 Illlnolt ftiBdt will
racalve ballot! tot thlt 1886 poll.
Sine* th« l«w p«riiilti only tho«» with
40 b«s« accai on tbalr fato to vot*.
imallei whaat srowar* ar* axcludad.
Bowaver. if a maikatlnt quota ahould ba
announcad, tha law raqulraa that all
farooars who graw whaat In racant yaara
would ba allslbla to vota.
All thoaa racaivlng • ballot ahould ba
tuta to axpraaa thalr viawi on thli
iiaua. Mora dlaoutilon on aandatoiy
acraaga control! Bin ba axpactad In
yaari to coma.
the national average cost ofproducing wheat (excluding land
and residual returns to management) to be about S3.23/
bushel. The objeaive of a mandatory production control
program, therefore, would be to raise the price of wheat to
about S4.04/bushel (1.25 times $3.23/bushel).
How Much Wheat Can Be Sold?
The answer to this question is vital to our analysis since
it determines the level of production necessary to sustain a
S4.04/bushel market price. Unfortunately, there is no
simple answer. The quantity of wheat sold at S4.04/bushel
will depend on a myriad of factors affeaing the domestic and
export sectors. Due to the importance of the answer to this
question, funher examination of these seaors is warranted.
Domestic Use
Domestic wheat utilization can be categorized into
three components: food, seed, and feed. As shown in
Figure 1, the major domestic use of wheat is in the food
sector. VC'heat for food use, however, has been virtually
non-responsive to price. Food demand, thus, would be
expeaed to decline only moderately to approximately 650
million bushels if price is increased to S4.04/bushel to the
farmer.
Seed use is a function of planted acreage and seeding
rate. The planted acreage will vary depending on such
faaors as grain needs, livestock grazing needs, wheat's use as
a cover crop on acres idled under government programs, and
wheat's importance in double cropping systems. For the
purpose of this analysis, we assume seed usage at 70 million
bushels, down 22% from 1985 levels.
Feed use has varied over the last several years (Figure
1) depending on the price relationship between wheat and
competing feed grains. If mandatory production controls
were implemented for wheat irrespective of the feed grain
seaor, it is likely that the amount of wheat used as feed
would drop significantly. For the purpose of this analysis,
we assume annual feed use to decline to 90 million bushels.
Export Use
Since the early 70's when the dollar was allowed to
float relative to other currencies, the export sector has
traditionally absorbed more wheat than the domestic
market. USDA's estimate of 900 million bushel :,
,,
1985/86 marketing year marks the first time since
:
that importers will demand less U.S. wheat thai
it
domestic sector. The decline in exports (Figure 1
occurred because of: a strong U.S. dollar, U.S.
support levels (loan rates) exceeding world market k
foreign competition, and a heavy debt load in many dev
ing countries.
The export wheat market is highly competitiv<
increase in the U.S. wheat price would place the U*
States soundly in the position of a residual supplii
conservative response to a U.S. price increase to $•
bushel would result in a drop in exports to 750 m
bushels.
This analysis suggests that the total demand fori
wheat could fall by 2 1% from 1 985 levels to approxim
1.56 billion bushels if U.S. wheat prices weresuppon
S4.04/bushel.
How Much Would Production Need to Be Cuti
In 1985, U.S. wheat producers harvested 2.43b
bushels from 64.7 million acres. Ignoring, for the mo>
record levels of carryover (Figure 1), the United i
would have to reduce wheat production by about 3
meet the 1.56 billion bushel demand estimated i
previous section. Further reduction would be necess*
the short run, if the wheat already in government st
were allowed to enter the market.
Assuming minimal production control pro
slippage (slippage is that portion of reduced acreagev
does not result in correspondingly lower production
due to idling the poorest land) resulting in a 39 bushel-
average yield, the projected demand of 1 .56 billion bv
could be produced on 40.0 million harvested acres-
43% of the wheat base for 1986. In other words, 57%
wheat base would need to be removed from grain pp
tion to support a market clearing price of $4.04/buJ.
What Mandatory Supply
Control Options Are Available?
Mandatory production control programs car
many forms. This discussion, however, will foo I
mandatory acreage controls and marketing quotas 11
analysis in the previous section applies to eit..er foM
production control. JUSDA may take the position that even if an i
whelming majority of the farmers vote in favj
mandator,' produaion controls, it has no authority to i
|
ment them. The 1985 farm bill contains author!'
establishing marketing quotas in wheat. USDA's po
could be that from a legal perspective, marketing co
(quotas) are not production controls. However,
conditions of a sufficiently overwhelming favorable
the marketing quota authority in the 1985 farm bill
still be utilized. Alternatively, Congress could enac
legislation authorizing acreage allotments or pro'
legal interpretation of marketing quotas as a to
controlling production.
fdatory Acreage Controls
Mandatory acreage controls or allotments would
o' wheat production on a specific number of acres
oed to each farm based on its share of the national
onent necessary to meet the Administration's supply-
irgement objectives. Acreage allotments were used
tesively in the 1950's and 60's and still exist in tobacco.
experience has shown that when acreage allotments
: ied, in the absence of marketing quotas, the program
irffective in limiting production to the desired level,
ners select their best acreage and farm the allotted
•ege more intensively. The result is increased produc-
wer acre, requiring further tightening of the allotment
f ure years.
If the Secretary determined, as in our analysis, that
'^(oi the wheat base would have to be removed from
ii production to meet the needs of the market at a price
S.04/bushel, farmers might only be allowed to plant
itt for grain on 43% of their allotted acreage. The
e.ion that immediately surfaces is, "What can we do
t)the idled acreage?" Allowances for use of the idled
rtge become extremely important to producers in
[(mining their preference for this type of mandatory
D;am.
The rules for transfer of the allotment are also very
prtant. If the allotment is tied to the land and non-
xferable, then the price of land tends to be bid-up. If
orients are transferable, then any profits resulting from
: .lotment will be quickly capitalized into the allotment's
li. Is the landowner better ofP The answer depends
»- on what he can do with his idled acreage. If the idled
rt can be profitably farmed, then the producer would
iiirom the capitalized value of the allotment as well as
irthe earnings on wheat. If the idled acres cannot be
l^d, the capitalized value of the allotment must be
K against the reduced value of land that cannot be
led and the cost of controlling weeds and erosion on
j'iled land.
Allotments tied to a specific crop tend to restrict the
7;r's abihty to adjust crop mixes in response to changes
ilative crop prices. If idled acreage is allowed to be
Med to alternative crops, furthermore, it could result in
Huses for non-allotment crops, thus tending to force
M producers to elect allotments for their crops.
The bottom line is that farmers are not automatically
t^r off from mandatory acreage controls. Whether they
:;etter off depends on the rules of the game and each
eific situation. At this point, we do not know the rules
iclr which mandatory controls would operate.
ajketing Quotas
lit is not surprising that the 1985 farm bill, under its
i« title, has a marketing quota section immediately
Uwing the section requiring the "Wheat Poll." A
a>eting quota is a mandatory mechanism which deter-
!i-s the quantity of a commodity that can be marketed,
^riational quota, set by the Secretary of Agriculture, is
«d on the quantity of wheal necessary to meet the
rcted market needs, taking into consideration domestic
and export requirements as well as emergency food aid
needs and adequate carryover stocks.
After the establishment of the national quota, the
Secretary would assign a marketing quota for each farm on
which wheat was planted or considered planted for harvest
during the 1981-1985 base period. The marketing quota
w^ould be equal to the product derived by multiplying the
farm's base acreage by its farm program yield and reduced
by the appropriate percentage necessary to bring national
marketing down to the level of national quota. Penalties
would be assessed to producers who marketed wheat
beyond their assigned quotas.
The Secretary has the authority to announce a
marketing quota for wheat to cover the crop years 1987-
1990. To implement a quota under the 1985 farm bill
provisions, the Secretary must proclaim the national wheat
quota by June 15, 1986. He must also conduct, by mail
ballot, a marketing quota referendum by August 1, 1986.
This referendum is separate from the non-binding poll
conducted in June, which is the topic of this paper. The
Secretary may proclaim that marketing quotas are in effect
for 1987-1990 if he determines that 60% or more of the
eligible producers, voting in the referendum, approved
marketing quotas. According to the 1985 farm bill, the
national quota could be terminated or adjusted in any
marketing year the Secretary determines there exists a
national emergency or there has been a material change in
the demand for wheat. Our analysis indicates that a
reduction in export and feed use demand would be likely.
Previous experience with supply control programs
indicates that marketing quotas are the most effective
means of controlling production because there is virtually
no slippage. Quotas are, however, hard to maintain
because of political pressure to increase the national quota
once it is established.
As was the case with acreage allotments, the use of
idled cropland is a big factor in a producer's decision to
favor a marketing quota. Many of the same consequences
may apply.
In the case ofmandatory acreage controls or marketing
quotas, the incidence of government involvement in
agriculture is high. In terms of taxpayer dollars, however,
mandatory programs are relatively inexpensive supply-
management alternatives.
What Are the Consequences
Of Continuing the Current Program?
The current program calls for voluntary compliance
in announced acreage reduction programs in return for
direct government income support (deficiency) payments
and access to price support loans. In addition, authoriza-
tion exists for a 45 million acre conservation reserve.
Voluntary acreage limitations call for different levels
of idled acreage each year, depending on the projected
carryovers. If carryover stocks are expected to exceed 1
billion bushels (highly likely for the next few years), the
annual acreage reduction requirement will be between
20-30% (20-27.5%) in 1987 of base acreage. If stocks are
expected to be less than 1 billion bushels, the acreage
reduction requirements would be not more than 20%.
The conservation reserve program provides for up to
45 million acres of land being taken out of production for a
10 year period. Available USDA data suggest that about
25% of this land (11.3 million acres) would have wheat
base. This is about 22% of the land that would be taken out
of grain production under a mandatory control program
that was designed to raise the price of wheat to S4.04/
bushel. The main question surrounding the conservation
reserve program is whether the money is going to be
appropriated to remove 45 million acres from production.
With potential Gramm-Rudmann-Hollings budget cut
restrictions on funding, this program could suffer.
Continuation of the current farm program would
likely result in farm level prices being determined by the
loan rate for the next few years. In addition, the presence of
large carryover stocks would likely lead to further reduc-
tions in the loan rate based on the loan rate formula in the
1985 farm bill. It would be difficult for the market to
absorb the expected 1.88 billion bushels of stocks on hand
as ofJune 1 , 1 986, with the acreage reduction requirements
called for in the farm bill. Voluntary acreage reduction
programs have never been a very effective tool for control-
ling production due to slippage.
A policy scenario which could lead to different price
results involves the implementation of a wheat marketing
loan by the Secretary, which is authorized in the 1985 farm
bill. Initial indications are that in rice, where the mar) i
loan is currently in effect, exports increase as market I
fall to the world price level. Government pay J
initially rise sharply, offsetting the fall in market
i
Once stocks are drawn down, however, market
i,
should rise above current levels. Regardless of wheth i
marketing loan is used, the current program w i
relatively costly to the U.S. treasury.
Conclusions
The "Wheat Poll," aUhough non-binding, coul
important implications for future wheat progranui
market says we have overproduced. Effectively nu
mandatory production controls provide an orderly-
get resources out of agriculture.
The decision to vote in favor or against man<
production controls is multi-faceted. Producersti
consider the short- and long-run consequences ofn
|
tory supply controls versus the current program. Th i
choice is between the current voluntary progran'
relatively high government costs and lower market k
and a mandatory program that costs less but could u k
relatively higher prices, lower export and feed de i
and considerably lower production. In any event, as i
political issue, it is important that farmers maki hi
preference known.
'y'-A^,^^ ^ ..^^.Jzt^^'^
Submitted by Harold D. Guither, Extension Specialist, Public Policy
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana-Champaign
1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
US DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE
AGR 10S
Official Business
Penalty for private use, $300
FIRST CLASS
CeS FARM ECONOMICS
Eindwi Stnrici
Urersity of Illinois
It rbana Champaign
Facts and Opinions
OCP«RTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS 61801
*
*
86-10/Intemational Markets for Corn and Soybeans
JUL 1 7 1986 J^ly 3, 1986
Since 1973. export markets have absorbed about one-quarter of U.S. corn production
and two-thirds of soybean production. In the last few years, low prices and large
carryouts of corn and soybeans have raised concerns that export markets for feed
grains will not be large enough to both absorb U.S. production and maintain farm
income. Corn exports in 198^1-85 were 25 percent less than their peak in 1979-80,
and soybean exports in 1981-85 were 35 percent less than their peak in 1981-82.
Total world market demand for both corn and soybeans has been sluggish. The total
world trade of corn has declined since 1980, and the total trade of soybean pro-
tein has increased only slightly in the last 5 years.
The 1985 farm bill lowered loan rates in a bid to recapture export markets.
Whether this lower price will increase export volume depends upon how U.S. prices
influence international prices and how import demand and export supply from other
countries respond to price change. Predicting this response is difficult because
each country differs and the mix of trading countries changes over time. This
newsletter looks at (1) the changes in our customers and competitors; (2) the ways
in which international prices are determined; and (3) the implications for future
U.S. exports and prices.
MHO IMPORTS OUR CORN AND SOYBEANS?
The composition of world corn demand has changed over time. The
Community (EEC) was a major customer during the 1970s, but recen
very little corn (Table 1). The EEC's Common Agricultural Folic
domestic grain production, leading to increased domestic supply
farmers' response to higher prices has been boosted in recent ye
agricultural research that has raised yields. Japan is now our
single customer and has recently taken one-quarter of our export
protects its agriculture but does not produce feed grains. Japa
have chosen to protect domestic livestock production and allow v
trade of feed grains to support the domestic livestock Industry,
another important customer, but Soviet demand varies widely with
sales to newly industrialized countries In Asia and Latin Americ
increasing importance.
European Economic
tly has purchased
y (CAP) protects
of grains. EEC
ars by European
most important
3. Japan also
nese policy makers
irtually free
The USSR is
production. U.S.
a are small but of
Regional exports of soybeans and soybean meal have not changed as much as corn
exports. The principal customers for whole beans are the EEC and Japan, while
soybean meal exports go to the EEC and other European countries (Table 1). In
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Table 1. Exports by Region, 1973-81 (Percent of Total U.S. Exports)"
1973 to 1977 1978 to 1982 1983 198H
CORN
Region/Country
EEC 3H 16 9 7
Japan 18 20 27 28
USSR 11 11 6 22
Other Asia 7 13 21 13
Other Europe 16 19 11 9
Latin America 6 8 16 10
Other 8 10 7 11
100 100 100 100
Type of Economy
Les3-developed 13 21 38 28
Developed 70 53 51 19
Planned 17 _26 11
.11
100 100 100 100
1 SOYBEANS
Region/Country
EEC 46 l|ii 38 31
Japan 21 18 20 22
USSR 2 3 2
Other Asia 10 12 ID 11
Other Europe 12 15 19 18
Latin America 2 4 6 10
Other 7 _13 18 22
Too 100 100 100
Type of Economy
Less-developed 8 13 18 22
Developed 87 80 76
6
71
1Planned
__5 7
1
100 100 100 100
SOyBEAM NEAL
Region/Country
EEC 60 53 62
10
Japan
USSR
3 3
Other Asia 1 4 6 1 8
Other Europe 23 23
1
12
14
10
20
Latin America t
6 12Other 7 7
100 100 100 100
Type of Economy
Less-developed
Developed
7
76
15
67
18
100
20
71
9
100
38
53
9
Planned 1 7
100 100
"^Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the Unitea
states
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contrast with corn, demand for soybean protein has remained high in the EEC be-
cause few domestic substitutes exist, and there are no import tariffs for
soybeans.
Domestic vegetable oils in the EEC are protected, so that some processors benefit
from importing whole beans and selling both oil and meal. This processing does
not meet the demand for soybean protein in feeds. Therefore, additional soybean
meal is imported into the EEC. Japan has protected its domestic soybean proces-
sors, confining import demand to whole beans.
Over the past few years, developing countries have taken an increasing share of
imports for both corn and soybean protein (Table 1) and this trend should con-
tinue. With rising income, many developing countries experience rapid growth in
the demand for meat and need increasing amounts of feed grains. Future growth in
the feed grain import demand most likely will occur In rapidly growing low and
middle income countries.
WHO COMPETES WITH US IN EXPORT MARKETS?
The U.S. has dominated total world trade in corn and soybeans from the late 1960s
to the present. Argentina is our most important competitor in the corn market,
but even in recent years, the Argentines have not supplied more than 10 percent of
the world trade (Table 2). South Africa supplies Europe small amounts of high-
quality corn, and Thailand competes in the East Asian markets. Subsidized exports
from France have increased in recent years with the growth in production under the
CAP.
Table 2. U.S. and Competitor' s Share of World Trade (Percent of Total World
Trade)^
1968 to 1972 973 to 1977 1978 to
CORN
U.S.
Argentina
South Africa
France
Thailand
SOYBEANS
U.S.
Argentina
Brazil
China
SOYBEAN MEAL
U.S.
Argentina
Brazil
Northern Europe
71 69 72
8 9 8
5 2
iJ 6 8
3 i| 5
84 86 76
9 5 12
3 5 6
1 1 3
37 29 22
3 7 12
39 38 37
18 19 18
^sources! fag, Trade Yearbook; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S.
''includes Belgium. Netherlands, Denmark, and West Germany. These apparent large
exports reflect trade within the EEC. Processors near the North Sea ports crush
imported soybeans and then export meal to other countries within the EEC.

Over the last 15 years, Argentina and Brazil have emerged as major competitors In
the soybean and soybean meal markets (Table 2), now supplying a total of about 15
percent of soybeans and 15 percent of soybean meal exports. In contrast with the
U.S., Brazil exports more soybean meal than soybeans.
Not surprisingly, the U.S. dominance of the world feed grain market has been chal-
lenged by countries in the southern hemisphere that have a similar climate and
abundant land. Recent studies by the USDA have shown that U.S. production costs
are low, however, and thus, the U.S. is likely to remain the market leader.
An additional and less obvious source of competition comes from within importing
countries. Most countries are reluctant to rely on the world market for a major
portion of their food needs because of a concern for food security. The high
prices and crop failures of the early 1970s led many countries to invest in agri-
culture and provide price protection to producers. Food production outside the
U.S. has grown generally at k percent per year, which is faster than population
growth. Many former food importers, particularly in Asia, are now self-
sufficient. This Increase in supply reduces the total world demand for grain.
¥HAT DETERMINES WORLD FEED GRAIN PRICES?
In any year, the U.S. corn price, reflecting domestic supply and demand as well as
government policy, sets the general level of world prices. Since the U.S. sup-
plies more than two-thirds of the world corn trade, competitors cannot charge
substantially more than the U.S. price, since importers would shift to the U.S.
If competitors charge less than U.S. prices, they do not have enough supply to
force down U.S. prices. U.S. soybean prices also determine world market prices,
but competitors in the soybean protein market have a large enough share to
influence prices when their production changes.
The domestic price for corn or soybeans in an importing country equals the U.S.
price plus transport costs, converted to local currency. Many importing countries
also impose a tax in order to Insulate their domestic producers from world
prices. Feed millers (and other customers) within an Importing country then
decide how much to import based on the domestic price. The total amount that is
imported will depend upon the surplus of domestic demand over the supply at the
domestic price.
Consider an example of imports into Europe. In February 1986, corn in Central
Illinois was $2.33 per bushel or $92 per metric ton (mt). Corn shipped from Gulf
ports was $2.62 per bushel, or $103 per mt. U.S. corn unloaded at Rotterdam was
$117 per mt after shipping costs. A levy (import tax) of $101 per mt was charged,
so the price in Europe becomes $217 per mt. When converted into German marks
(DM), the price is DM 486: the price that would be paid by a feed miller In
northern Europe.
The levy on corn imported into the EEC varies inversely with world prices in order
to maintain a high, stable price within Europe. Thus, changes in the U.S.
price are not reflected in the EEC corn price and do not alter import demand.
Soybeans,
Eur
Cei
$207 p«
is DM ij8'J in local currency
corn

-5-
This example shows that the U.S. domestic price or loan rate is only one deter-
minant for the prices paid by importers. The price paid by Importers will also
depend on the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar to local currency and on import
policy. Because the U.S. dollar exchange rate has fluctuated much more than
domestic corn or soybean prices in recent years, it has had a significant impact
on the prices importers pay, and therefore on import demand. The major exception
is the corn market in the EEC, where the CAP Insulates grain prices from changes
in world prices.
From 1976 to 1980, the dollar declined in value against the DM and the Japanese
Yen (Table 3). U.S. products became cheaper for our major customers, even though
U.S. domestic agricultural prices were rising. During this period, exports of
soybeans to the EEC and of corn and soybeans to Japan both Increased substantially
(Table 3)- From 1981 to 1984 U.S. macroeconomlc policy led to a doubling in value
of the dollar against other currencies. Corn and soybean prices converted to
foreign currency increased much more than domestic prices (Table 3). Soybean
exports to the EEC declined, while the rate of export growth of both products to
Japan slowed.
Table 3. Percent Changes in Prices and Quantity of Imports^
1976 to 1980 1981 to 1984
Corn Soybeans Corn Soybeans
JAPAN
Imports from the U.S. 85 31 15 6
Price
due to exchange rate
due to export price ($)
Total Price (yen)
EEC
Imports from the U.S. S** -33
Price
due to exchange rate -31 26
due to export price ($) 20 -2
Total Price (DM) -11 24
''SOURCE: United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricul-
tural Trade of the United States (various issues), International Mone-
tary Fund, InternatJonaJ Financial Statistics (1985), United States
Department of Agriculture, Grain Market News (various issues).
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE EXPORT POTENTIAL?
Recently, the dollar has declined sharply in value. The additional decline in
prices brought about by the lower loan rate in 1986 will lead to border prices
that are about 50 percent lower in 1986 than In 1985. This should stimulate de-
mand, particularly for soybeans. The Impact of these price declines will not be
seen immediately, however, because the world supply of grains is very large this
year, depressing the total world demand.
25 -26 8 8
11 21 n -2
H -5 12 6
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Unfortunately, the change in the dollar exchange rate will not discourage competi-
tors. Most of these countries have currencies that continue to devalue against
the dollar. Argentine and Brazilian producers will see some decline in price due
to the fall in the U.S. loan rate, but not as much as the decline in prices faced
by importers. Thus, most of the adjustment to the price change will be in import
demand rather than in foreign production.
It takes time for world supply and demand to respond to price changes. The cur-
rent price decline should have two long-run effects. First, lower prices make it
more expensive for the EEC to subsidize exports, putting pressure on the EEC bud-
get, and on policy makers to reduce agricultural prices. It is unlikely that the
EEC will dismantle its CAP, but perhaps EEC domestic prices will not rise as
quickly in real terms or the EEC will impose production quotas. This would lead
to a modest recovery in EEC demand for corn.
cond, lower prices should encourage industrializing countries with growing feec
ain demand to rely on imports. Long-run demand prospects for soybeans may be
tter than those for corn, because fewer substitutes exist for soybean protein.
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The U.S. will remain the world's largest supplier of feed grains, but the 1970s
rapid growth in world markets is unlikely to be repeated in the near future.
Prepared by Laurian J. Unnevehr, Extension Specialist, and Chris Gingrich, Re-
search Assistant.
Submitted by Laurian J. ''Unnevehr , Extension Specialist, Prices and Outlook
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana-Champaign
1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
POSTAGl AND FEESPAID
U S DtPABTMENT OF
ACniCULTUHE
AGR 105 U S MAJL
Official Business
Penalty for private use, $300
FIRST CLASS
Ag. Ecofi Reference Rooi A
305 Huiford Hall
1301 H. Gregory Dr.
CAHPUS HAIL
(I
05 FARM ECONOMICS
ilttM S«nrtct
niirsity of Hlinois
I loanaChampaign
Facts and Opinions
KPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS 61801
:m^
JUL 1 7 1986 July 1986
86-11/Farm and Family Sources and Use
of Dollars, 1982-1985, Illinois Farms
In 1985 the total, noncapital, family-living expenses of farm operators within a
group of 313 record-keeping farms averaged $21,235, or $2,020 per month per family
(see Table 1). The farms were located primarily in central Illinois. This aver-
age was unchanged from 1981, 3-9 percent higher than 1983, and 8.7 percent higher
than for 1982. Another $2,991 was used to purchase capital items such as the per-
sonal share of the family automobile, furniture, and household equipment. Thus
the grand total for living expenditures averaged $27,226 for 1985 compared with
$26,713 for 1981, or a $513 increase per family. Expenditures for capital items
increased $525 per family, while noncapital expenses decreased $12 per family.
How these families use their funds depends somewhat on the levels of net farm and
nonfarm incomes and the priority of the expenditure. In this sample, the 1985 net
farm incomes increased $12,101 per farm over 1981, but net nonfarm incomes de-
creased slightly from the record high levels of 1981. Most of the farms in
the sample were classified as grain farms and were located in a 15-county area
bounded by Jacksonville, Peoria, Champaign, and Mattoon. This area had excellent
grain yields in 1985, with many of the corn yields averaging from 160 to 170
bushels per acre.
Although the amount of interest paid per farm increased from $20,651 in 1981 to
$22,111 in 1985, there was no change from 1981 to 1985 in interest expense as a
percentage of farm receipts (11.1 percent) or as a percentage of cash operating
expenses (18.6 percent). Farm receipts per tillable acre increased $7; cash oper-
ating expenses, including interest, increased $1. Interest payments per tillable
acre increased from $31 to $35, while noncapital living expenditures decreased
l|
from $10 to $39 per tillable acre.Lv/ ^-v cu s'j? ycL i-xxxa^xc ovlv. Machinery and building purchases remained at
—low levels, dropping from $15,871 in 1981 to $15,589 in 1985.
Based on data recorded by the farmers and then edited by the Farm Business Farm
Management (FBFM) Association field staff, the sample of farms showed an average
debt of 63 cents for each $1 of farm assets as of December 31. 1985; machinery was
valued on a cost-less-depreclation basis. A year earlier the debt was 51 cents
for each $1 of farm assets. This debt-to-farra asset ratio would be lower
with machinery valued at a current market value. Bringing in nonfarm assets would
also lower the ratio.
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The farms in this sample were 63 acres larger than the average for the 7,500 farms
in the FBFM record-keeping program. Crop yields averaged about 5 percent above
those reported by the Illinois Crop Reporting Service. These factors, when com-
bined with the fact that the area sampled had the highest corn yields in Illinois
in 1985, resulted in the net farm income averaging $3,610 above the average of all
Illinois record-keeping farms. As long as this level of income persists, the
average living expenditures for farms in this sample are estimated to be 15 to 20
percent above the average of all Illinois farm operators having more than $40,000
gross sales per farm.
In 1985 the operators of these 313 farms averaged 13 years of age. The family
averaged 3.6 members, with the age of the oldest dependent child being 10 years.
They farmed 629 tillable acres, 119 of which they owned, or 19 percent of this
land. The operators kept records so that all sources of funds, both farm and non-
farm, balanced with all uses of funds in a complete monthly cash-flow accounting
system.
In the table, the averages per farm for total family living expenses are divided
into five categories for 1982 through 1985. The "expendables" category includes
cash spent for food, operating expenses, clothing, personal items, recreation,
entertainment, eduation, and transportation. Cash spent for capital improvements
exceeding $250 is not included. The value of farm-furnished meat amounted to an
estimated $200 average per farm. The use of a rented house on an estimated 10 to
50 percent of the farms in this sample is not included, since these data cover
only cash outlays.
The excess of nonfarm taxable income over nonfarm business expense was $8,721 in
1985, or 32 percent of the total living expense; in 1981 the excess was 31 per-
cent. It includes dividends on stocks, interest on savings and money-market
funds, income from other nonfarm investments, and income from off-farm work per-
formed by family members. Interest earned and left in savings accounts not in-
cluded in the cash flow is not reflected in the nonfarm income.
One of the more significant observations about this group of 313 farms is that
farm assets continued to drop while liabilities increased compared with a year
earlier. The value of farm assets on December 31, 1985, was $27,898 less than a
year earlier. The decline reflects the continued drop in land values. At the
same time, liabilities increased by $15,106. The $15,589, or $25 per tillable
acre, spent on capital purchases for machinery and equipment remained at about
one-half the level of capital purchases common before 1980.
The records from farm families with three to five persons were sorted into two
categories, the high-third and the low-third, according to their noncapital living
expenses. The total living expenses for the high-third group averaged $36,557,
compared with $19,685 for the low-third group. The high-third group farmed 309
more acres than the other group and owned 15 percent of the land farmed; the low-
third group owned 22 percent of the land farmed. The larger farms In the first

group had more incorae for living expenses and income tax. Net farm plus nonfarm
income was $36,025 for the high-third group compared with $28,054 for the low-
third group. The average age of operators in the high-third group was ^3 and the
number of family members was 4.1 compared with 39 years of age and 3.8 family mem-
bers for the other group.
Narrow profit margins are expected over the next few years because of low commod-
ity prices. It is therefore important that more farmers learn how to balance and
monitor their cash low each month. Computer program assistance is now becoming
available in more service centers such as some FBFM Association district offices.
These centers are prepared to offer services to help farmers project monthly
cash flows on computer printouts so that they can compare projections with their
actual results.
For farm operators with low equity or very high debt-to-asset ratios, this type of
accounting is essential. These operators need to account for all of their sources
and uses of funds to assist them in making sound financial management decisions.
The data summarized in this process may also serve as a guide in budgeting allow-
ances for family living expenses. For families in this sample, the family living
expenses totaled $43 for each tillable acre farmed. If the net nonfarra income of
$14 per tillable acre is used for living, $29 per tillable acre would have to be
generated from the farm business to meet family living requirements. Each family
must determine how much each acre of crop or each litter of hogs should contribute
to their family living. This amount, when added to production costs and other
obligations, can help to determine break-even prices needed for products sold.
Submitted by Dale H. Extension Specialist , Farm Management
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana -Champaign
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Urbana, Illinois 61801
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In response to a potentially serious problem, state and federal governments are
taking steps to reduce erosion. This newsletter highlights major changes as they
apply to Illinois farmers. First, we review Illinois's T-by-2000 guidelines and
use recent survey results from the 1982 National Resource Inventory to put the
soil erosion problem in perspective. Second, the conservation section of the Food
Security Act of 1985 is discussed. Finally, in the last section we discuss state
and federal conservation programs.
T-BY-2000: ILLINOIS EROSION CONTROL GUIDELINES
Passed in 1977 by the General Assembly, the Illinois Erosion and Sediment Control
Program and Standards law gave the Illinois Department of Agriculture (IDOA) re-
sponsibility to draft a set of erosion control guidelines that would bring soil
erosion to T (tolerance levels) values by the year 2000. T represents the maximum
annual rate of soil erosion that could occur and not cause a decline in long-term
agricultural productivity. On April 18, 1980, IDOA drafted State Erosion and
Sediment Control Guidelines. Over the next two years, local soil and water con-
servation districts (SWCD) adopted similar or more stringent guidelines. On
January 1, 1983, IDOA published state guidelines (Table 1). By 2000, all soils
should be at or below T, which ranges from 1 to 5 tons per acre per year, depend-
ing on soil type.
How does T-by-2000 affect citizens of Illinois? The 1982 National Resource Inven-
tory survey furnishes some answers. Excluding federal land, 35,137,200 acres of
land in Illinois are devoted to cropland, forest land, pastureland. and other
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Table 1. State Guidelines for Erosion and Sediment Control in Illinois
Land with slope 5 percent Other land
tons/acre/Yr
January 1, 1983 < 'J T (J< to 20 tons) < 1 T (H to 20 tons)
January 1, 19883 < T (1 to 5 tons) < 2 T (2 to 10 tons)
January 1. 1994 maintain < T < 1 . 5 T ( 1
. 5 to 7. 5 tons)
January 1, 2000 maintain < T < T ( 1 to 5 tons)
SOURCE: IDOA, "T by 2000." ~
'
~~
^Soll erosion should be reduced to T on gently sloping soils (soil with 5 percent
or less slope) where erosion can be controlled with conservation tillage.
uses. Total rural acreage comprises 31,935,900 acres. For all acres, annual ero-
sion equals 6.3 tons per acre; total yearly erosion equals 200.7 million tons.
The magnitude of the erosion problem by rural land use category is shown in Table 2,
To comply with T-by-2000 guidelines, 11.2 million acres require a conservation sys-
tem that uses one or more conservation practices. Less than two years away, 1988
guidelines suggest that 8,021,4^18 acres with a slope of less than or equal to 5 per-
:ent should be at or below T. Hence, by 1988, 90 percent of Illinois's rural land
should be at or below T (IDOA, "T-by-2000"); the remaining 10 percent, no more than
> T
)ne should point out that the Illinois Erosion and Sediment Control Program and
Standards guidelines are voluntary. A complaint process exists and any person or
{roup can file a complaint. Your local soil and water conservation district
Investigates complaints, offers technical assistance if guidelines are violated,
ind identifies cost-share programs to ease the financial burden. Failure to coop-
;rate within one year can lead to formal local meetings and a formal state meeting
jonducted by IDOA, with all recommendations being made public. The final step in
;he complaint process is referral of the case to the Illinois Pollution Control
ioard. If a link can be made between erosion and water quality, the board may be
ible to enforce the guidelines shown in Table 1. As of June 1986, 114 complaints
"iled at local SWCD offices never reached the public meeting phase. Land users in
ill cases agreed to follow conservation plans recommended by the local SWCDs.
'OOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985: PUBLIC LAW 99-198
"hree components of the act relevant to landowners are the conservation compli-
ince, "sodbuster," and "swampbuster" provisions. Landowners who violate any of
•he provisions are not eligible to receive commodity price support payments, pro-
uction adjustment payments, farm storage facility loans, disaster payments, fed-
Tal crop insurance payments for storage of Commodity Credit Corportion grain,
:nnual payments through the Conservation Reserve Program, and other unmentioned
rogram benefits. The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS)
alved enforcement of the sodbuster provision for the 1986 crop year. However,
he land must have a conservation plan applied for the 1987 crop year If the
armer is to remain eligible for federal program assistance.
nterln regulations that define highly erodible land and wetlands, discuss excep-
lons, and outline procedures were published in June 1986. The important defini-
|ions and relevant provisions follow.
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Highly Erodible Land
Highly erodible land is defined by using parts of the universal soil loss e
(USLE), the wind erosion equation (WEQ), and a soil's assigned T value defi
previously. The relevant formulas are:
!> 8: highly erodible
< 8: not highly erodible
!> 8: highly erodible
< 8: not highly erodible
quation
ned
(1) Soil erosion index = R x K x LS
T
(2) Wind erosion index = C x I
USLE (equation 1) represents tons of soil loss per acre per year for fallow land.
USLE takes into consideration rainfall and runoff (R), a soil's resistance to ero-
sion (K), and slope and length interactions (LS). USLE addresses only sheet and
rill erosion. The wind erosion index (equation 2) consists of two factors: C
characterizes windspeed and surface soil moisture and I represents the degree to
which a soil resists wind erosion.
For either wind or water erosion, an erosion index greater than or equal to 8
signifies highly erodible land. In other words, land that has an average annual
erosion potential equal to or greater than 8 times its T value is highly erodible
and raust be in compliance. (For specific details about the USLE, T values, and
examples, consult Cooperative Extension Service Circular 1220, "Estimating Your
Soil Erosion Losses with the Universal Soil Loss Equation.")
A field is classified as highly erodible if at least 33-33 percent of the field
acreage is identified as highly erodible or if a field contains 50 or more acres
of highly erodible land. Field boundaries can be modified subject to a written
request submitted to and approved by (ASCS).
Table 2. Estimated Average Annual Erosion in Relation to T Value, by Rural Land
Use. 1982
Other
Cropland Pastureland Forest land rural land Total
Less than T
1,000 acres 1H, 500.0 2,688.3 3,03t.t 513.6 20,736.3
1,000 tons ST.OiJO.I 1,989.8 1,786.1 273.2 ^1,089.5
Tons per acre 2.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 2.0
T to 2 T
1,000 acres 5,506.6 203.1 128.7 31.1 5.870.1
1,000 tons 33,838.9 1,221.6 711.9 713-2 35,915.6
Tons per acre 6.2 6.0 5.5 5.5 6.1
Greater than 2 T
1,000 acres 1,720.8 265.6 266.3 77.8 5.330.5
1.000 tons 101,522.0 6,206.2 10.176.9 5,807.5 123,712.6
Tons per acre 21.5 23.1 38.2 71.7 23.2
Total 1.000 acre 21.727.1 3,157.3 3,129.1 622.8 31,936.9
SOURCE: 1982 National Resource Inventory data summarized in Table 2 of publication
••T-By-2000.''
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Conservation Compliance
The conservation compliance provision addresses the problem of highly erodible
land in the production of annual crops such as corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, and
sorghum grains or land considered planted before December 23, 1985. Compliance
can take one of three forms:
1. Land bid into the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) is in compliance. At the
end of the ten-year CRP contract, a producer must fully implement an approved
conservation plan or lose government program benefits.
2. For highly erodible land that has a detailed soils map and is not bid into the
CRP, landowners have until January 1, 1990, to begin impleinentlng an approved
conservation plan; otherwise, they lose program eligibility. Landowners must
have fully implemented an approved conservation plan by January 1, 1995, or
lose federal program benefits.
3. For highly erodible land that does not have a detailed soils map, landowners
must begin an approved conservation plan two years after completion of a soil
survey or lose eligibility for program benefits. Landowners have until Janu-
ary 1, 1995, to complete application of the conservation plan or again face
ineligibility.
Sodbuster Provision
iighly erodible land not in production of annual crops or not considered planted
as of December 23. 1985, must have an approved conservation plan fully implemented
Defore crop production can be initiated; otherwise, landowners immediately lose
'ederal program benefits. Farmers who plowed out land from December 23, 1985, to
June 27, 1986, will be exempt from these provisions for one crop year only: a plan
Dust be fully implemented in 1987 for the farmer to retain government program ben-
;fits. A summary of the compliance and sodbuster provisions is shown in Table 3.
''able i. Target Dates for the Compliance and Sodbuster Provisions of the Farm
Act of 1985
Conservation plan Conservation plan
developed applied
JonserTation coapliance
Iighly erodible land in
)roduction of annual crops
)r considered planted before
)ec. 23, 1985
CRP acreage Contract termination Before land is put
"•" back in production
With soils map Before Jan. 1, 1990 Before Jan. 1, 1995
Without soils map 2 years after mapping Before Jan. 1, 1995
>odbuster proTision
Iighly erodible land Before land is put in Before land is put
lot in production or production in production
lOt considered planted
"efore Dec. 23, 1985
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Landowners who already have implemented a conservation plan on their lands remain
eligible to receive federal program benefits. Furthermore, conservation compliance
and sodbuster provisions are not applicable to landowners who do not participate in
federal government programs or who, because of the high cost of conservation prac-
tices, decide in the future not to participate in federal farm programs. These pro-
visions simply state that if you want to participate in federal farm programs, then
you must use environmentally sound practices on land defined as highly erodible.
Wetlands and Converted Wetlands
Wetland is any land that contains a predominance of hydric soils and supports a
prevalence of hydrophytlc vegetation under normal circumstances. Hydric soils are
soils saturated, flooded, or ponded long enough to support growth and regeneration
of hydrophytic vegetation during a growing season. Hydrophytlc vegetation con-
sists of plants that grow in water or in a soil substrate that is periodically
deficient in oxygen because of too much water.
Converted wetland is any wetland drained, dredged, filled, leveled, or otherwise
manipulated to make agricultural production possible. Land in this classification
is subject to the following conditions: first, production was not possible before
conversion and, second, before conversion the land was wetland and not highly
erodible land or highly erodible cropland.
Swampbuster Provision
Any person who produces an agricultural commodity on wetland converted after
December 23, 1985, is ineligible to receive federal program benefits. Ineligibil-
ity continues until the person converts the land back to wetlands. A person does
not lose eligibility if wetland conversion started before December 23, 1985, nor
does a person lose eligibility if a contract to convert a wetland was signed be-
fore that date.
ASCS waived enforcement until the interim rules were published in June 1986. Once
again let me point out that the swampbuster provision currently binds only indi-
viduals who want to participate in federal farm programs.
LAND RETIREMENT AND COST-SHARE PROGRAMS
People interested in voluntarily following T-by-2000 guidelines and in participat-
ing in federal farm programs can join the Conservation Reserve Program or choose
from a variety of cost-share conservation programs. Brief descriptions of major
programs follow. For more information, visit your local soil and water conserva-
tion, county Extension, ASCS, and SCS offices.
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
During policy deliberations on the Food Security Act of 1985, legislators, environ-
mental groups, soil conservation groups, and farm groups broadly supported a program
designed to retire highly erosive land. Reacting to concern about our nation's
ability to maintain productive capacity in the future, to mitigate off-farm damages
caused by sediment and related contaminants, and to stabilize the boom-bust cycle in
the agricultural sector, these groups successfully lobbied for a comprehensive con-
servation section. Conservation compliance, sodbuster, and swampbuster form one
component. CRP forms the second half. Subject to funding constraints, CRP can re-
move up to 45 million acres from annual production between 1986 and 1990.
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RP is a voluntary program designed to remove highly erodible land from produc-
lon. The Secretary of Agriculture exercised his right to define highly erodible
ands during the first two sign-up periods. He used T values and the Land Capa-
ility Class System, which divides land into eight capability classes. Capability
lass I is prime land with slopes of less than 2 percent. Land assigned in pro-
resslvely higher numbered classes becomes progressively more unsuitable for crop
reduction. Class VIII land is unsuitable for any crop production. Future slgn-
ps may use the same definition, other definitions such as the one found in the
odbuster provision, or the original definition of two times T found in the law
nd interim rules. The main program components are summarized in Table ^i.
articipation in CRP depends on land eligibility requirements and USDA acceptance
f your contract offer. Before the first sign-up, USDA divided Illinois into
hree bidding pools that reflected differences in land quality and earning poten-
ial. Within each pool and during a sign-up period, landowners or tenants with
andowner approval submit a contract at their county ASCS office, stating that
hey will remove a specified number of erosive acres from annual production for a
peclfied yearly per acre payment. After the sign-up period closes, USDA chooses
ontracts that satisfy program eligibility requirements and do not exceed a pre-
eterrained per acre bid cap. Maximum acceptable bids and a list of counties in
ach pool as of the last two sign-up periods can be found in Table 5.
Oder current definitions of eligibility, 3,053,200 acres of Illinois land quali-
ies for the program. The first sign-up period, from March 3 to 11, 1986, pro-
uced disappointing results on the national and state level. Only 828,387 acres
ere accepted into the program nationwide, far short of USDA's 1986 goal of 5 mil-
ion acres. Illinois acreage accepted into CRP amounted to only 17,239 acres.
SDA reviewed the results of the first sign-up, interviewed farmers throughout the
ation, and scheduled another sign-up for May 5 to 16, 1986. For the nation
,000,681 acres and for Illinois 31. 05^ acres were tentatively accepted into the
986 and 1987 CRP program years. The final number of acres accepted depends upon
OS's verification of land eligibility for acres without a current soil survey,
llinois farmers' activity in the two sign-ups by bidding pool is summarized in
able 6.
he 1987 CRP sign-up begins August 1 and ends August 15, 1986. Several important
^oints require highlighting. First, Illinois might have four bidding pools rather
han three pools. USDA must approve the request submitted by the state ASCS of-
Ice. The proposed change simply tries to bridge the gap between pool 2 at $80
nd pool 3 at $60. Boundaries do not change for pools 1 and 2. Furthermore, a
ounty cannot be reassigned to another pool that has a lower bid cap. At this
tage, all we know about the proposed new pool bid cap is that it will be between
60 and $80. Counties that might be included in the new pool are indicated in
able 5.
econd, before the third sign-up, SCS determined if a field was eligible (greater
han 3.5 T), questionable (greater than 2.5 T and less than 3-5 T), or ineligible
less than 2.5 T) for CRP. Fields placed In the "questionable" category required
field visit by SCS to calculate the erosion level. The "questionable" category
3 now greater than 2 T and less than 3-5 T. Furthernore, gully erosion can be
sed to move a field out of the "questionable" category to the "eligible" cate-
ory. If the district conservationist discovers a significant amount of gully
rosion during the visit to a field and soil is eroding between 2 T and 3 T, the
onservatlonist can declare the field eligible for CRP.

Table ^. Components of the Conservation Reserve Program
Components
Eligibility requireaents
1. Land Land classified as VI, VII, or VIII. Or land classi-
fied as II, III, IV, or V with erosion exceeding 3
times the T level. Or combination of the above.
2. Production Planted or considered planted to a commodity at least
2 years between 1981-1985. And physically able to
produce a crop.
3. Predominance test At least 2/3 of a field must be highly erodible. If
an existing field is greater than 9 acres, it can be
redefined to meet predominance test.
•l. Ownership-operator Land must be owned or operated by applicant on or
before Jan. 1, 1985. Or land must be owned or
operated at least 3 years before signing contract.
Or land was acquired by will or by succession as a
result of death.
5. Tenant-landlord Tenant or share cropper and landowner must agree on
fair and equitable distribution of annual rental
payment.
Coapensation
1. Procedure Applicant submits bid that reflects profitability
plus other factors considered important. ASCS
accepts bids that meet requirements and do not exceed
bid cap. CRP acres cannot exceed 25 percent of a
county's production acreage.
2. Compensation Generic PIK certificate for annual rental payment.
Maximum $50,000 annual CRP payment per person. Pay-
ment on or shortly after Oct. 1 each year. Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings not applicable unless certificate
held required minimum time and cashed at ASCS office.
Hunting fees-leases acceptable.
3. Cost-share 50 percent cost-share for cover establishment and for
conservation structures required to establish cover.
Contractual agreeaent
1. Contract period 10 years.
2. Cover crop Owner or operator agrees to establish and maintain
cover for duration of contract. Cover crop can be
grasses, legumes, wildlife habitat, field windbreaks,
trees.
Contract violations
1 . Erosion
2. Illegal compensation
3- Violation penalties
1. Liquidation damages
Cover crop not maintained.
Grazing the land; harvesting hay or seed; planting
Christmas trees, vineyards, ornamentals, orchards.
or nut trees.
Applicants may be required to refund cost-share funds
and annual rental payments.
25 percent of annual rental payment.

Table 5. Illinois Counties and Bid Pools
Pool 1,
bid cap of $i
Pool 2,
bid cap of $90
Pool 3,
bid cap of $60
Adams
Boone
Brown
Calhoun
Carroll
Cass
Cook
DuPage
Fulton
Greene
Grundy
Hancock
Henderson
Iroquois
Jersey
Jo Daviess
Kane
Kankakee
Kendall
Knox
Lake
McDonough
HcHenry
Macoupin
Marshall
Mason
Menard
Mercer
Morgan
Peoria
Pike
Putnam
Rock Island
Sangamon
Schuyler
Scott
Stephenson
Tazewell
Warren
Whiteside
Will
Winnebago
Woodford
Bureau
Champaign
Christian
Coles
DeKalb
De Witt
Douglas
Edgar
Ford
Henry
La Salle
Lee
Livingston
Logan
McLean
Macon
Moultrie
Ogle
Piatt
Shelby
Stark
Vermilion
Alexander
Bond
Clark^
Clay
Clinton
Crawford^
Cumberland^
Edwards
Effingham^
Fayette^
Franklin
Gallatin
Hamilton
Hardin
Jackson
Jasper^
Jefferson
Johnson
Lawrence^
Madison^
Marlon
Massac
Monroe^
Montgomery^
Perry
Pope
Pulaski
Randolph
Richland
St. Clair^
Saline
Union
Wabash^
Washington
Wayne
White
Williamson
"Counties that
$80.
light be placed in another pool that has a bid cap between $60 and
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Table 6. Summary of Illinois's Participation in CRP
March 3 to U,
, 1986, siRin-up May 5 to 16. 1986, 3 i gn- up
Pool
no.
Max.
bid
Acres
offered
Acres
accepted Av. bid
Acres
offered
Acres
accepted^ Av. bid
1 .. $80 '41.131 5, 3*48 $68,.52 17.525 10,841 $76.69
2 .. 90 15,553 2,114 80,.12 4.729 2.159 87.67
3 .. 60 80,109 9.777 53..27 36,007 18,064 58.43
Total .
a.^ . .
—
136.793 17,239 61..29 58,261 31.064 66.83
Tentatively accepted acres
Third, past evidence suggests that all submitted bids below or equal to USDA's
established maximum bid are accepted. Hence, the rule of thumb is to submit a bid
if profits from crop production are less than the maximum dollar amount set by
USDA for your pool.
Conservation Practices Program (CPP)
Funded with appropriations from the "Build Illinois" program, the Conservation
Practices Program (CPP) receives $10 million over five years beginning in fiscal
year 1986. The objectives of CPP are to provide financial assistance to land
users who install costly conservation practices and to help meet Illinois's T-by-
2000 guidelines. All 98 soil and water conservation districts receive a share of
the money based on the percentage derived from dividing total acres exceeding T in
a district by total acres exceeding T in the state. Every district, however, re-
ceives at least $10,000 in cost-share funds.
Maximum state cost-share rates for most conservation practices are 75 percent of
average costs. Several exceptions are worth noting: the establishment of contour
farming ($5 per acre for one year), contour strip cropping ($10 per acre for one
year), and permanent vegetation (75 percent not to exceed $100 per acre). For
land classes VI through VIII. the state limits use of cost-share funds to prac-
tices that convert land to less intensive uses such as permanent vegetative cover.
Every SWCD can set lower cost-share rates if local conditions warrant the change.
Landowners or renters who sign contracts with their local SWCD agree to maintain
the Installed conservation practices for the life of the contract, ten years after
installation of the last practice. In addition, land users agree to continue com-
plementary practices such as conservation tillage if these practices were part of
the conservation plan. Landowners or renters who fall to abide by contract terms
must reimburse cost-share funds to the SWCD.

iriinois Watershed Land Treatment Program (WLTP)
Funded from the "Build Illinois" program at $10 million over five years, WLTP
focuses soil conservation on critical watersheds throughout Illinois. Within a
watershed, landowners or renters with landlord approval can apply and receive
cost-share funds for lands with at least a 2 percent slope and eroding above T
values. Again, a land user must be a SWCD cooperator and have a conservation plan
on file before requesting cost-share funds. State cost-share rates, conservation
practices, contract life, and penalties are the same as those found in the Conser-
vation Practices Program.
One major difference in WLTP is solicitation of state funds. Soil and water con-
servation districts must prepare and submit an application to their area land use
councils. The application must describe the geographic area, quantify resource
concerns and needs, identify necessary conservation practices and costs to achieve
T values, and outline a time frame for completing the project. The land use coun-
cils then prioritize the applications and make recommendations to the state Water-
shed Priority Subcommittee, which in turn makes recommendations to the Soil Ero-
sion and Water Quality Advisory Committee. The Illinois Department of Agriculture
makes the final selection of priority watersheds on the basis of recommendations
from the advisory committee.
The selection process is competitive and depends on several related criteria:
reduction in erosion and sedimentation per cost-share dollar, achievement of T-by-
2000, presence of a lake, municipal water supply, or other impoundment, an educa-
tional component, outside funding, willingness and ability of a SWCD to complete a
funded watershed resource plan, and land user support. To date, 60 watershed pro-
jects have been fully or partly funded with "Build Illinois" funds distributed by
IDOA.
Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP)
USDA's Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) administers ACP.
ACP provides cost-share funds to encourage voluntary compliance with federal and
state conservation regulations, to control erosion and sedimentation, to improve
water quality, and to maintain soil productivity. Each year, county ASCS commit-
tees choose eligible practices from an approved state list of acceptable practices
and assign cost-share rates to the eligible ones. Land users must file annually
Ifor federal assistance if they do not have a long-term agreement (LTA) with ASCS.
LTAs cover three to ten years, and applicants file only once for approval and as-
sistance over the life of the agreement. Cost-share rates under the annual and
LTA programs are between 30 and 75 percent of average costs. Under special cir-
cumstances, low Income producers can obtain 80 percent cost-share rates. Yearly
payments to a producer cannot exceed $3,500.
Application for cost-share funds and final payment involve several steps. Any
landlord, owner, tenant, or share cropper can file for federal cost-share funds at
their ASCS county office. After a land user files for assistance, the Soil Con-
iservation Service (SCS) determines if the practices are feasible and estimates
costs. The county ASCS committee then approves or rejects the request and noti-
fies the applicant. Applicants who begin installation before written approval are
not eligible to receive cost-share funds. If the application is approved, SCS
idevelops a practice plan in accordance with its technical guide and local regula-
tions. The land user installs or hires a contractor to install the practices.
SCS certifies that the Installed practices meet technical specifications and local
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regulations. Finally, the land user submits bills to ASCS for reiabursement ac-
cording to established cost-share rates. Land users who accept cost-share funds
agree to maintain the installed practices for a specified number of years or re-
fund all federal funds.
Other Programs
Other special programs disburse cost-share funds. For example, land users located
within the boundaries of Illinois's five PL-566 Watershed Protection Projects can
apply to the Soil Conservation Service for cost-share funds in their specific
watersheds. An excellent example of state, federal, lake homeowner association,
and farmer cooperation can be found at Apple Canyon Lake, located in Jo Daviess
county. For further information about special projects in your watershed or
county, contact your local farm adviser, SWCD, or SCS.
SUMMARY
Soil erosion decreases agricultural productivity and in some instances causes sub-
stantial damages in other sectors of the economy. The time has come to develop a
long-term strategy for erosion control. Once you construct a strategy, examine
current cost-share programs and the Conservation Reserve Program. Since these
programs change regularly, call your local Extension, SCS, and ASCS representa-
tives for the most recent changes and benefits of each program. Join those pro-
grams, that can maximize long-term farm profitability and viability, given current
state and federal guidelines and regulations.
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86-13/Illinois Farm Property Tax Levels
Begun in 1984, the reversal of the long-standing trend of ever-increasing property
taxes on Illinois farmland continued in 1985. The poorly performing farm economy
is placing downward pressure on farmland assessments. Countering the lower
assessments are tax rate increases by schools, townships, and counties. The out-
come of lower assessments and higher tax rates was a slight decline in average per
acre property taxes for 1985. Property taxes on Illinois grain farms declined an
average of 30 cents per acre, from $15.63 per acre in 1984 to $15.33 in 1985. The
average decline from 1983 to 1984 was 12 cents per acre.
The per acre property taxes for a sample of Illinois grain farms for 1975 to 1985
are shown in Figure 1. Also included in Figure 1 are data for the sample farms in
the 68 northern counties and the 34 southern counties. In 1985, the sample in-
cluded 1,892 grain farms, which totaled 1.4 million acres of land. Because of
higher building assessments, per acre property taxes for livestock farms will
average above these levels.
The historical difference between per acre property tax levels in southern and in
northern Illinois continues. The 1985 per acre property tax on northern Illinois
grain farms was $19.53, compared with an average of $8.97 reported for southern
Illinois. One major reason for this difference is the difference in soil produc-
tivity between northern and southern parts of the state. Without dramatically
higher property tax rates in southern counties, farm property taxes there will
continue to be less than in the northern region.
FARM PROPERTY TAXES AND SCHOOLS
reduction amounts to an
STATE • COUNTY- LOCAL GROUPS- U S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
THE ILLINOIS COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYMENT
$ per
20
Northern Illinois
19-61 19.53
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Year
Sper I
15
Southern Illinois
9.25 926 9.23
6.50 6.1
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Year
'5.75 15.63 15.33
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Year
Figure 1. Per acre property taxes on Illinois grain farms. 1 975 to 1985.
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Figure 2. Estimated distribution of 1983 farm
property tax extensions
.
The changes in farm assessments and average farm property tax rates from 1981 to
1984 are given in Table 1; 1984, the most recent year for which complete
assessment data are available, is the base for 1985 taxes. Reflecting the
recessionary economy of Illinois agriculture, farm assessments declined 15.3
percent from 1981 to 1984. The largest decline was between 1983 and 1984. During
these four years, rural schools and other governments lost approximately $1.5
billion in farm property tax base.
In 1984, concern for the financial health of rural schools and other local govern-
ments was the major reason for legislation that limited the change in farmland
assessments to 10 percent from one year to the next. The limit law, which was the
focus of legislation again in 1986, can provide rural schools only short-terra in-
sulation from the fundamental economic changes taking place on Illinois farms.
The weak farm economy will reduce the fiscal capacity of all rural local
governments, including school districts.
Table 1. Change In Illinois Farm Real Estate Assessments and
Average Tax Rates, 1981 to 1984^
Percent change in Percent change in
Years farm assessments average tax rates
1981-1982 -3.80 2.75
1982-1983 -''.77 '*.5>i
1983-198H -7.50 H.73
"Decline in farm assessments between 1981 and 1981 is 15.3
percent. Increase in average tax rate between 1981 and 1984
is 12.5 percent (13.9 percent between 1980 and 1981).
Countering the assessment declines has been a steady increase in tax rates as
schools and other governments try to maintain revenues. Between 1981 and 1981,
average tax rates on farm property increased 12.5 percent, with nearly a 5 percent
Increase between 1983 and 1981. In 1980, 29 Illinois counties reported an average
tax rate at or above 5 percent for farm property. In 1983, the average tax rate .
on farms was 5 percent or more in 60 of Illinois's 102 counties. |
Most tax rates are limited by law. A referendum is required to exceed the limit.
Rate increases in recent years suggest that referenda will be required to raise
tax rates significantly in the future, unless the General Assembly changes the
rate limits.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND FARH TAXES IN NEIGHBORING STATES
On way to measure the property tax burden on farms in Illinois is to use the ef-
fective property tax rate. The effective rate compares property taxes to land
values. These rates for the last eleven years are presented in Table 2. Between
1981 and 1985, effective tax rates for Illinois farmland increased 69.6 percent
(from 0.56 percent to 0.95 percent). This increase, which occurred after a 11
percent decline in the effective tax rate between 1975 and 1981, reflects rather
stable per acre property taxes combined with a significant reduction in Illinois
farmland values. As land values continue to adjust to the economic conditions on
farms and without significant changes in the finance policies for schools and ">
other local governments, effective property tax rates on Illinois farms can be i
expected to continue to increase during the rest of this decade.
"
Comparing property tax levels among midwestern states shows a general trend toward
higher effective tax rates on farms in all states (Table 3). The increase in ef-
fective tax rates between 1981 and 1983 ranged from 12.5 percent in Indiana to 5.7
percent in Iowa. In terms of average per acre taxes, only Illinois, Iowa, and
Missouri were reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture to have lower taxes
in 1983 compared with 1981. All other states reported tax increases between 1981
and 1983. In five out of eight midwestern states, property taxes on farm real
estate increased while the farm economies in these states were under substantial
economic stress and while the market value of farmland was declining. These
seemingly Inconsistent trends result from the operations of the property tax
systems In the respective states. Current conditions in the farm economy take
time to be reflected in the assessment of farms and, eventually, in property
taxes. Sooner or later, farm assessments will decline. Without rate increases,
the decline will lower farm taxes.
Table 2. Effective Property Tax Rates on Illinois Farms, 1975 to 1985
Tax year
Effective tax rate, percent'
Northern
Illinois
Southern
111 ino is
Property taxes
as percent of
land rent
1975..
1976..
1977..
1978..
1979..
1980..
1981 ..
1982..
1983..
1981..
1985^.
1.12
1.02
0.93
0.71
0.72
0.69
0.60
0.58
0.66
0.85
0.99
0.99
0.88
0.75
0.62
0.59
0.51
0.19
0.51
0.56
0.72
0.81
1.11
0.96
0.86
0.72
0.68
0.65
0.56
0.56
0.61
0.82
0.95
13.19
11.71
15.00
15.29
11.18
15.11
17.11
18.66
17.06
19.01
17.86
"Effective tax rate is property taxes as percent of farmland, computed using
only grain farms.
"This percentage refers to a group of northern and central Illinois grain
farms. Land rent is the landlord's crop-share rent and includes property
taxes.
°Land rent for 1985 is estimated.
Table 3. Per Acre Taxes Levied on Farm
Selected States, 1983
il Estate: Illinois Versus
Amount,
1983
Dollars per acre
Change,
981 to 1983
Effective tax rate
Amount, Change,
1983 198 to 1983
percent
0.78 18.2
0.57 12.5
0.56 5.7
2.08 21.6
0.60 39.5
0.35 12.9
0.66 37.5
1.50 11.5
percent
Illinois $13.55 3.8
Indiana 8.53 9.1
Iowa 8.81 -11.3
Michigan 23-03 12.1
Minnesota 6. 31 20.8
Missouri 2.61 -10.5
Ohio 8.51 2.2
Wisconsin 15-32 6.2
SOURCE: Unpublished USDA data.
More frequent reassessment shortens the time between economic changes and changes
in property taxes. The annual reassessment of farmland in Illinois results in
economic conditions on farms being quickly reflected in property assessments.
Higher tax rates can of course result in higher taxes, even if assessments are
declining.
SUMMARY
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The weak farm economy is lowering farm assessments and will probably continue to
do so for several more years. Because schools depend on the property tax, the
weak farm economy will reduce the capacity of rural schools, as well as other
rural governments, to finance expenditures. Lower farm property taxes may margir
ally improve the financial position of Illinois farmers, but the associated fiscc
pressures on rural schools will challenge state government policymakers to evalu-
ate the current approach to financing schools in both rural and urban Illinois ir
1987. Tax policy initiative and leadership will be required to address the "farn
property tax paradox" because the renascence of rural Illinois's economy will in-
clude major structural changes in the farm sector. The farm property tax capacit
now being lost will most likely not be restored.
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86- A 4 /Guide for Adjusting Custom Rates and Machine Rental Rates for 1986-87
Custom field operation rates are charges made for the use of field equipment, the time
of the operator, necessary mechanical power, other supplies furnished, such as tractor fuel,
wire or twine for baler, and an allowance for risk and overhead. Rental rates are for the
use of the power unit and the machine only. There are two methods of establishing the charge
for a particular operation. One is the market rates charged. The other is the cost of per-
forming the operation or providing the machine services.
CUSTOM RATE COST IWfX
In the absences of current market rates, index numbers of prices paid by farmers for
selected classes of expenditures can be used to adjust historical market rates for increased
costs. Index of prices paid by U.S. farmers for selected production items directly related
to the costs of providing custom farm operations are presented in Table 1. The weightings
of the four items for the calculated custom rate cost index are as follows: tractors and
self-propelled machinery 30\; other machinery and implements 2S\; fuel and energy ISt; and
farm wage rates 30\. The base for each index is 1977. The data in the column -- percent
change from previous year -- uses the previous year as the base. The custom rate cost
index assumes custom rates are based on costs of performing operations and no change in the
efficiency of performing the operation.
CALCULATED CUSTOM RATE COST INDEX t ANNUAL CHANGE. 1977-1986
Irxlrx for Pricrt Psiit by U.S. PmV"for Proc uction Items 977. IOC
OCiMtxf
Parcvnt Chan;*
Trtctorm tnd Othar ruti tram
flf-prop»llt<S mMchintrv t tiuS Wmgt cvmtom rat* praviou.
y«r •cWn.ry i-pj.».nt. •n.rjy nt» coat indtMi/ yaar
1977 100 100 100 100 100.0
1978 109 108 104 107 107.4 7.4
1979 121 119 137 117 121.7 13.3
1980 136 132 188 126 139.8 14.9
1981 152 146 213 136 154.8 10.7
1982 165 160 211 143 164.0
1983 174 171 202 148 169.6
1984 181 180 201 151 174.8
198S
,
178 183 201 154 175.5
1986t/ 175 184 160 164 171.7 '2.2
roormoTLs , (.) Sourc. AgrlcuUur. Prlc... SRS. USDA. (b) Traclort and atU propalLd
Mchlnery weighted bv JOI other •chlntry and iapliMnts 251 fu«l 4 anarij IJX;
1
and <nge r< <• 30Z. (c) January-Jun* CU«
COSTS OF OWNING MO OPERATING POWER ANV IMPLEMEVTS
The cost of using replacement machines is another guide to establishing and adjusting
custom rates. The short cut method of computing the direct use costs for individual power
units and implements is illustrated by the example In the fom on page two.
The direct use costs for typical sized machines at current replacement cost and at aver-
age performance levels are presented in Table 2. These direct use costs include depreciation
interest, insurance, repairs, fuel and labor. There has been no allowance for profits,
management, overhead or risk in these calculations.
There are three direct use values presented in Table 2. The value in the first column
covers all direct use costs of power, implement, fuel and labor. The data in the second
and third columns are for situations where the power and equipment units are rented out.
Costs for both the tractor and implement are included in the second column. The third
column has the own'.'rship and opeiating costs for the inplcncnt only.

METHOD OF COMPUTING DIRECT COSTS OF OPERATING POWER AND IMPLEMENTS
(+ Estimated return for management, overhead and risk) \
Machine
Size
Purchase price
Ownership and repair cost (see Table A)
Hourly ownership and repair cost (3x4)
Fuel and lubrication, cost per hour*.
Total power and implement, cost per hour (5 + 6). . .
Labor cost per machine-hour on the job •.
.
Total costs per nachine-hour on the job for operation (7 + 8) .
Units of work per machine-hour on the job (acres, bushels, tons
Total cost per unit of work (9-f 10)
Power unit
(tractor or self-
propelled unit)
ftPQif
Implement
oon n
% ~
^JLkiiL
Adjustment for risk, time for moving from job, other overheadj
and profit margin [line 11 x (10 to 25%)]
Estimated machine hire rate per unit of operation
.069 for gasol ine
X .0504 for diesel
I go .0823 for LP gas
PTO HP
.75 for light load ^ ^
X 1 .00 for ave. load X y .*fO
1.25 for heavy load price per gallon fuel cost per hour
/So 4.r
m.p.h. speed
1.05 for tillage operations
vestf
.ntin;
lb
^ ^ -— I
-
^ O I I%. 2.S X I 1.10 for harvesting operations • H^ C. fcfi
wge rate no. of workers 1.20 for plan g, spraying labor cost per machine hour
field efficiency acres per hour
rable A. Amount of Assumed Use, Assumed Ownership and Repair Costs Per Hour, Per Dollar of the List Price and
Rates of Performance Coefficients to be Used in Estimating Costs of Operating Power and Implements
Cost of owner-
ship and re-
Number of Annual pair per hour. Field-
years of hours per dollar of Speed efficiency
use of use list price (HPH) coefficient
Tractor 10 400 .00041
Basic combine 5 250 .00094
Corn head 5 150 .00167 2.7 .65
Grain head
,,
5 100 .00217 3.0 .70
Heavy tillage toolsi', 10 100 .00177 4.5 .80
Light tillage tools- 10 100 .00150 5.0 .80
Planter only 8 75 .00278 4.5 .70
Planter with attachments 8 75 .00278 4.5 .65
Grain drill 8 75 .00278 4.5 .70
Fertilizer equipment 8 75 .00256 4.5 .65
Spraying equipment. . . . 8 75 .00276 5.0 .65
Mower 10 100 .00175 5.0 .80
Mower - conditioner 10 100 .00167 5.0 .80
Hay rake 10 100 .00167 5.0 .80
Hay baler, forage wagon 10 100 .00153 3.5 .75
Forage harvester, blower 10 100 .00166 2.5 .60
Grain wagon 10 100 .00150
Manure spreader 10 100 .00156 5.0 .70
Liquid manure spreader 10 100 .00156
1/ Includes moldboard plow, chisel plow, field cultivator, and row cultivator.
7/ Includes disk harrow, spike tooth harrow, and rotary hoe.
NOTE: Costs were based on 5, 8, or 10 years of depreciated life, an interest rate of 12 percent, insurance at
1/2 percent, and housing at 1 1/2 percent of the remaining value of the beginning of the year. The
purchase price was assumed to be 90 percent of the manufacturer's list price, plus freight and the
dealer's setup cost.

Table 2.
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•DIRECT COSTS OF MACHINE SERVICES (excluding Management. Overhead and Risk)
(Guide to Custom and Rental Rates for Farm Equipment)*
Power, machine
fuel and labor Power and Machine
Field Operation Unit Costs machine costs costs only
TILLAGE OPERATIONS
Moldboard plowing acre $ 13.25 $ 9.25 $ 4.00
Chiseling, 8"-10" acre 8.50 5.50 1.25
Coulter chiseling acre 11.00 7.50 3.00
Field cultivation acre 5.25 3.50 1.50
Offset disking-reg. acre 7.50 5.00 2.00
-deep acre 11.00 7.75 3.50
Tandem disking acre 6.00 4.00 2.00
Disking & applying insec-
ticide & herbicide acre 7.50 5.25 3.00
Combination tool
(disc-cult-level) acre 7.50 5.00 2.25
Packer mulching acre 5.00 3.25 1.75
Stalk shredding acre 5.50 3.50 1.50
Row cultivating acre 6.25 4.25 1.75
Rotary hoeing acre 1.75 1.15 .50
TILLING AND PLANTING
Field cultivating and plant-
ing corn or soybeans acre
Packer mulching and
drilling soybeans acre
13.00
12.00
10.75
9.25
8.00
6.75
9.50
PLANTING
Planting corn or
soybeans only
Planting corn or soybeans
& applying chemicals
No till planting
Drilling small grain
No till drilling
Power till seeding
Broadcast seeding
APPLYING FERTILIZER
|. Anhydrous ammonia
- Mixed dry fertilizer
SPRAYING (excluding materials)
Field spraying
Fence row spraying
Rope wick applying
(This table is continued on the next page.)
6.50
acre 10.50 8.50 7.25
acre 12.50 10.50 8.50
acre 8.50 6.00 4.25
acre 13.50 10.75 8.50
acre 12.50 9.50 7.25
acre 1.50 .60 .15
acre 5.00 3.50 2.00
2.00 1.25 .60
acre 3.25 2.00 1.00
hour 27.50
acre 2.75 1.00 .20
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\ble 2.
-
DIRECT COSTS OF MACHINE SERVICES (excluding Management. Overhead and Risk)
(Guide to Custom and Rental Rates for Farm Equipment)a/
*eld Operation
Power, machine
fuel and labor Power and Machine
Unit costs machine costs costs only
IRVESTING GRAIN
Combine soybeans or wheat acre $ 24.00 $ $ 20.00
Combine coim acre 29.00 24.50
Combine and store bu.
.30
Pick ear corn acre 36.00 26.00 16.00
Pick and store ear corn bu. .40
riaul grain bu. .09 .06
Dry grain bu. point .0225
.012
IWESTING FORAGES
•lowing Hay acre 5.00 2.50 1.10
low, condition, windrow acre 8.25 5.50 3.50
.taking hay acre 4.50 2.25 1.00
Baling sq. bales-wire tie bale .32 .16 .09
-twine tie bale .24 .13 .07
Baling large round bales bale 4.75 3.00 1.75
stacking (1 1/2 tons) stack 7.00 4.75 2.75
Stacking and moving stack 9.00 5.75 3.00
Field chop only - corn
silage - 2 row chopper hour 49.00 36.00 24.00
ton 2.70 2.00 1.30
5ilo filling with 2 row
chopper wagons & blowers hour
ton
89.00
4.90
TACTOR RENTAL
50 PTO H.P. 2 W.D. hour $ $ $ 6.00
SO PTO H.P. 2 W.D. hour 9.00
35 PTO H.P. 2 W.D. hour 12.00
;05 PTO H.P. 2 W.D. hour 15.00
'30 PTO H.P. 2 W.D. hour 18.00
55 PTO H.P. 4 W.D. hour 22.00
30 PTO H.P. 4 W.D. hour 28.00
25 PTO H.P. 4 W.D. hour 34.00
a, Adapted from Computation of Costs of Performing Farm Operations, Pricing and
Valuing Farm Input Handbook - Section 4 - No. 3. Assumes $8.25 per hour labor
rates, $.90 diesel fuel costs, and machinery and power costs for new equipment
estimated by procedure described in Table A.
The estimated costs of using machines and changes in custom rate index are
starting points for establishing a custom rate for a particular situation.
The supply and demand of machinery and adverse field and weather conditions alter
the appropriate custom rate from case to case
(^.a. /<A^_^
R. A. Hinton
Extension Special!
Fam Management
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86-15/Looking Ahead to Farm Programs for 1987-1990
The Food Security Act of 1985 sets the course of commodity programs through 1990.
Many parts of the programs for 1987 will be similar to those found in programs
for 1986. But with lower loan rates, lower market prices, and substantial defi-
ciency payments, most farm operators have very little choice about participating
in these programs. The participants will be entitled to substantial benefits;
nonparticipants, especially grain producers, will face almost certain losses.
The key elements to watch are loan rates, target prices, and acreage reduction.
LOAN RATES AND TARGET PRICES
The 1985 Act established the basic loan rates for corn, soybeans, and wheat but
gave the Secretary of Agriculture discretionary authority to reduce the loan rate
further if the supply was above certain limits. The goal was to reestablish the
competitive position of the United States in the world market. But the drop in
the basic loan rate was limited to 5 percent per year.
The target prices for feed grains and wheat in 1986 and 1987 were frozen to re-
main the same as in 1985. Starting in 1988, a gradual reduction will begin as
shown in the accompanying table. As a result of the freeze on target prices,
deficiency payments from the 1986 and 1987 crops will be substantial because loan
rates and market prices are lower.
ACREAGE REDUCTION
The 1985 Act continues the authority to require acreage reductions, set-aside, or
paid land diversion to qualify for price support benefits.
For the feed grain program, the maximum acreage reduction from 1987 through 1990 is
12 1/2 percent if the carryover stocks are 2 billion bushels or less and 20 percent
if carryover stocks are greater than 2 billion bushels. The Secretary has announced
a 20 percent acreage reduction for the 1987 feed grain program. For wheat, the max-
imum acreage reduction for 1987 is 20 percent if the carryover is less than a bil-
lion bushels and 27 1/2 percent if the carryover is greater than a billion bushels.
The Secretary has announced a 27 1/2 percent acreage reduction program for 1987.
For 1988 through 1990, the maximum acreage reduction is 30 percent when the carry-
over stocks exceed a billion bushels.
STATE -COUNTY- LOCAL GROUPS- US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
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inimum Target Prices and Loan Rates for Com, Soybeans, and Wheat, 1987-1990
1986 1987 1988 1989 IQQO
ORN
arget price $3.03 3.03 2.97 2.88 2.75
asic loan rate 2.40 2.28^ 2.17^ 2.06^ 1.96^
.nnounced loan rate 1.92^ 1.82=
adjusted loan rate 1.84 d
rUEAT
Target price 4.38 4.38 4.29 4.16 4.00
Sasic loan rate 3.00 2.85^ 2.7ia 2.57^ 2.44^
Vnnounced loan rate 2.40^ 2.28^
Adjusted loan rate 2.30 d
SOYBEANS
Basic loan rate 5.02 5.02 e e e
lininiuni discretionary 4.77 4.77 4.50 4.50 4.50
Announced loan rate 4.77
^Projected rainimum basic loan rate. The rate established by law is to be from 75
to 85 percent of the five-year average market price, dropping the high and low
years, but not less than 5 percent below the rate for the previous year.
"The actual loan rate announced by the Secretary after having used his
discretionary authority to reduce the loan rate up to 20 percent.
=The loan rate expected to be announced by the Secretary.
"Not yet announced at the time of writing.
®To be based on 75 percent of the simple five-year average market price, excluding
the high and low years
.
Acreage reduction or set-aside programs for wheat must be announced by June 1 the
year before the crop is harvested; for feed grains the deadline is September 30.
Adjustments may be made until July 31 for wheat and until November 15 for feed
grains. Further announcements on the 1987 feed grains program therefore can be
expected by November 15.
CONSERVATION
The 1985 Act made some major changes in conservation policies. The three major
features affecting farming operations and management decisions are:
Si- For highly erodible land on which crops were grown from 1981 to 1985,
approved conservation plans must be approved by 1990 and in full
compliance by 1995 so that the operator can qualify for farm program
benefits. For all other highly erodible land, conservation plans must
be approved by 1987. This feature is often referred to as the
sodbuster provision.
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2. Under the wetlands conservation provision, also called the swampbuster
provision, program benefits are denied to producers who convert
wetlands to cropland after December 23, 1985.
3. The Conservation Reserve was established in order to retire between AO
and A5 million acres of cropland for 10 years by 1990. In 1986
contracts were accepted on about 3.8 million acres, which are about 1.2
million acres short of the goal. Opportunities for signing contracts
beginning in 1987 will be offered either this fall or next spring.
If acreage contracted falls below the established targets, some changes may be made
in the length of contracts, specifications for highly erodible land, or payments.
The amount of retired cropland could influence crop acreage and the oversupply of
wheat and feed grains
.
OPTIONAL PROGRAM FEATURES
The 1985 Act is complicated by the fact that many of its features permit discre-
tionary action by the Secretary. The most significant options discussed, even if
never implemented include:
The marketing loan . Under this program, farmers sell their commodities on the mar-
ket and pay off their government loans at the world market price or at 70 percent
of the basic loan rate, whichever is higher. Although there is political pressure
to use the marketing loan, the Secretary of Agriculture has resisted efforts to
expand this program to corn, wheat, or soybeans. The marketing loan is being used
for rice and cotton. Those favoring the marketing loan claim it would make U.S.
commodities more competitive in the world market; those opposing it point out the
high cost to the federal government.
Loan deficiency payments . If producers who are eligible agree to forego taking out
a commodity loan, the Secretary may offer a loan deficiency payment. Sometimes
called a producer option payment (POP), the objective of such a payment would be to
iPrevent the government from having to take over commodities that it would acquire
if the market price did not exceed the loan rate plus interest.
i Disaster payments . Although the 1985 Act does not automatically entitle producers
to disaster payments if they can obtain crop insurance, the Secretary may make
disaster payments to producers when certain emergency conditions have been met.
Cross compliance . The Secretary may require that when an acreage reduction program
is in effect the acreage planted for any other program crop may not exceed the acre-
age base for that crop. Cross compliance was not in effect in 1985. Limited cross
compliance has been announced for 1987 wheat, feed grains, cotton, and rice crops.
Acreage bases and yields. The effort to provide equity and fairness in setting
bases and yields has created considerable confusion and uncertainty. Although cer-
tain rules are established in the law, the Secretary also has some discretion in
setting bases and program yields.
The 1985 Act provided that payment yields of farm programs for 1986 and 1987 were
to be calculated as the average program yield on the farm during the preceding 5

irop years (1981-1985), excluding the highest and lowest yields. Under the amend-
rnts passed in 1986, if the farm program yield for the 1986 crop was reduced more
lan 3 percent from the 1985 yield, the Secretary had to make up the difference to
uthin 3 percent in commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
.
br 1987, if the program yield declines more than 5 percent from 1985, then the
Ijcretary must also make up the difference to within 5 percent in CCC-owned
ommodities
.
jLthough the law provided authority for farmers to adjust the base acreage of any
irop by up to 10 percent with a corresponding downward adjustment in the base acre-
je of another crop on the farm, this option will not be permitted in 1987.
,
ivance Payments . Required in 1986, advanced deficiency payments are at the dis-
cretion of the Secretary for crops from 1987 to 1990. Advance recourse commodity
Dans may also be made to producers for commodities with nonrecourse loan programs,
"at such payments are not expected in 1987.
nterest payment certificates
. The Secretary may issue commodity certificates to
reducers who repay their loans with interest. The value of the certificates would
e equal to the interest paid.
avments in kind (PIK) . PIK payments are authorized under the wheat, feed grains,
otton, rice, and peanut titles of the Act.
aid land diversion (PLD) . The Secretary has the discretion to offer a paid land
iversion program. It can be offered whether or not an acreage reduction or set-
side program is in effect. Although not mentioned in the first announcement of
he 1987 feed grain program, some believe that a paid land diversion will be added
ater
.
se of conservation acres . Production of alternate crops on the Acreage Conserva-
ion Reserve will not be permitted in 1987. Grazing will be permitted at the
equest of state committees of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation
ervice (ASCS), except during any five-month period designated by the committees.
0/92 program provisions . This provision provides that producers who plant at
east 50 percent of their permitted acreage to the program crop and devote the
emaining permitted acreage to a conserving use will be eligible for deficiency
ayments on 92 percent of the permitted acreage. Under this provision, haying and
razing of land designated to be used for conservation will be permitted at the
equest of the state ASCS committees. But the production of nonprogram crops on
hese acreages will not be permitted in 1987.
HAT ABOUT A NEW FARM BILL IN 1987?
Ithough the 1985 Food Security Act has been in effect for only about nine months,
ressures are mounting to rewrite the Act in 1987:
The farm economy has not recovered, and many farmers are still in
financial distress.
The cost of the Act in 1986 will total from $30 to $35 billion at a time
of huge federal deficits.
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• Some very large benefits are going to very large fanning operations,
whereas some middle-sized and smaller farming operations are being forced
out of business.
• Huge surpluses of wheat and feed grains continue to be a major problem
despite acreage reduction programs.
• Exports declined in 1985 despite lower market prices and a subsidized
program to enhance exports.
Several bills have been introduced in Congress to rewrite or revise the 1985 Food
Security Act. The most significant are those that would require a marketing loan
for wheat and feed grains and higher price supports with a mandatory acreage con-
trol program if approved in a farmer referendum. No final action on these bills is
expected in 1985.
When a new Congress convenes in January, more new bills can be expected. Efforts
to raise supports and set up mandatory acreage controls will probably get further
attention. Other bills will probably include attempts to limit extremely large
payments, to target payments to operators of smaller and medium-sized farms, and to
increase measures that will enhance exports.
Several factors will determine how successful any efforts to revise the 1985 legis-
lation will be. These factors include farm prices, incomes, exports, the willing-
ness of the Administration to change current policies, the party in control of the
Senate, and the readiness of Congress to make any significant changes in current
farm legislation.
Prepared by Harold D. Cuither, Extension Economist , Public Policy

35 FARM ECONOMICS
;="- Facts and Opinions
DCPARTMfNT OF AGOICUlTUOAl ECONOMICS
URBANA. ILLINOIS SI 801
' ~
. November 1986
8^ fefRrojected Financial Situations of Midwest Cash-Grain Farms
Low commodity prices, weak land values, and large surpluses of grains have raised
questions about the ability of farm operators to prosper and survive in agricul-
ture. Although the future cannot be predicted with certainty, it is useful to
examine projected financial situations under a set of conunodity prices, produc-
tion costs, and government farm programs that now seem likely. Such information
can help farmers and their lenders make tough decisions about the future of agri-
culture. In this article, therefore, we project the future financial situations
of Midwest cash-grain farms under different economic conditions.
The Food Security Act of 1985 provides cash-grain farms with price supports
through a set of target prices, set-aside acreage diversion payments, and commod-
ity loans. In anticipation of increased domestic grain surpluses, the U. S.
Department of Agriculture announced a mandatory 20 percent acreage diversion for
participation in 1987 programs. Farmers also have the option to idle an addi-
tional 15 percent of their land in return for diversion payments of $2.00 a
bushel on grain that normally would have been grown on that acreage. In our pro-
jections, we predict the effects of program participation, tenure pattern, and
amount of leverage on the financial situations of cash-grain farms. The effects
of superior management skills are also considered.
THE PROJECTED ECONOMIC SITUATION OF CASH-GRAIN FARMS
To examine the effect of participation in farm programs, tenure pattern, and level
of debt, the financial situation of a cash-grain farm is projected from 1987 to
1990 under three tenure patterns- -full owner, part owner, and full tenant--and
three initial debt-to-asset levels- -0. 20 , 0.50, and 0.70--both with and without
participation in the farm program. Assumptions about the size of farms and pro-
duction costs are based upon grain farms in northern and central Illinois whose
operators are in the Farm Business Farm Management Association (FBFM)
.
The base farm used in the simulation consists of 629 acres. Under all scenarios,
the cropping pattern consists of 55 percent corn and 45 percent soybeans. The
full owner is assumed to own all of the land; the part owner owns 119 acres and
share-rents the remaining 510 acres on a 50-50 basis; the full tenant share-
rents the entire 629 acres on a 50-50 basis.
Production costs and land values are assumed to remain constant over the four-
year period of these projections. Production costs are based upon 1985 levels as
STATE • COUNTY • LOCAL GROUPS • U S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
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jflected by averages of the FBFM. Interest rates on current, Intermediate, and
DHg-term debt are assumed to be constant at 11 percent. Commodity yields are
Iso assumed to be constant over the four-year period at 141 bushels per acre for
om and 44 bushels per acre for soybeans. Commodity prices for corn and soy-
eans are averages that are based on estimates from the Food and Agricultural
Dlicy Research Institute (FAPRI) and Chase Econometrics. These prices are sum-
arized in Table 1.
Table 1. Commodity Prices used to Project the
Financial Situations of Midwest Cash-
Grain Farms
Year
Commodity 1987 1988 1989 1990
dollars per bushel
Corn 1.90 1.86 1.95 2.10
Soybeans 4.89 4.83 5.04 5.41
or the scenarios that include participation in farm programs, 35 percent of the
ase corn acreage is diverted. The deficiency payment rate each year is assumed
o equal the target price for corn, $3.03 a bushel, minus the expected price in
able 1. A diversion payment of $2.00 a bushel is included for 15 percent of the
ase corn acreage. Base yields provided by the Agricultural Stabilization and
onservation Service are assumed to equal produced yields.
ash-Grain Farms With an Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Twenty Percent
esults from the simulations of farm operations with an initial debt-to-asset
atlo of 20 percent are summarized in Table 2. For the scenario with no program
articipation, net farm income is positive but weak except in the last year, when
ommodity prices are highest. Net worth and the leverage position of the full
wner and full tenant decline modestly over the four-year period, but the net
orth and leverage position of the full tenant decline more sharply.
'or the scenario with participation in the farm program, the net farm income
.nder all three tenure patterns is strong and increases each year. Net worth
Iso increases for all tenure patterns, and both full and part owners improve
heir leverage positions.
he results of the simulations of farm operations with initial debt-to-asset
atios of 20 percent suggest that survival is possible for an extended period of
ime under relatively low commodity prices even without participation in a gov-
rnment program. But program participation improves the financial situations of
hese operations as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio.
;«sh-Grain Farms With an Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Fifty Percent
Results from the simulations of farm operations with an initial debt-to-asset
•atio of 50 percent are summarized In Table 3. Under the scenario without

Table 2. Projected Financial Situations of Midwest Cash-Grain Farms with an
Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Twenty Percent
Scenario Full ovmer
Tenure pattern
Part owner Full tenant
NO PROGRAM:
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 4.731 $ 8,305 $ 7,791
1,855 6.917 6,601
10.083 12,745 11,748
22.200 20.236 16,904
$1,011,236 $306,735 $141,012
996.252 295.761 129,880
990.663 292.085 125,254
995,974 294,985 125,022
Ending debt-to-asset ratio
WITH PROGRAM:
0.20 0.21
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 39,029 $ 28,666 $ 24,939
40,932 30,443 26,611
46,189 32,655 28,052
52,209 34.825 29,173
$1,045,534 $327,096 $158,160
1,056,197 332,133 160,953
1,074,371 341,803 167,681
1,093,992 350,746 173,215
Ending debt-to-asset ratio 0.15 0.18
participation in the government farm program, net farm income is negative for the
full owner and part owner in most years and very small or negative for the full
tenant. A decline in net worth and leverage position occurs for each of the ten-
ure patterns because net farm income is Insufficient to cover the living expenses
of the family.
With participation in the farm program, the net farm income of the full owner is
still negative in most years, but net worth declines much less rapidly. Although
the financial condition of the full owner is not improving, participation in the
farm program clearly slows the decline in the financial condition of this opera-
tor. The part owner and full tenant generate positive. Increasing net farm
incomes by participating in the farm program. Government benefits allow the part
owner and full tenant to increase their net worth and Improve their leverage
positions. The results of the simulations of farm operations with initial debt-
to-asset ratios of 50 percent suggest that participating in the farm program is
essential to their continued economic success.

Table 3. Projected Financial Situations of Midwest Cash-Grain Farms with an
Initial Debt- Co-Asset Ratio of Fifty Percent
I
gcenarto Full owner
Tenure pattern
Part owner Full tenant
NO PROGRAM:
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
Ending debt-to-asset ratio
($37,458)
(44,976)
(Al,728)
(35,267)
($A,676)
(7,492)
(2,962)
2,927
$ 1,624
(244)
4,344
9,899
$585,503
525,248
468,241
417,695
$175,739
152,967
134,726
122,330
$ 78,782
62.568
51.521
45.380
0.66 0.66 0.69
WITH PROGRAM:
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
($3,160) $ 15.685 $ 18,772
(4.954) 16,266 19,766
(1.699) 20,255 23,763
1,848 24,076 26,632
$619,801 $196,100 $ 95,930
599.529 192,105 94,299
582,551 194,556 99,299
569,044 197,008 102,581
Ending debt-to-asset ratio 0.54
Cash-Grain Farms With an Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Seventy Percent
Results from the simulations of farm operations with an initial debt-to-asset
ratio of 70 percent are summarized in table 4. Under the scenario without par-
ticipation in the farm program, the large interest expense associated with these
operations cause negative net farm incomes under all three tenure patterns. The
increased borrowing needed to cover operating costs and the living expenses of
the family are so great that the full tenant is insolvent by 1990, and the full
and part owners will probably be insolvent the following year.
Program participation is not enough to slow significantly the decline in net
worth of the full or part owner. The net farm income of the full owners is nega-
tive and decreases with participation in the farm program. Only for the full

tenant are government benefits sufficient to maintain or Improve the Initial
leverage position.
Table 4. Projected Financial Situations of Midwest Cash-Grain Farms with an
Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Seventy Percent
Scenario Full owner
Tenure pattern
Part owner Full tenant
NO PROGRAM:
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
($ 65,585)
( 76,196)
( 76.382)
( 73,733)
$301,680
210,205
118,544
29,532
(S; 13 ,331)
( 17 ,099)
( 13 ,626)
( 8 ,909)
$ 88, 407
56, 029
27. 124
2, 936
($ 2.487)
( 4,808)
( 652)
4,366
37,296
17,153
1.222
9.793)
Ending debt-to-asset ratio 0.9J 0.99 1.07
WITH PROGRAM:
Net farm 1
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
($ 31.287) $ 7,030 $ 14,661
( 36,174) 6,660 15.202
( 36.349) 9,895 18.861
( 36.614) 12.733 22,104
$335,978 $108,768 $ 54,444
284.525 97.926 49,729
232,897 91.438 50,943
181,004 87,310 52,170
Ending debt-to-asset ratio 0.65
EFFECTS OF SUPERIOR MANAGEMENT ON CASH-GRAIN FARMS
Individual farmers have little control over the nature of government programs or
the level of commodity prices. Nevertheless, through superior management they
can achieve higher prices, better yields, and lower production costs.
To examine the effects of superior management skills on the financial situations
of cash-grain farms, commodity prices and yields are Increased, and input costs
are decreased slightly for farm operators participating in the government pro-
gram. Researchers at the University of Illinois ranked a sample of 179 Illinois
cash-grain farms by management returns per acre (Sonka, S.T., R.H. Hornbaker, anc

M.A. Hudson. "Managerial Performance and Income Variability for a Sample of
Illinois Cash-Grain Producers." Selected Paper, Annual Meeting of the American
Association of Agricultural Economists, Reno, Nevada, August 1986). This sample
showed that the top one-eighth of these producers increased corn yields by one
percent and soybean yields by five percent, and they increased prices received
for com by four percent and for soybeans by two percent. They also decreased
operating expenses by 8 . 5 percent. Based upon these findings, Table 5 compares
previous simulation results for average management with the results obtained by
operators exhibiting superior management skills under the same three tenure pat-
terns--full owner, part owner, and full tenant--and two initial debt-to-asset
ratios (0.50 and 0.70). Participation in the government program is assumed for
all operations.
Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Fifty Percent
Results of the simulations of farm operations with an initial debt-to-asset ratio
of 50 percent in Table 5 show that net farm income is positive under all three
tenure patterns with superior management. The part owner and full tenant are
able to increase net worth more with superior management than with average man-
agement. The full owner still experiences a decline in net worth with superior
management because, even though net farm income is positive, it is not enough to
cover the living expenses of the family. But the full owner is able to maintain
the initial debt-to-asset ratio of 50 percent with superior management skills.
Under each tenure pattern, ending leverage positions are reduced with superior
management compared to average management, and the part owner and full tenant are
able to reduce their debt-to-asset ratios significantly from the initial level of
50 percent.
Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of Seventy Percent
Results of the simulations of farm operations with an initial debt-to-asset ratio
of 70 percent in Table 5 show that net farm income is positive and increases for
both the part owner and full tenant. Participation in the government program and
superior management skills are not enough to stop the decline in net worth or in-
crease in leverage for the full owner. But the part owner is able to decrease
significantly the rate at which net worth declines and can reduce leverage
slightly with superior management skills. The full tenant is able to increase
net worth and decrease significantly the ending leverage position with superior
management
.
Simulation results presented here suggest that participating in government pro-
grams and management skills have a strong bearing on the ability of cash-grain
farms to survive and prosper under relatively low commodity prices. In all but
one case, a combination of participation in the government farm program and
superior management skills enables the simulated farms to survive for an extended
period of time regardless of tenure pattern or initial debt-to-asset ratio. Farm
operators may also affect their tenure patterns and leverage positions through
sales or purchases of capital and land.

Table 5. Projected Financial SiCuations of Midwest Cash-Grain Farms with Average
and Superior Management Skills with Participation in the Government Farm
Program
Management skills
Full ovmer Part owner Full tenant
Average Sucerior Averace Superior Average Superior
Initial 0.50 debt-to-asset ratio
Net farm
income
1987 ($ 3,160) $ 9.374 $ 15.685 $ 23,204 $ 18.772 $ 25.042
1988 ( 4.954) 8,597 16,266 24,397 19,766 26.54A
1989 ( 1.699) 13,481 20.255 29.237 23,763 31.194
1990 1,848 18,918 24,076 33,961 26,632 33,137
Net worth
1987 $619,801 $632,335 $196,100 $203,619 $ 95,930 $102,200
1988 599,529 622,711 192,105 204,889 94.299 104.885
1989 582,551 619,523 194,556 213,524 99.299 114.581
1990 569,044 620,600 197.008 221.835 102.581 121.194
Ending debt-to-
asset ratio 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.37 0.41 0.37
Initial 0.70 debt-to-asset ratio
Net farm
income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
1987
1988
1989
1990
($ 31.287) ($ 18,753) $ 7,030 $ 14.549 $ 14.661 $ 20.931
( 36,174) ( 22,624) 6,660 14.791 15.202 21,980
( 36,349) ( 20,850) 9,895 18,931 18.861 26.360
( 36,614) ( 19,036) 12,733 22.853 22.104 30.396
$335,978 $348,512 $108,768 $116,287 $ 54.444 $ 60.714
284.525 310.609 97.926 111.198 49.729 60,471
232.897 274.480 91.438 112.543 50.943 67.191
181,004 240.165 87.310 114,568 52.170 73.168
Ending debt-to-
asset ratio 0.85 0.81 0.75 0.68 0.65 0.51
Prepared by David Neff, Agricultural Economist and David Lins , Extension
Specialist, Farm Financial Management
Submitted by David Lins
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and Recent Assessment Legislation
November 1986
Legislation signed into law in August, 1986, has frozen farmland assessment certi-
fied values for 1987. Several counties have faced declining farm assessments and
administrative difficulties as assessing officers have begun implementing use-value
assessments for the first time. The attention of the General Assembly was again
focused on the property tax assessment of farmland. In 198A the 10 percent "limit
law" was enacted to insulate local tax bases somewhat from the poor performance of
the farm economy. This law slowed the decline in farmland assessments by restrict-
ing the change in farmland assessments in any county to 10 percent from one year to
the next. The limit, which was on the total farmland assessments in a county,
provoked administrative challenges and subsequent legislative actions in 1986. The
1986 legislation, among other things, freezes farmland assessment certified values
in 1987 at the 1986 level.
Because of the economic decline in agriculture, the assessed value of Illinois farm
real estate has been dropping since 1981. Between 1981 and 1984 farm assessment de-
clined 15.3 percent. But taxes paid by the owners of farm real estate from 1982
through 1985 (based on assessments from 1981 through 1984) declined only 4.7 percent
from $446.0 million to $424.9 million. The discrepancy arose as rural schools, town-
ships, counties, and other rural governments countered the poor performance of the
rural tax base with tax rate increases in an attempt to maintain tax receipts and
services. Higher property tax rates will be required in the future if current spend-
ing by rural governments and school districts on local public services is to be main-
tained without fundamental changes in the tax and spending systems supporting them.
The 1984 "limit law" and the 1986 farmland assessment amendment merely retard the
rate of adjustment in farm assessments and the tax bases of rural governments. They
mask the implications of the fundamental economic changes in farming for the adequate
and equitable financing of rural governments and schools. The poor performance of
Illinois 's farm economy will continue to depress farm property tax bases and the
fiscal health of its rural local governments and schools well into the 1990s.
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raE 1986 FARMLAND ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION
rhe farmland assessment legislation passed in 1986 recognized the limited protection
jffered many rural governments by the county-wide 10 percent limit in the 1984
statute. It also recognized that use-value farmland assessments must be implemented
in all counties if farmland is to be assessed uniformly throughout Illinois. The
legislation included state financial assistance for rural schools that have been
severely affected by the declining farm tax base. The state will provide transi-
tional assistance for the 1987 budget year. Specifically, the 1986 farmland assess-
ment legislation will result in:
1. The 10 percent limit on changes in aggregate county-wide farmland assessments
being imposed only for 1984 and 1985.
2. Farmland assessments in 1986 and 1987 based on 1986 certified assessed values.
If 1986 assessments on farms are correctly determined using the 1986 certified
values, 1987 assessments will be the same as in 1986.
3. A limit on the change in these certified assessed values from year to year to 10
percent beginning in 1988. This will insulate the tax base of all rural govern-
ments to the same degree and effectively limit the change in assessments on
individual farms to 10 percent.
i|4.
Partial protection of 1987 revenues of rural school districts from losses if
1986 total assessments decline more than 10 percent because of drops in farmland
assessments. The state will pay districts for taxes not received in 1987
because of decreases in total assessments in 1986 in excess of 10 percent.
Because of sparse information, it is difficult to identify the implications of the
changes in farmland assessments for the tax bills of individual farmers and the tax
bases of schools and other taxing districts. Data are only available at the county
' level. The lack of other data hides the substantial variation within counties,
among farms, and among rural governments and schools.
PER-ACRE AVERAGE FARNLAND ASSESSMENTS: 1984 THROUGH 1988
Average farmland assessments for Illinois counties are presented in Table 1. The
1984 and 1985 assessments are actual assessments, whereas the 1986, 1987, and 1988
assessments are estimates. The variation in 1984 and 1985 per-acre assessments
among counties reflects differences in the quality of land, past assessment prac-
tices, and the county-wide 10 percent limit under the "limit law." For the most
part, changes in farmland assessments between 1984 and 1985 reflect the 10 percent
limit. The estimated per-acre average assessments for 1986 are based on the 1986
certified values. Under the 1986 amendment, these values are also the basis for
1987 farm assessments. Thus, 1986 and 1987 estimated averages are identical, and
1988 averages are 90 percent of the 1987 averages based on the assumption that the
change in 1988 certified values will be limited to 10 percent as prescribed in the
1986 amendment.
The change in assessments between 1985 and 1986 will reflect the transition to
certified values In all counties. The percentage of change in per-acre assessments
is also presented in Table 1 for all counties. A number of counties have no change
or a small increase in average assessments between 1985 and 1986, whereas other
counties are expected to experience up to a 50 percent decline in farm assessments.
The small increase in average assessments in some counties reflects the slight
increase In the 1986 certified values particularly for the more productive soils.

County Average Farmland Assessments
County 1984 1985 1986^ 1987« 1988^ 1984-85
of change
1985-86^
146
55
91
235
105
231
85
213
154
340
275
100
89
94
282
109
119
315
366
131
49
82
211
90
208
75
192
139
315
dollars per acre
97
107
290
326
126
24
82
202
84
184
59
157
126
325
248 255
89 71
81 65
84 73
263 252
68
107
302
326
126
24
82
202
84
184
59
157
126
325
255
71
65
73
252
68
107
302
326
113
22
74
182
76
166
53
141
113
293
230
64
59
66
227
62
96
272
293
10.3
10.9
• 9.9
10.2
-14.3
-10.0
-11.8
- 9.9
- 9.7
- 7.4
- 9.8
-11.0
• 3.8
-51.0
0.0
- 4.3
- 6.7
11.5
-21.3
-18.2
- 9.4
3.2
3.0
-20.2
-19.8
-13.1
- 4.1
-29.9
0.0
4.1
0.0
352 333 346 346 311 - 5.4 3.9
236 223 200 200 180 - 5.5 -10.3
275 247 253 253 228 -10.2 2.4
132 119 74 74 67 - 9.8 -37.8
110 98 62 62 56 -10.9 -37.7
92 82 82 82 74 -10.9 0.0
239 215 203 203 183 -10.0 - 5.6
85^ 76 48 48 43 -10.6 -36.8
136 122 95 95 86 -10.3 -22.1
139 126 126 126 113 - 9.4 0.0
175 160 166 166 149 - 8.6 3.8
240 216 215 215 194 -10.0 - 0.4
80 72 57 57 51 -10.0 -20.8
183 166 170 170 153 - 9.3 2.4
48^ 43a 31 31 28 -10.0 -27.9
188 170 174 174 157 - 9.6
- 9.7
2.4
207 187 191 191 172 2.1
239 215 178 178 160 -10.0 -17.3
68 61 35 35 32 -10.3 -42.6
127 115 76 76 68 - 9.5 -33.9
107 99 46 46 41 - 7.5 -53.5
139 125 110 110 99 -10.1 -12.0
91 89 90 90 81 - 2.2 1.1
59 53 41 41 37 -10.2 -22.6

Continued
1984 1985 1986^
Percentage of change
^
1984-85 1985-86^ (
242
199
280
251
143
267
222
180
254
226
128
239
dollars per acre
218
163
262
216
95
248
218
163
262
216
95
248
196
147
239
194
86
223
• 8.3
• 9.5
• 9.3
10.0
•10.5
10.5
1.8
• 9.4
3.2
4.4
25.8
3.8
106 106 111 111 100 0.0 4.7
262 235 210 210 189 -10.3 -10.6
246 221 212 212 191 -10.2 - 4.1
298 270 279 279 251 - 9.4 3.3
238 215 210 210 189 - 9.7 - 2.3
220 198 181 181 163 -10.0 - 8.6
321 296 305 305 275 - 7.8 3.0
386 338 345 345 311 -14.2 2.1
168 147 129 129 116 -12.5 -12.2
205 183 146 146 131 -10.7 -20.2
86 77 52 52 47 -10.5 -32.5
251 226 235 235 212 -10.0 4.0
158 137 109 109 98 -13.3 -20.4
104 94 55 55 50 - 9.6 -41.5
270 243 246 246 221 -10.0 1.2
200 180 184 184 166 -10.0 2.2
121 111 81 81 73 - 8.3 -27.0
162 145 148 148 133 -10.5 2.1
233 233 233 233 210 0.0 0.0
358 339 340 340 306 5.3 0.0
230 207 201 201 181 -10.0 - 2.9
196 167 164 164 148 -14.8 - 1.8
85 76 48 48 43 -10.6 -36.8
347 341 348 348 313 - 1.7 2.1
163 145 149 149 143 -11.0 2.8
53 47 42 42 38 -11.3 -10.6
86 78 64 64 58 - 9.3 -17.9
205 186 186 186 167 - 9.3 0.0
118 107 71 71 64 - 9.3 -33.6
88 81 61 61 55 - 8.0 -24.7
196 177 177 177
117
159
105
- 9.7
- 6.5
0.0
124 116 117 0.8
97 87 62 62 56 -10.3 -28.7
313 289 299 299 269 - 7.7 3.4
109 98 80 80 72 -10.1 -18.4
159 143 117 117 105 -10.1 -18.2
161 145 123 123 111 - 9.9 -15.1
247 222 230 230 207 -10.1 3.6
162 153 158 158 142 - 5.6 3.2

Table 1. Continued
- 3 3
3 4
-23 4
-26 2
-10 8
- 1 5
- 9
-43 9
- 4 5
3 5
Percentage of change
County 1984 1985 1986^ 1987^ 1988^ 1984-85 1985-86^
dollars per acre
Tazewell 265 238 243 243 219 -10.2 2.1
Union 94 85^ 70 70 63 -10.0 -17.7
Vermilion 238 215 209 209 188 - 9.7 - 2.8
Wabash 135 122 118 118 106 - 9.6
Warren 321 296 306 306 275 - 7.8
Washington 85 77 59 59 53 - 9.4
Wayne 110 99 73 73 66 -10.0
White 133 120 107 107 96 - 9.8
Whiteside 226 204 201 201 181 - 9.7
Will 196 177 161 161 145 - 9.7
Williamson 83 66 37 37 33 -20.5
Winnebago 173 156 149 149 134 - 9.8
Woodford 311 287 297 297 267 - 7.7
^Indicates an estimate. The change for all counties between 1986 and 1987 is
percent; and between 1987 and 1988, it is -10 percent.
For counties with 1984 assessments based on certified values or where implementation
of use-value assessments was complete before 1985 and where the county was not subject
to the 10 percent limit law in 1985, the small increase in 1986 certified values
increased average per-acre assessments. Other counties are expected to experience
reduced rates of farm assessment declines.
Generally, the change in farmland assessments expected in 1986 will be smaller for
counties having more uniform and higher-quality soil and past assessments that were
based more closely on certified assessed values. For those same counties, the
slightly higher 1986 certified assessed values are more likely to increase average
assessments between 1985 and 1986.
Alternatively, counties with a wide range in soil quality and a higher proportion of
noncropland in farms and counties that implemented use -value assessments for the first
time in 1985 are expected to experience substantial drops in average per-acre
assessments in 1986. These characteristics divide the counties geographically as
shown in the map in Figure 1. All but one of the 23 counties expected to have 1986
farmland assessments reduced by over 20 percent are counties in southern Illinois.
All but three of the 29 counties expected to have higher 1986 farmland assessments are
in northern Illinois.
BALANCE IN THE ILLINOIS TAX SYSTEM AND AGRICULTURE
The economic troubles on Illinois farms are slowly and adversely affecting the tax
capacity of rural schools and other local governments. The renascence of rural
Illinois 's economy in the years ahead will include major structural changes in the
farm sector. The farm property tax capacity that is being lost will not be restored.
As a result, some fundamental rethinking of the tax and spending system in Illinois is
needed.

S^'r?::;::H»v»w:;
Figure 1. Change in per-acre farmland assessments, 1985-86.
Equity is important for tax systems. The perception of fairness is critical. The
burden of the property tax on the farm sector, when compared to personal income from
farming, has been historically high in comparison to other sectors and the state as a
whole because of the importance of land in agricultural production. Historically,
property taxes in Illinois have varied between 3 and 4 percent of personal income.
For agriculture, the range has been between 12 and 18 percent.
During the 1980s, the property tax burden on Illinois agriculture has increased as
farm incomes declined and farm property taxes remained relatively stable, despite
declining assessments. For the period from 1980 to 1984, the average ratio of
property tax payments to personal income for the nonfarm sectors in Illinois was 3.5
percent (3.7 percent for the state). For agriculture, the ratio is an astounding 36.1
percent- -nearly two to three times the historical level of 12 to 18 percent.
The historical balance between the property taxes and personal income of farmers has
been disrupted by the poor performance of the farm economy. Restoring this balance
requires some difficult decisions about public finance and tax policy. One option is
to replace some of the revenues from farm property taxes with other revenues in order
to lower the property tax burden of the farm sector.
Presented in Table 2 are alternative levels of farm property tax burdens and estimates
of the funds required to lower them. For example, $62 million are required to lower

Table 2. Balancing Farm Property Taxes
Farm property tax
burden® percentage
Balancing
funds
,
millions of
dollars
Change in the rate
of state personal
income tax
percentage
Required rate
of state personal
income tax
percentage
15
20
25
30
304
244
183
123
62
+0.25
+ 0.16
+ 0.10
0.05
2.75
2.70
2.60
2.55
^Burden is defined as the percentage of personal income from farming represented by
farm property taxes in Illinois. The farm property tax extensions has been taken from
Illinois Property Tax ScatisCics . Illinois Department of Revenue, Springfield,
Illinois (various years) . The figure for the personal income from farming in Illinois
have been obtained from the data on income and employment provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.
the amount of farm income represented by property taxes to 30 percent from the current
36.1 percent. About $123 million of other revenues would be required to lower the
farm property tax burden to 25 percent.
The "balancing funds" to lower farm property tax burdens could be raised through
higher rates for state taxes or the reallocation of current state government funds.
Higher state individual income tax rates are one option. The rate changes and the
resulting individual income tax rates necessary to raise the monies to finance the
balancing fund are also given in Table 2.
Increasing the state individual income tax to balance the property tax burden on agri-
culture would shift the tax burden from farmland property taxpayers to individual
income taxpayers. For example, to finance the estimated $123 million necessary for
reducing the property tax burden of agriculture to 25 percent (about seven times the
burden of the nonfarm sector) , the individual income tax rate would have to increase
by .1 percent. This increase would raise the state individual income tax rate from
2.5 percent to 2 . 6 percent. Another option is to finance the "balancing fund" with
the increased state tax revenues coming from economic growth. Of course, a third
option is to take no action, but following this course would probably see the burden
of the property tax on the farm sector approach 50 percent of personal income in the
years ahead.
SUMMARY
Administrative problems combined with declining farm assessments brought the assess-
ment of farmland to the attention of the Illinois General Assembly again in 1986.
Legislation passed in 1986 will move farmland assessments in all counties toward uni-
formity and freeze certified values in 1987. Beginning in 1988 the change in the tax-
able value of individual farm parcels will be limited to 10 percent from one year to
the next. In effect this limitation legislates the level of farmland assessments to

be independent of the economic conditions in Illinois agriculture. Farmland assess-
ments will decline 10 percent annually for several years beginning in 1988 as assess
ments catch up to the faltering farm economy.
One result of low farm incomes and relatively stable taxes on farm property has been
an increase in the property tax burden on Illinois agriculture when measured as a per-
centage of personal income. This burden has climbed to over 36 percent from histori-
cal levels of 12 to 18 percent. For the nonfann sector this burden is 3.5 percent.
Fairness is essential for all tax and spending systems. An evaluation of the fairness
of the Illinois property tax on farmers may be needed.
^.c^ i. cl
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86-18/Land Values: Factors Pushing the Market
A number of pervasive factors that influence land income and values are pulling in
different directions. Most indicators show that land values are down about 15
percent from one year ago (based upon the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and both a
private survey and that of the author) . Most of the better land in central and
northern Illinois is selling in the range of $1,400 to $1,900 per acre. Some
occasional sales occur outside that range. Expectations are for a further decline
next year, averaging less than last year.
Interest Rates are lower and have been down long enough to cause mortgage interest
rates to come down substantially. The short-term Treasury Bill and CD rates are
affecting the availability of funds for land investment even more than the lower
mortgage rates. With the CD rates at 5 to 5.5 percent and long-term treasury bonds
at 7.5 percent, some investors feel that land is a good buy because it is returning
on current account as much as are CD's. Investors also believe land prices are
near their low, and if or when there is a resurgence of inflation, land prices will
increase. The St. Louis Farm Credit System is making special 8 percent loans for 5
years on land which they have acquired and are selling. A private reporting
service indicates this special financing is producing a higher average price on
that land compared with other similar land sold for cash or on more normal
financing terms. Therefore, the rate of interest does make a difference: other
things being equal, lower interest rates raise values.
Exchange Rates and the Trade Deficit. The dollar has been devalued from 25 percent
to as much as 40 percent, compared with the European currencies and the Japanese
yen. Combining the change in exchange rates and the dollar price decline, land
prices in terms of these foreign currencies are only one -fourth to one -third as
much as they were in 1980.
The large continuing trade deficit is putting megabucks into the hands of
foreigners. These dollars are coming back to the U.S. to buy different forms of
capital- -mostly government bonds and other commercial financial instruments but
also factories (the auto factory in Bloomington, Illinois is an example), U.S.
based companies (Howard Johnson's is owned by a British company), and real estate
in the form of office buildings, apartment complexes, shopping centers and
farmland. Up to now, foreign investment in farmland has been small, but with our
trade deficit running at over 10 to 15 billion dollars per month, there are
"megabucks abroad looking for something to purchase in the U.S." Three months of
the trade deficit provides enough money to buy all the farmland in Illinois. This
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author expects an increase in interest, demand, and purchase of Illinois farmland
by foreign investors. All things being equal, the increased demand will cause
farmland prices to rise. Some neighboring states have rules against foreign
ovmershlp; therefore, foreign money is more likely to be targeted at Illinois
farmland, provided the midwest is on the foreign buyers' shopping list.
General Inflation or Deflation. Inflation, at least as we knew it a few years ago,
is almost dead. The current rate is less than three percent. But what is the
chance that inflation will be resurrected? Probably, fairly high. The $64,000
question is when? With both a federal deficit still running bigger than ever and
the immense trade deficit, few economists seriously believe that low inflation
rates can be maintained for very long. Again, other things being equal, inflation
will increase farmland prices. Whether farmland ownership proves to be a good
hedge against inflation, as it was from 1950 to 1980, depends upon how large a
share of total GNP is garnered for agriculture. This might not happen next time
around. Commodity prices and land prices could go up but at a slower rate than
general inflation, making farmland prices nominally higher but less relative to
other things.
Farm Income has been declining in real terms for several years, but net rent to
land, except for year to year variation, has been almost level in current dollar
terms since 1980. Net rents from the better land on crop share leases in central
and northern Illinois have averaged $108, $93, $90, $102, $91, and $117 per acre,
respectively, for the years 1980 through 1985. Since 1983, however, a larger and
larger share of this rent has been produced through the use of Federal Farm
Programs. This could increase the uncertainty of potential return to the free
market should Congress, in its wisdom, retreat from appropriating ever larger
government subsidies. A substantial part of the record 1985 rents came from recorc
high yields as well as from government payments. A total return to the free market
(which is probably not very likely in the near term) could conceivably cut rent in
half. If this continued at a new, lower level for several years, and if investors
were convinced that this situation represented the equilibrium, land prices would
soon follow net rents down accordingly. So we continue to have rather depressing
commodity prices in the market for midwestern agricultural goods. This is a
serious drag on farmland prices resulting in, most likely, lower land prices.
Another factor developing in the market is the direct value effect on land due to
the size of the corn base on a particular tract. Two identical tracts with a
different corn base will have different values. Government programs totally
distorted the tobacco land market, and a similar distortion of the com land market
is in the offing. This means a widening differential in income to farmers and to
land rent between northern and southern Illinois because of the difference in crop
history of the various areas within the state. Northern Illinois, with more
livestock, has always grown more corn. Central Illinois has been about 50-50
between corn and soybeans, while southern Illinois has had less than half in corn.
If the programs continue to subsidize corn, the land price differential between
northern and southern Illinois will become even greater (the land price
differential Is already large because of basic productivity).
Other Reasons for Holdi ng Farmland. There are, of course, many reasons why people
own farmland, in addition to the level of current income generated. Other reasons
include speculation about inflation in the general economy, speculation about
location (where it could be used for other non-farm purposes), intrinsic value,
emotional attachment, open space, territorial imperative, permanency, and many
more. Thus, land value has never been as low as one would think, based purely on
comparing value and income of land with value and income of most financial
Instruments (for example, commercial and government bonds). In other words, the
current rate of return on land has always been less than the long- terra government
bond rate. This difference has varied over the years, depending on expectations
and non- agricultural income value. At the present time this difference is
approaching, historically, a more normal relationship. Land prices could overshoot
the equilibrium mark on the down side.
Summary. Currently, market prices on corn, wheat, and beans are much lower than
many people expected. Even though incomes have held up well, income decline is
likely over the coming year, due mainly to the lower price of soybeans. With a
return to normal yields and persistent lower market prices, the downward pressure
of income on land values is the most pervasive factor in the market. Lower
commodity prices coupled with government program uncertainties are the overpowering
factors pushing the market lower.
Another price depressant in the land market is the supply of land being held by
lending agencies that must come into the market. Despite many price- increasing
factors in the market, the general expectation is for a continuation of somewhat
lower land prices in the coming year. There are instances of land sales at prices
higher than expected, but there are usually special local circumstances affecting
those sales. Any future annual declines are likely to be more modest by recent
history (in the 5 to 10 percent range) but could be more, depending upon government
programs, extent of foreclosures, and land selling actions of lending institutions.
John T .yScott , Extension/Specialist , Land Economics and Farm Management
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana- Champaign
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86-19/The Projected Economic Situation of Midwest Livestock Farms
The financial situation of Midwest hog, feeder cattle, and dairy farms are pro-
jected from 1987 to 1990 with three initial debt-to-asset levels (20, 50, and 70
percent) and under three different price scenarios (weak, moderate, and strong).
Assumptions about farm size and production costs are based upon northern and
central Illinois hog, beef, and dairy farms in the Farm Business Farm Management
Association (FBFM)
.
For all three livestock farms, production costs and land values are assumed to
remain constant over the four-year projection period. Production costs are based
upon 1985 levels as reflected by FBFM averages. Interest rates on current,
intermediate, and long-term debt are assumed to be constant at 11 percent. An
assumption of $8,700 of off- farm income is included in all simulations. Crop
yields are assumed to be constant at 141 and 44 bushels per acre for corn and
soybeans, respectively, and 18 and 5 tons per acre for corn silage and hay,
respectively. Commodity prices for corn and soybeans are averages based on Food
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) and Chase Econometric esti-
mates. The prices used in the moderate price scenarios for market hogs, market
cattle, and milk are also averages of these estimates. Projected prices of all
crops and livestock are summarized in Table 1.
HOG FARMS
The base hog farm consists of 348 acres, of which 66 acres are owned and 282 are
rented on a 50-50 crop-share basis. Of this, 212 acres of corn and 136 acres of
soybeans are raised. The farm operator is assumed to own all hog facilities and
to farrow and finish 169 litters per year with an average of 7.68 pigs weaned per
litter. The results of the hog farm simulations are presented in Table 2.
Weak Prices
In the weak price scenario, net worth declines regardless of the initial debt-to-
asset ratio. Only the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent is
able to realize positive net farm income over the four-year period. This small
amount is insufficient to cover family living expenses; therefore, net worth
still declines. The hog farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent
is insolvent by 1990 under the weak price scenario.
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Table 1. Conxoodity Prices Used Co Project the Financial Conditions of Midwest
Livestock Farms
Commoditv Unit Scenario 1987 1988 1989 1990
Corn bu. All $ 1.90 $ 1.86 $ 1.95 $ 2.10
Soybeans bu. All 4.89 4.83 5.04 5.41
Silage ton All 15.00 15.00 15.00 15.00
Hay ton All 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Cull sows cwt. All 35.70 34.50 35.50 34.20
Feed, steers cwt. All 64.75 67.20 68.45 66.10
Veal calves cwt. All 71.50 71.50 71.50 71.50
Cull cows cwt. All 37.00 37.00 37.00 37.00
Weak 36.63 35.55 36.45 35.28
Mkt. hogs cwt. Moderate 40.70 39.50 40.50 39.20
Strong 48.84 47.40 48.60 47.04
Weak 55.13 57.33 58.46 56.34
Mkt. cattle cwt. Moderate 61.25 63.70 64.95 62.60
Strong 67.38 70.07 71.45 68.86
Weak 10.59 10.05 9.74 9.29
Milk cwt. Moderate 11.77 11.17 10.82 10.32
Strong 12.95 12.29 11.90 11.35
Moderate Prices
In the moderate price scenario, net farm income is still low and only the farmer
with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent is able to increase net worth.
For this farm, net farm income is still insufficient to cover family living
expenses. The inclusion of off- farm income allows these expenses to be met and
net worth to increase slightly. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset level of
50 percent will be able to survive for some time, but net farm income is weak and
net worth is declining. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70
percent has lost over one -half of the initial net worth by 1990 with moderate
prices. It is unlikely that this farm will survive much longer under these
economic conditions.
Strong Prices
For the strong price scenario, net farm income is strong and positive; net worth
increases regardless of the initial debt-to-asset ratio. The strong price
scenario most closely reflects the prices being received by hog farmers in late
fall of 1986 and depicts an optimistic outlook for hog farms if these economic
conditions continue.
I
Table 2. Projected Financial Situations of Midwest Hog Farms
Scenario
Initial debt-to-asset ratio
0.50
WEAK PRICES
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
Ending debt -to -asset
MODERATE PRICES
$ 12 238
6 322
6 994
6 211
$293 060
289 019
277 239
268 469
259 557
149
(5,994)
(4,790)
(5,367)
$183,163
167,033
145,638
125,569
104,923
0.61
($ 7,910)
( 14,939)
( 14,706)
( 16,374)
$109,898
85,709
55,491
25,506
6,147)
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
Ending debt-to-asset
STRONG PRICES
$ 23,202
16,962
17 , 904
16,770
$ 11.113
5,852
8,370
8,841
(
(
(
? 3,054
3,093)
1,328)
1,880)
$293,060
299,983
295,066
296,612
296,229
$183,163
177,997
166,094
158,744
151,508
$109,898
96,673
77,927
61,279
44.035
0.16 0.43
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 45.129
38,243
39,724
37,889
$ 33,040
29,545
32,110
31,095
$ 24,981
20.600
24.748
26,075
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
j
Ending debt-to-asset
$293,060
321,910
329,528
346,309
359.057
0.14
$183,163
199.924
203,521
214,134
220.830
0.34
$109,898
118.600
116.613
123.418
126.992
0.54
FEEDER CATTLE FARMS
The base feeder cattle farm consists of 434 acres, of which 119 acres are owned
and 315 acres are rented on a 50-50 crop-share basis. Of this, 260 acres of
corn, 115 acres of soybeans, 31 acres of corn silage, and 28 acres of hay are
raised. The farm operator is assumed to own all feeder cattle facilities and
feeds out 304 head of cattle per year. The results of the feeder cattle farm
simulations are presented in Table 3.
Veak Prices
For the weak price scenario, net farm income is negative and net worth declines
throughout the four-year period regardless of the initial debt-to-asset level.
The farmer with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent is insolvent by the
third year. Only the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent is
able to survive for an extended period of time under these economic conditions.
Moderate Prices
In the moderate price scenario, net farm income is negative except for the farm
with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent. The net farm income of this
farmer is still not enough to cover family living expenses; therefore, net worth
declines, but not as rapidly as it does for farms with initial debt-to-asset
ratios of 50 to 70 percent. Moderate prices are still not enough to allow the
farm with an initial 70 percent debt-to-asset ratio to remain solvent over the
entire four-year period.
Strong Prices
With strong prices, the feeder cattle farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
20 percent is able to increase net worth and maintain a strong level of net farm
income. The farm with an initial debt level equal to one-half of its assets is
able to generate small positive net farm incomes in the last three years and
slightly decrease the initial debt-to-asset ratio. Net worth still declines,
however. Even with strong prices, it is unlikely that the farmer with an initial
debt-to-asset level of 70 percent can continue to profitably feed cattle for an
extended period of time. Under the economic conditions presented here, this farm
has lost nearly one-half of its initial net worth at the end of the four-year
period.
DAIRY FARMS
The base dairy farm consists of 280 acres, of which 100 acres are owned and 180
acres are rented on a 50-50 crop-share basis. Of this, 122 acres of corn, 80
acres of soybeans, 28 acres of corn silage, and 50 acres of hay are raised. As
with the hog and feeder cattle farms, the farm operator is assumed to own all
livestock facilities. The farmer is assumed to milk a herd of 55 cows with an
annual milk production of 14,997 pounds per cow. Calves not kept for replacement
heifers are sold at 200 pounds. The results of the dairy farm simulations are
presented in Table 4.
Table 3. Projected Financial Situations of Midwest Feeder Cattle Farms
ratio
Scenario 0.20 0.50 0.70
WEAK PRICES
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
($23,617)
( 19,500)
( 14.430)
( 7,862)
($43,341)
( 41,393)
( 38,731)
( 34,836)
($ 56,490)
( 55,988)
( 54,932)
( 52,819)
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
$478,147
438,251
403,472
373,763
350,622
$298,843
239,223
182,551
128,541
78,426
$179,305
106,536
35,269
( 34,942)
( 103,040)
Ending debt-to-asset 0.33 0.85 1.20
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
($ 3,682)
3,442
11,423
20,017
($ 23,406)
( 18,451)
( 12,876)
( 6,886)
($ 36.555)
( 33.047)
( 29.077)
( 24.869)
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
$478,147
458,186
446,323
441,840
444,769
$298,843
259,158
225,428
197,273
175,108
$179,305
126.471
78.145
33,789
( 6,359)
Ending debt -to -asset
STRONG PRICES
' Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
I
1990
' Ending debt-to-asset
0.66 1.01
$ 16,284 ($ 3,440) ($ 16.589)
26,387 4,494 ( 10,101)
34,754 13,013 ( 3.184)
41,812 20,984 ( 3,091)
$478,147 $298,843 $179,305
478,152 279,124 146,437
484,058 268,307 121,057
497,381 265,258 102,594
512,000 268,919 90,368
0.12 0.48 O.E
Table ^. Projected Financial SiCuaCions of Midwest Dairy Farms
Initial debt-to-asset ratio
0.20 0.50 0.70
VEAK PRICES
\
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 26.503
22,693
21,339
25,362
$ 11.614
9,236
9.105
13,570
$ 1,687
( 1.783)
( 2.954)
221
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
$360,966
371,190
372,062
377,025
384,160
$225,603
220,938
213,175
206,599
204,544
$135,362 i
120.770 '
103,548
85.242
70,140
Ending debt-to-asset 0.16 0.46 0.81
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 36,236
31,932
30,247
33,858
$ 21,347
19,545
19,482
24,313
$ 11,420
8.527
7,993
11,932
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
$360,966
380,923
387,498
398,426
411,443
$225,603
230,671
230,117
232,392
237,963
$135,362
130.503
122.087
114.470
110.805
Ending debt-to-asset 0.15 0.38 0.71
STRONG PRICES
Net farm income
1987
1988
1989
1990
$ 45.969
41.170
39.155
42.354
$ 31,080
29,184
28.390
32.809
$ 21,153
18,835
18.767
23,314
Net worth
Initial
1987
1988
1989
1990
Ending debt-to-asset
$360,966
390.656
402.353
418.553
436.793
0.14
$225,603
240.404
245.711
253.998
264.183
0.36
$135,362
140.236
139,044
140,710
145,645
0.62
Weak Prices
For the scenario with weak milk prices, net farm income is strong and net worth
increases for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent. The
farmer with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 50 percent generates a positive net
farm income, although net worth declines. This farm can survive for a period of
time under these conditions even with the low milk prices assumed here. However,
the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent is not likely to
survive an extended period of time with low prices. Net worth declines rapidly
and the debt-to-asset ratio has risen to 81 percent at the end of the fourth
year.
Moderate Prices
All three farms are able to generate positive net farm incomes in the moderate
price scenarios. In addition, the farms with initial debt-to-asset ratios of 20
to 50 percent are able to increase net worth and reduce their debt-to-asset
ratios. Only the dairy farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent
decreases its net worth with moderate prices; net farm income is insufficient to
cover family living expenses. The inclusion of off -farm income, however, allows
this farm to nearly maintain the initial debt-to-asset ratio of 70 percent.
Strong Prices
For the scenario with strong milk prices, net farm income is positive and strong
for all three simulations, particularly for the dairy farms with initial debt-to-
asset ratios of 20 to 50 percent. Net worth is increased and the debt-to-asset
ratio is reduced in each case. The results of these simulations are optimistic
for dairy farms if strong milk prices are maintained in the future.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The simulations presented here provide an optimistic outlook for hog and dairy
farms if the strong prices realized in late fall of 1986 continue in the future.
Livestock farmers should also consider farm program participation to increase
crop returns.
Prepared by David Neff, Agricultural Economist and David Lins , Extension
Specialist, Farm Financial Management
Submitted by David A. Lins
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87-1/Crop Production and Marketing Plans for 1987
Although you may have already taken steps to carry out your long-run crop plans, it
could be profitable to take a careful look at prices and costs and the provisions
for participation in the Feed Grain and Wheat Programs for 1987 to see whether some
changes should be made in your cropping program for the upcoming year. ""'''CULTURF ltBR/\({f
1987 PROGRAMS PROVISIONS FOR FEED GRAINS & WHEAT *^^'- 5 1388
TARGET PRICES AND LOAN PRICES . For a 1987 crop, the target prices wi^^W^^MlUINOiS
for corn and $4.38 for wheat, the same levels as 1985. The announced loan rates
will be $1.82 for corn and $2.28 for wheat. The base loan rate for soybeans con-
tinues at $5.02 price level but may be reduced by 5 percent to $4.77, if the Secre-
tary of Agriculture deems it necessary. Deficiency payment rates are calculated as
the difference between the target price and the higher of the average price that
farmers received for the commodity during the 1987 grain marketing year or the
Table 1. Program Provisions and Payment Rates, 1987
Corn Sorghum Barley Oats Wheat
Required acreage reduction (% of base)
Maximum permitted acreage (% of base)
.
Cash land diversion (% of base)
Target price
Announced nine-month loan price
Maximum deficiency payment rate
Deficiency subject to payment
limitation
Projected deficiency payment rate
Advance deficiency rate
Cash
PIK
Cash diversion payment rate
Advance diversion rate
Cash
PIK
20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 27.5
80 80 80 80 72.5
15 15 15 15 NA
$3.03 $2.88 $2.60 $1.60 $4.38
1.82 1.74 1.49 .94 2.28
1.21 1.14 1.11 .66 2.10
.75 .70 .74 .42 1.53
1.21 1.14 1.11 .55 2.10
.242 .228 .222 .11 .42
.242 .228 .222 .11 .42
2.00 1.90 1.60 .80 NA
.50 .425 .40 .20 NA
.50 .425 .40 .20 NA
I
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the 130-bushel corn yield level. Higher corn prices increase returns over variable
costs per acre for nonparticipants . Net returns per acre for participants do not
change because increases in seasonal average market prices are offset by reduced
deficiency payment rates.
At expected yield levels near the program yield, there is little difference between
net crop income from participation in 20 percent set aside and from participation
in optional 15 percent land diversion for feed grains. In a marginal sense, the
simple comparison is between the net returns from 1 acre of paid land diversion
(ASCS yield x $2.00 less conservation cover costs) and net returns from one acre
planted to corn (yield of corn x $3.03 less variable production costs). The criti-
cal considerations are the amount of variable costs and the production yield risk.
Livestock producers considering participating in the program should compare the
quantity of feed grains that could be raised on the idled acres required for par-
ticipation with the amount of feed grains that could be purchased with some of the
experted deficiency and diversion payments plus the crop costs saved by the idle
acres.
Producers should carefully budget alternatives to their situation using worksheet
AE-4543, Income PossibiliCies : Participation versus Non-Participation in 1987
Government Program for Com or Wheat. Copies of this worksheet are available in
county Extension Offices.
R.A. Hinton, Extension Specialist , Farm Management
TABLE 2. Comparison of Crop Returns per Acre, 1987
Harvest Crop
Production Price Returns Net Returns
or Base or Rate or Variable Over Var-
Acres (bu. or ton) per Unit Payment Costs
^
abie Costs
CORN (Not participate) 1.0 90
Participate - 20* RAP
Com 8 72
RAP (deficiency for.aA)^ _^ 69.2
Composite base acre... 1.0
Participate - 20* RAP + 15* Diverted Acres
Corn 65 58.5
RAP (deficency for.65A)2 .20 56.2
Diversion . 15 13
Composite base acre... 1.00
CORN (Not participate) 1.0 130
Participate - 20* RAP
Com .8 104
RAP (deficiency for.SAj^ /l 100
i te base acre ... 1.0
Participate - 20* RAP + 15* Diverted Acres
Com 65 84.5
RAP (deficency for.65A)2 .20 81.25
Diversion .1 5 18.75
Con^osite base acre. . . 1.00
CORN (Not participate) 1.0 130
Participate - 20* RAP
Corn .8 104
RAP (deficiency for.BA)^ _^ 100
Ccmposite base acre... 1.0
Participate - 20* RAP + 15* Diverted Acres
Com .65 84.5
RAP (deficency for.65A)2 .20 81.25
Diversion 15 18.75
Composite base acre. . . 1.00
SOYBEANS 1.0 30
45
60
WHEAT (Not participate)... 1.0 54
Participate
Wheat 725 39.2
RAP (deficiency on
.725A.)2 .275 37.6
Composite 1.000
DOUBLE CROP SOYBEANS 1.0 20
WHEAT & DC SOYBEANS
Not participate 1.0
Participate
Composite base acre 1.0
OATS 1.0 60
80
100
HAY 1.0 3.0
4.5
6.0
J1.70 $163.00 SllO.OO
1.70 122.40 88.00
1.21 83.73 4.00
S206.13 S 92.00
1.70 $ 99.45 $71.50
1.21 68.00 4.00
2.00 26.00 3.00
$193.45 S 78.50
$221.00 $134.00
1.70 176.80 107.20
1.21 121.00 4.00
$297.80 Sill. 20
1.70 $143.65 $ 87.10
1.21 98.31 4.00
2.00 37.50 3.00
$279.46 $ 94.10
52.30 $299.00 $134.00
2.30 239.20 107.20
.60 60.00 4.00
$299.20 $111.20
$114.95
$ 87.00
$185.36
$166.00
2.30
.60
2.00
$194.35
48.75
37.50
$280.60
$
?
87.10
4.00
3.00
94.10 $186.50
4.50 $135.00
202 . 50
280.00
$ 65.00
73.00
81.00
$ 70.00
129.50
189.00
2.00 $108.00 $ 63.00 S 45.00
2.00 78.30 45.70
2.10 79.20 1^
$157.50 $ 51.20 $106.30
4.50 S 90.00 $ 59.00 $ 31.00
$198.00 S122.0O S 76.00
$222.75 S 94.00 $128.75
SI. 00 $ 60.00 $ 49.00 $ 8.00
1.00 80.00 52.00 25.00
1.00 100.00 57.00 40.00
$50 $150.00 $ 68.00 S 82.00
50 225.00 90.00 135.00
60 300.00 115.00 185.00
^ Includes seed, pesticides, fertilizer, machinery repairs and fuel, drying costs,
and interest on operating capital only.
2 Quantity for payment is program yield times acres planted. Assume ASCS
program yield of 86.5 or 125 bushels for com and 62 tushels for v*eat.
Table 3. Estimated Costs Per Acre for Producing Crops, 1987
SeoorxJ- Double- Set
Rotated year Grain crop aside Alfalfa
com oom sorghum Soybeans Wheat Oats scybearts cover hay
fl35bu.) fl25 bu.) fl20bu.) f45bu.) f54 bu.) reo bu. ) f20 bu.) croD f4.5 tons)
Variable costs:
Seed $ 20
Pesticides 16
Fertilizer
N 26
P, K, Lime 19
H=hy. rep. & fuel . . 30
Dry. fuels & r^. . . 16
Interest on operating
capitiil 7
Total variable costs. . $134
Other costs:
Mchy. depr. & int. . . § 45
labor 21
Management 10
Storing (int. & bin)
.
23
Misc 15
Total other costs . . . $114
Land oosts (cash rent) $ 80
Total all costs .... $328
$ 20 S 6 $ 9
30 13 18
26 23
18 16 17
30 27 25
15 18
10 $ 8 $ 11
1 1 25
14 12
16 12 6
18 16 14
$ 10
7
—
s
§ 4 4 3 3 --- 5
$147 $109 $ 73 $ 63 $ 52 $ 59 $ 15 $ 90
$ 45
21
9
21
_15
$ 42
20
8
19
$ 40
20
10
15
_J3
$ 32
10
6
11
15
$ 32
10
4
11
_15
$ 25
10
5
7
$ 22
5
$ 40
40
14
34
$111 $104 $100 $ 74 $ 72 $ 55 $ 35 $143
$ 80
$338
$ 80
$293
$ 80
$253
$ 80
$217
$ 80
$204
$
$114
$ 80
$130
$ 80
$313
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87-2/Changes in Meat Demand
JUL 5 )988
The red meat industry is an important source of farm income in Illinois. Hogs
provide 16 percent of cash farm income; cattle account for another 10 percent. Poor
profitability in recent years has led to declining numbers of hogs and cattle in
Illinois as well as in the rest of the United States. Many producers have blamed low
real livestock prices on a decline in consumer willingness to eat red meat. This
newsletter reviews the changes in meat demand and their implications ^or the future
of the red meat industry. flGRICUITl»»>i l»f^„^
WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO MEAT CONSUMPTION?
Annual total meat consumption- -red meats plus poultry- -has grown frT5tt*^0§'^cWntti.»/netf
person in 1965 to 211 pounds in 1985, but the percentages of poultry, pork, and beef
consumed have changed. Poultry consumption grew steadily over the last twenty years
from 41 pounds per person in 1965 to 70 pounds per person in 1985 (Figure 1) , and the
rate of growth has increased in recent years. Pork consumption fluctuated around a
long-run average of 60 pounds per person from 1965 to 1985. Beef consumption peaked
In 1976 and then fell sharply. Average beef consumption from 1979 to 1985 was 78
pounds per person and less than the average of 81 pounds from 1965 to 1972. Beef's
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Figure 1. Per capita meat consumption, 1965 to 1985 (pounds per year).
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share of meat intake declined from 44 to 37 percent over the last twenty years, whi
poultry's share increased from 25 to 33 percent. Pork's share declined slightly f:
31 to 29 percent.
DO THESE TRENDS MEAN THAT DEMAND HAS CHANGED?
A change in consumption is not the same as a change in demand. Meat consumption
changes when consumers respond to changes in meat prices and consumer income. But
changes in meat consumption can also occur because of changes in consumer
preferences. Changes in consumption due to changes in consumer preferences are tmie
changes in demand. A change in demand requires a change in the willingness of
consumers to buy meat, even when prices do not change.
The distinction between changes in prices and changes in preferences is important
the red meat industry. If beef consumption has declined because chicken has becoi
cheaper, then the beef industry needs to reduce costs to stay competitive in terms
price. If beef consumption has declined because consumers now prefer chicken, thi
the beef industry needs to focus on product development and promotion.
WHAT TYPE OF CHANGE HAS OCCURRED?
A look at the relative prices of meat illustrates why beef consvunption fell and why
chicken consumption increased. The price of beef increased relative to the price of
chicken after 1978 (Figure 2). Chicken has always been the cheapest meat, but it
became even cheaper relative to beef. The price of beef also increased relative to
the price of pork. Consumers ate less beef because it was more expensive, and more
chicken because it was cheaper. In addition to these relative changes in price,
consumer income grew more slowly in the early 1980s because of the economic recessio
in 1981 and 1982. Consumers had fewer extra dollars to spend on increased meat
consumption and more reason to shift to cheaper poultry products.
Changes in meat prices and consumer income explain most of the changes in chicken an
pork consumption, but only about half of the changes in beef consumption. Various
1965 1970 1975
Figure 2. Ratios of retail meat prices, 1965 to 1985.
1980 1985
^tudies of meat demand have concluded that some type of change in beef preferences
occurred in the late 1970s. Consumers became less willing to buy more beef when beef
prices fell, less willing to spend additional income on additional beef consumption,
and more willing to substitute chicken for beef.
JHAT MIGHT HAVE CAUSED THE CHANGE IN DEMAND?
rlealth concerns about the fat and cholesterol in red meat are frequently cited as a
:ause of changed meat preferences. But why would health concerns only alter the
demand for beef and not the demand for pork? Cutting down on beef alone because of
wealth concerns would be inconsistent.
Another possible cause of the change in beef demand is the changing composition of
Che U.S. population. The characteristics of the "average" consumer have altered over
time, so average consumption might have changed. For example, the proportion of
lonwhites increased from 13 percent of the population in 1970 to 17 percent in 1980.
\s nonwhites consume more pork and chicken than whites , average pork and chicken
consumption would tend to increase slightly.
\nother demographic change is the aging of the population. The proportion of the
population over 65 has increased from 10 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 1983. This
aging should lead to a decline in average beef consumption. After age 65, beef
consumption falls by 31 percent, but pork consumption falls by only 15 percent, and
and chicken consumption falls by only 10 percent. With lower birth rates and the
aging of the baby boom generation, there will be a larger proportion of senior
citizens and slightly smaller average beef consumption.
Changes in the distribution of income growth since 1978 have also had an adverse
sffect on beef consumption. The proportion of the population in middle income groups
laving an annual household income between $20,000 and $47,000 declined. Most of
those leaving the middle group experienced a drop in real income. Income growth from
1978 to 1986 was more concentrated than in previous years in the upper income group,
rfhich has an annual household income greater than $47,000. Because middle income
'roups have the biggest increase in beef consumption when their income grows, this
distribution of income growth has not favored growth in beef consumption.
rhe changing structure of American households and the increasing participation of
<7omen in the paid work force have probably altered consumption preferences,
louseholds headed by single persons increased from 13 to 23 percent of all households
)etween 1960 and 1980. Households headed by females increased dramatically from 9 to
?6 percent of all households during the same period. The proportion of women between
:he ages of 25 and 44 who work for pay increased from 40 percent in 1960 to 66
percent in 1980. These trends mean that the value of time has increased for the
)rincipal meal planner and preparer, so the demand for convenience has risen. As
households headed by females have lower incomes than the average, these households
/ill be interested in both convenience and value.
it is interesting that the broiler industry has been able to increase the convenience
pf their product over time. The proportion of broilers marketed as cut-up parts
increased from 19 percent in 1965 to 53 percent in 1985; processed products grew from
> to 17 percent during the same period. Less convenient, whole birds declined from
'0 percent in 1965 to 30 percent in 1985. Red meat products have always been "cut-
ip," but chicken now has both a price advantage and equivalent convenience.
I
Chicken has become relatively cheaper over time so that it is more competitive with
both red meats. The declining cost of chicken accounts for a large portion of the
changes in American meat consumption. In order for red meats to maintain their
market share in the future, they will have to offer reduced prices relative to the
price of chicken. The pork industry has slowed market-share loss in the 1980s with
sharp declines in the real price of pork due to reduced costs of production. Beef
lost its share of the market more rapidly than pork because the price of beef
increased more relative to the price of chicken. Cost reductions in beef production
would allow producers to offer a cheaper product at a profit- -a measure that would
enable beef to regain some share of the market.
Beef demand also seems to have suffered from a change in consumer preferences. Even
if prices had not changed, consumers would be less willing to buy beef now than they
were in the early 1970s. Health concerns do not seem to explain sufficiently this
shift in preferences. Therefore promotional efforts that focus on health issues may
have only a limited effect in boosting consumer demand. Developing products that
meet the taste and need for convenience of the changing American consumer will be a
more effective strategy for restoring consumer demand for beef.
(^iu^yU^L^y^^ U^v\/iA^/^/^J^
Issued by Laurian J. Unnevehr , Extension Specialist , Prices and Outloc
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"Why do I have to grow old?" was Bruce 's question during a series of interviews
with 140 retired farm couples, widows, and widowers. Bruce 's 45 -year-old
daughter answered her father's question: "Dad, you don't have to grow 'old,' but
we want you to grow 'older.' If you don't, the alternative is not very pleasant
-
-for you or for us!"
There is a difference between "growing old" and "growing older!" After all,
hasn't your goal been to "grow older" since the day you were born? So keep on
doing that each day of your life. But don't ever let yourself "grow old."
Before you retire, choose whether you want to drift into retirement or whether
you want to plan and prepare to make the top third of your life satisfying, self-
enriching, useful, and rewarding.
As you "grow older" there come the questions, "Should I quit farming?
retire?" "When?" or "Should I 'just die with my boots on?'"
'Should I
Whatever the answer for you, here are some guidelines to help you think about,
talk about, and make plans for your "older" years- -wise suggestions from the
retired farm folks who were interviewed.
THERE WILL BE MORE OF US.
The ranks of older Americans surged dramatically during the 1970s. In a new
study, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that the number of persons aged 65 and over
jumped 23 percent from 1970 to 1979. In 1930, one of every twenty Americans was
over 65; today it's one of every ten.
Predictions for the year 2000 are one of every eight, and for 2035 --when today's
teenagers will be in their sixties- -one of every five and possibly one of every
three or four will be 65 and older.
So planning for your "older" years is as critical as the planning you've done
thus far in your life.
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THE LONGER YOU LIVE, THE LONGER YOU'RE GOING TO LIVE. 1
One of the far-reaching developments of this century is the lengthening of the
life span. In 1900, the average American life expectancy at birth was 45 years.
By 1930, that had been extended to 64 years and by 1980, to 78 years. Today,
golden wedding anniversa- ries are not an uncommon American celebration.
And what about average life expectancies for older Americans? In 1930, an
average 55-year-old female could expect to live 20 more years and in 1980, 27
more years.
The key to successful retirement living is planning well in advance of your
scheduled exit from the world of full-time farming, not postponing it to the last
possible moment. Many of the 140 retired farm couples recommended that retire-
ment planning should begin well before you quit farming, slow down, or turn the
business over to the next generation. But one word of caution: never let those
plans fence you in. Be ready for changes. Remain flexible.
CHANGES. CHANGES, CHANGES!
Just as you've adjusted to change while you've been farming, so you will need to
adjust to change as you quit farming, slow down, or even keep on farming to "die
with your boots on."
While you have been farming, many changes have occurred outside of agriculture:
the atom bomb, objects and persons in space and on the moon, antibiotics,
television, sedatives, pain killers, new surgical procedures, laser beams.
Changes will continue to occur that will affect your retirement lifestyle.
In the interviews, the retired farm couples shared many "changes" they had
handled since retiring- -some successfully, some not so successfully: 1) change
in their "people circle" or persons with whom they spent their time, such as
family, friends, or others; 2) more togetherness: "...twice as much husband and
half as much pay," joked one farm wife; 3) health limitations: you or your mate
may develop health problems that drastically change both of your lifestyles; and
4) more idle- -and sometimes boring- -time may creep into the daily schedule.
During the coming years, family, governmental, cultural, and economic
institutions will have to accommodate the changes in society brought on by the
shift from a youth- oriented culture to one in which the fastest growing segments
of the populations are middle-aged and older people.
TALK ABOUT IT.
Talk with your spouse, your children, other family members, trusted friends, and
counselors about "retirement," "growing older," "what it will be like." Don't be
like the Illinois farmer who planted corn in his 42nd year of farming and
announced to his wife, "I am going to retire when we harvest this corn next fall,
and we're moving to Florida," when neither of them had ever been to Florida.
After living- -unhappily-
-in Florida for two years, he then announced, "We're
selling our house here and moving to Galveston, Texas. Again, neither had been
to Galveston. A year later while visiting a cousin who was wintering in the
Southwest, both he and his spouse decided that was where they wanted to live.
They sold the Galveston house and moved to Arizona. For nine years life was fine
in their double-wide mobile home. Regretfully, he said "We just wasted four
years of our retirement because we didn't "talk about it."
WHERE YOU LIVE.
You have lived where you have farmed. Where you live when you retire is a "new
ball game." You have some new options: move into a smaller house on the farm or
in a nearby village; rent or buy a house in the county seat or a larger town or
city; rent an apartment; buy into a retirement village or a life -long living
facility; buy a condominium, move to "sun country."
Regardless of where you decide to live and in what you decide to live, you should
- Be near people you like or love and who feel the same about you.
- Know you can live comfortably and have a full life despite any handicaps.
- Have access to facilities and services you'll need for comfort and contentment.
- Feel you "belong" in the community or in your "people circle."
- Feel mentally at ease and physically safe.
But, by all means, if you decide to move, check it out- -try it out. Look before
you leap!
KEEP ON GIVING -- OF YOURSELF. THAT IS.
"Time hung heavy on my hands," "I was bored," "I climbed the walls," "I didn't
have anything to do," "I felt I wasn't worth anything when we first retired,"
were typical comments from retired farm folks.
How did they solve these bugaboos? Generally with activities where they gave of
themselves for or with someone else: volunteering, part-time job, creative
hobbies, doing things for others on a somewhat regular schedule. If you begin to
feel sorry for yourself- -not genuine sorrow, but the "poor put-upon me" variety-
-
the best way to deal with this is to do something for someone else.
Satisfying, newly-found leisure when you retire isn't something that's
automatically going to happen to you. Most people must plan for it. Today,
while you're still farming is the time to set a few new leisure-time goals and
try out some activities other than farming or being a farm homemaker. As Alan
Harrington wrote in his book. Life in Che Crystal Palace, "We are all, it seems,
saving ourselves for the 'senior' prom. But many of us forget that somewhere
along the way... and surely before the prom. . .we must learn to dance."
Your adjustment to retirement's abundance of time will be easier if you regard
leisure, play, and loafing as important and necessary parts of a well-rounded
person. "We don't stop playing because we grow older; we 'grow old' because we
stop playing.
"
YOU ARE WHAT YOU EAT.
Proper nutrition is a must whether you're 8 or 80. Eat a variety of foods from
the four food groups: 1) milk and cheese, 2) vegetables and fruits, 3) meat,
poultry, fish, and beans, and 4) breads and cereals. Eat other foods with
caution.
Retired farm folks often reported that they gained weight, "got fat" when they
quit farming. They handled the situation by eating a balanced and varied diet,
consuming less, and exercising more.
KEEP THE LEGS GOING.
Typical was Henry's response:
"Our retirement lifestyle was drastically different. We took
trips, did some fishing, slept late, and ate out often. Being
around the house more, I snacked and 'warmed' the rocking chair in
front of the TV. "Hilda and I put on weight. I was having
sleepless nights, didn't feel good. My friend, a former coach,
challenged us to 'get more exercise.' So we started walking. I'm
learning to swim at the Y. Now we walk a mile three times a week.
We've both lost weight, feel better, and have more energy to do
the things we've looked forward to in our retirement."
Physical decline need not happen when you retire. Retirement is not necessarily a
time to slow down and do less. Much of physical frailty attributed to aging is
actually the result of muscular disuse and poor diet. You can lower your rate of
physical decline through proper eating habits and getting some physical activity
into your dally life.
DON'T GIVE IT AWAY TOO SOON.
Some retired farm couples said that when they retired, they started "gifting" to
children and others their wealth and possessions. Why? "To avoid tax when we
die." But one couple, ages 94 and 92 and retired 34 years, said, "We've lived
longer than we expected. We now need some of the money we gave away 30 years ago."
As you think about, talk about, and make plans for the top third of your life, if
retirement appears to be a strange land you are preparing to visit, there's good
news. The people there speak your language. And it is a language with which you
are familiar: $ $ $!
Money will continue to have its familiar role after Social Security payments begin
to appear each month on your bank account statement or in your mailbox.
You will not be able to exchange money for everything you want, just as you haven't
while you've been farming. You'll have priorities then just as you have now. They
might be different, but you'll still have them. Many of the retirement satis-
factions and comforts will be closely related to having those dollars at the right
time and in the right amount.
Peter A. Dickinson, in his The Complete Retirement Planning Book, advises, "Chances
are you'll find that no matter at what age you retire, or how much or how little
money you have now, you must change to the changing conditions. Your income and
your expenses will change; Interest rates and investment returns will change....
To be financially free during retirement, you'll need:
-savings for emergencies,
-guaranteed income to meet expenses.
-Investment income to move up and down with inflation, and
-some form of security for now and in the future."
Diversify your investments so your wealth does not rise and fall solely on land
values
.
DON'T "HANG IN THERE" TOO LONG.
"When I was 60, I told my sons 1 thought I could help out on the farm until I was
65. I'm 66 now and I think I can still go another five years!"
But the older one grows, the more difficult it becomes to make the adjustments to
retirement. Some retired farmers said they thought the best thing they did was to
"step aside and turn the farm over to the next generation."
Preparing for lifestyle changes when you retire requires accepting inevitability,
just as you have accepted and coped with change during your whole life. To
acknowledge that one's youth and energy must wane is a measure of maturity. It is
the law of nature and therefore an unwritten provision in the charter of every
human family and its members. Stepping aside and getting out of the way of the
next generation may be the most valuable service you can render.
But it is by no means a final service. For as you step aside and look at things
from a different perspective, you can observe- -with satisfaction or disgust- -the
effectiveness of having taught the next generation. It is then that your sei-vice
to your spouse, children, relatives, friends, and organizations can be most
rewarding. With careful foresight and planning you can prepare a retirement
program that allows you a sense of continuing achievement and self-satisfaction,
yet reserves time to share your hard-earned expertise.
What is retirement? One retiree said, "It is doing what you want to do when you
want to do it.
"
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87-4/The World Bank, Economic Development, and Future Markets
for U.S. Agricultural Exports
In the past few years, U.S. assistance to agriculture in other countries has
provoked considerable controversy in discussions of farm policy. Opponents of
further assistance have blamed it for the farm crisis at home. Others have de-
fended this assistance because it has served our enlightened national self-interest
and the long-run interests of U.S. agriculture. Presented to the U.S. Feed Grains
Council in August, 1986, this paper by Dr. G. Edward Schuh provides information
about one type of foreign assistance that is supported in part by the United States:
the World Bank.
Dr. Schuh spent many years as Head of the Department of Applied and Agricultural
Economics at the University of Minnesota. In 1985, he joined the World Bank as
Director of Agriculture and Rural Development . The opinions expressed here are
those of Dr. Schuh and do not necessarily represent those of the World Bank or the
University of Illinois.
Many U.S. farmers have gone through unusual economic stress these past five years as
foreign markets for their commodities have contracted, the relative prices of their
commodities have declined, and their assets have experienced an unusual collapse in
value. These developments have occurred in a poorly understood world in which the
U.S. economy has grown so open to trade that it is increasingly beyond the reach of
domestic programs. Monetary and fiscal policies and the international capital
market have had a greater impact on the welfare of U.S. agriculture than domestic
commodity programs.
It is not surprising that under these circumstances farmers and their representa-
tives should be critical of whatever seems to contribute to their problems. An in-
creasingly important target in recent months has been the efforts of The World Bank
and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to strengthen agriculture in
developing countries.
I would like to divide my comments into four parts. First, I will provide some
background on the World Bank and its program. Second, I will establish the link
between agricultural development in developing countries and markets for U.S. agri-
cultural commodities. Third, I will consider the issue of playing on a level play-
ing field. And finally, I will discuss economic growth and liberalization of trade
as the keys to future agricultural markets.
i
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The World Bank was created at the end of World War II as one of the Bretton Woods
twins--its sister being the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Bank was known
as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in its original
Incarnation. That name still applies to the main component of the Bank. The
original mission of the Bank was the reconstruction of war- torn Europe and other
countries affected by the war, primarily by means of longer-term investments in
physical infrastructure and physical capital. Its present focus on the developing
countries came only later, although this objective was foreseen in its original
charter. The IMF, for its part, was designed to help countries experiencing
problems with their balance of payments by granting them short-term loans to help
them get through difficult adjustment problems.
The Bank is owned by 150 member countries who have subscribed its capital. Day- to-
day operations of the Bank are guided by a Board of Executive Directors nominated b
the member countries. Voting is proportional to the amount of capital contributed.
Having contributed about 20 percent of the Bank's capital, the United States has 20
percent of the vote. Lest you think that this is an excessively high share of the
capital, keep in mind that the United States accounts for 30 percent of world GNP.
In that sense it has not contributed its proportional share of the operations of th
Bank.
The Bank is made up of three main components and thus is often referred to as the
World Bank group. The most important of these is what was originally created as th
IBRD, although now it too is commonly referred to as the World Bank. This componen
of the Bank is a financial intermediary just like any other bank in that it borrows
from international capital markets and relends this capital to developing countries
at near commercial rates. In the process the Bank makes a profit. Its lending
rates tend to be about a half a point below regular commercial rates. The
difference in rates is accounted for by the ability of the Bank to borrow at lower
rates than most commercial banks. Contrary to regular commercial banks, the World
Bank does not accept deposits.
In the fiscal year just ended, total lending of this component of the Bank was
US$13.2 billion. The goal for the current year is US$15 billion.
The second component of the Bank is the International Development Association (IDA)
The IDA was created in the 1970s, largely at the instigation of the United States.
It loans to the poorest of the poor countries at a zero interest rate and for a
period up to 50 years. These countries do have to pay a service charge of about a
half percent, and they also have to pay the loan back. Hence, this is not grant
money
.
The goal has been to provide US$4.0 billion of IDA lending each year. Because the
United States did not come through with the amount expected in the last subscrip-
tion, however, IDA lending has not met that goal. In the fiscal year just
completed, total lending was only US$3.1 billion, but this amount was augmented by
US$780 million from the Special African Facility.
The third component of the Bank is the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
which makes direct investments in private companies in the developing countries.
I
The IBRD and the IDA lend their money directly to national governments. The IFC, in
contrast, is designed to promote the development of the private sector. Like the
IBRD, it borrows the money it lends from capital markets.
The total lending from IBRD and IDA for agriculture this past year was US$4.7
billion, which was about 30 percent of total Bank lending. In recent years, this
proportion has generally been about 25 percent of a smaller total loan portfolio.
That percentage is about what it is expected to be in the near future in terras of
the share, but total lending is expected to increase.
To put this agricultural lending in perspective, a comparison with the ending of the
U.S. Farm Credit System is useful. In 1984, the last year for v.-hich data are
available, the gross loans and refinancing of the Farm Credit System was US$64.4
billion. This figure is the closest I could find to the US$4.7 billion agricultural
lending of the World Bank for the agriculture of all developing countries this past
year. The numbers are not directly comparable, but they do help put the Bank's
lending program in perspective.
Now let me say something about the nature of the Bank's lending program.
Traditionally, the Bank has engaged in what is described as project lending. In
other words, it provided funding for construction of dams, irrigation projects,
roads, railroads, ports, and other components of physical infrastructure. Moreover,
this money was loaned with very few conditions other than those related to these
projects per se
.
Starting around 1980, however, two important changes were made in the lending
program. First, a great deal more attention was given to economic policies in the
borrowing countries, and more rational economic policies began to be required as a
condition for a loan- -what is referred to as conditionality . In the case of agri-
culture, of course, such reforms can cut two ways. Many developing countries
seriously discriminate against their agriculture by means of overvalued currencies,
export taxes, marketing boards that buy cheap from agriculture and sell dear, and
outright embargoes on agricultural exports. Reducing or alleviating these
discriminatory policies strengthens agriculture in these countries, and that is the
intent of the conditionality. In some cases, as in the proposed elimination of the
agricultural export tax in Argentina, it can even make a country more competitive in
foreign markets.
But in other cases, the reforms go the other way. For example, many developing
countries provide subsidized credit to their farmers, as well as subsidized
fertilizer and other modern inputs. The Bank often requires the phasing out of
these subsidies as part of its conditionality. This was the case in the recent loan
to Brazil. The phasing out of these subsidies makes these countries less
competitive in foreign markets.
The second change in lending policies since around 1980 has been to provide more
lending for what is called structural or sectoral adjustment. This lending is
designed to help countries restructure their economies in order to develop the means
to service their foreign debt, and to help deal with the serious problems with
ibalance of payments that these countries face. Structural and sectoral adjustment
loans tend to be fairly large, quick disbursing- -over a one- or two-year period,
carry heavy policy conditionality and often are not related to a project. A good
example is again the recent loan to Brazil, which provided US$400 million out of a
US$500 million loan to finance imports over a two-year period, a portion of which is
expected to be agricultural commodities- -rice , wheat, corn, and beef. (The remain-
ling US$100 million of that loan, incidentally, is to finance improvements in the
Idomestic marketing system.)
There is one other aspect of the character of the Bank's lending program that is
important. The bank's emphasis on agriculture became significant in the early
1970s. But this increased attention was motivated not so much by a desire to
increase agricultural production as it was to improve the incomes of rural people.
The bulk of the poverty in the world is located in agriculture, and in many
developing countries per capita incomes in the urban sector are larger than per
capita incomes of rural people by a factor of two or three. This concern about
poverty still dominates the agricultural lending program: the Bank is committed to
allocating about half of the funds in its agricultural lending program to alleviate
poverty.
AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
AND FUTURE MARKETS FOR U.S. AGRICULTURE
The World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development have recently come
under fire from U.S. commodity groups and their representatives in Congress for
their efforts to strengthen agriculture in developing countries. These efforts in
my judgment are counter-productive in terms of the best interests of U.S.
agriculture. U.S. commodity groups and their representatives in Congress should be
supporting development efforts abroad, not trying to abort or stop them. Both the
logic and the data in support of this position are clear and extensive. Consider
the issues, which can be summarized in the following four propositions.
First, future foreign markets for U.S. agriculture will be in developing countries,
not in other industrialized countries or in centrally planned countries . (I includ«
China among the developing countries.) Even if the European Economic Community
(EEC) were to liberalize completely its agricultural policies, our total exports to
that market are not likely to increase, although the commodity mix might shift away
from soybeans toward corn and feedgrains. Whether the Soviet Union will have the
where-withal to import additional grain, or even to sustain present levels, is an
open question.
Second, developing countries will constitute a growing market for U.S. producers
only if they experience significant economic development. The experience of the
1970s, when imports of wheat and coarse grains by developing countries increased
from 20.4 to 58.6 million metric tons, provides an object lesson in this regard.
Over 70 percent of these imports were sent to developing countries having upper-
middle incomes and experiencing rapid increases in per capita income. Poor
countries that exist in near-Malthusian conditions simply do not have the means to
pay for Imports.
Third, developing agriculture is the key to economic growth in developing countries
The bulk of their resources are in their agricultural sector, which is typically
characterized by general low-level productivity. Increasing productivity (and
incomes) in this sector is the key to raising per capita incomes in the economy as i
whole, and in the short run it is often the only means by which these countries can
earn the foreign exchange to further their own economic development.
Fourth, raising the productivity of agriculture in developing countries need not, a:
a general proposition threaten U.S. producers with competition. The populations of
most developing countries grow between two and three percent per year. Given their
low level of per capita incomes, the income elasticity of demand for agricultural
commodities in the aggregate tends to be much higher than in the United States and
other industrialized countries. If we assume a plausible 0.6 for this income
elasticity, a relatively modest 3 percent growth rate in per capita incomes,
together with a 2 percent growth rate for the population would result in a 3.8
percent growth rate in demand for agricultural output. If we assume a more
optimistic growth rate of 5 percent in per capita income and a 3 percent growth rate
for the population, the growth rate in demand for agricultural output would be 6
percent
.
Two points are important in providing perspective on these data. First, obtaining a
growth rate in agricultural output between 3.5 and 4.0 percent per year on a sus-
tained basis is not easy. Few countries have done it in the past, except when there
have been extensive new lands to bring into production, as in the case of Brazil.
Not many developing countries still have such stocks of land available.
Second, increases in per capita income between 3 and 5 percent per year are not
unusual in countries that lag in their development and therefore can play catch-up
by adopting technology from abroad. Japan, South Korea, and other newly
industrialized countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, have all performed better than
this for extensive periods of time.
There is another feature of increases in per capita incomes in these countries that
is important for U.S. agriculture: a rise in per capita incomes leads not only to
upgrading the quality of the diet, but also to a change in the configuration of
demand toward commodities that are less time-intensive in terms of household
preparation. Both of these changes favor U.S. agriculture. The upgrading of diets
means more rapid growth in the demand for poultry, livestock, and livestock
products. This growth in turn implies an increase in the demand for feedgrains--
commodities for which the United States has an obvious comparative advantage. The
shift to commodities that are less time -intensive in terms of household preparation,
for instance, involves a shift away from rice toward wheat. In the aggregate, this
shift also favors the United States, although obviously not U.S. rice growers.
The analysis I have traced out suggests that instead of lobbying to curtail efforts
by the World Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development to strengthen
agriculture in the developing countries, U.S. commodity groups should seek to
' support and strengthen these efforts. This is a case of enlightened self-interest:
knowing on which side one's bread is buttered. It includes investments in
agricultural research, which are so important for raising the productivity of
resources in agriculture and in turn per capita incomes.
PLAYING ON A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
It is popular these days for U.S. commodity groups to talk about playing on a level
!
playing field- -a perspective which implies that U.S. agriculture is often put upon
\
by others. In one sense there is justification for this concern, especially when it
refers to the policies of Japan and the EEC. But we also need to recognize that we
I
have experienced some important self-inflicted wounds these past five years, and
I
that our own policies are also often very detrimental to others.
I
When it comes to shooting oneself in the foot, the 1981 farm bill was an outstanding
' example. The predetermined increases in loan levels in that legislation would
' probably eventually have priced U.S. agriculture out of foreign markets without any
1 other developments, especially as inflation was brought under control. But the
I
large rise in the value of the U.S. dollar brought about by contradictory monetary
and fiscal policies caused it to happen in spades. Candor demands that we admit the
self-inflicted nature of these wounds and are aware that the high prices these
policies created in currencies of other countries have contributed importantly to
the large supplies we have in today's markets.
Our policies historically have had a detrimental impact on other countries,
especially low- income countries. Although in the past, U.S. policies were less
detrimental than those of the EEC, the 1985 farm bill has succeeded in putting us
almost on a par with it.
Consider our sugar legislation. The high protection of this section has provided
the means for the development of a high fructose corn sweetener industry, which has
made rapid inroads into the domestic market for sugar. In addition to imposing high
costs on domestic consumers- -about US$3 billion a year, the development of this in-
dustry has led to steady reductions in U.S. import quotas, taking away markets from
developing countries. The Caribbean Initiative and associated efforts to re-
structure agriculture in that region are little more than an offset to reduced U.S.
imports of sugar.
Consider our other commodity programs. Unless target prices are set at market
clearing levels, deficiency payment programs, such as we have had since 1973, are in
effect implicit export subsidy programs. Our wheat program, for example, has in-
volved a modest export subsidy of this kind since 1973. Now with the 1985
legislation, this implicit subsidy is being enlarged and extended to other
commodities, such as feed grains. These subsidies and the implied dumping they
entail cause world prices to be lower than they would otherwise be. Lower world
prices not only raise the costs of our own commodity programs in a counter-
productive way, but they also inflict significant losses of income on developing
countries
.
On the surface, these programs may sound like a good way to reduce supplies in other
countries and thus to gain a tactical advantage. But we need to recognize the
losses of income involved. And we also need to recognize that these programs create
protectionist pressures in those other countries.
The same logic applies to our explicit export subsidies, like those involved in the
Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and other programs. The negative effect of these
programs on the income of low- income countries and the incentives they provide for
protectionist measures are not the only issues, of course. There are international
political consequences as well. Thailand has traditionally been a political ally of
the United States; our rice program is creating stresses in that relationship.
Similarly, the wheat program and the extension of the provisions of the EEP to the
Soviet Union create stress in our relationships with Australia, Canada, and other
traditional allies.
Do we really want our commodity programs to weaken our international political
relations in this way? Equally important is the question: do we really want our
domestic commodity programs to reduce the income of low- income countries in this way
and thus to reduce the demand for commodities for which we have a comparative
advantage? And are we justified in demanding a level playing field when our own
policies do such economic harm to others? I leave the answers to these questions to
you.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE
AS THE KEYS TO FUTURE AGRICULTURAL MARKETS i
Much of the recent controversy about World Bank loans and AID efforts to strengthen
agriculture in developing countries have implied that the total global economic pie
Is fixed, and that one country gains only at the expense of another. In a period of
generalized economic stagnation, like the one we have experienced in recent years,
there is something to that argument. But that is not the kind of world for which we
should be striving. Moreover, protectionist, inward- looking policies are sure to
give us a continuation of that kind of world.
Instead, we should be liberalizing trade and dismantling the domestic agricultural
commodity programs that trade restrictions are designed to protect. In addition, we
should do all in our power to promote the development of low- income countries, for
our stake in those countries is great, especially in terms of future markets. (For
more details on the economic stake the United States has in the developing
countries, see G. Edward Schuh, The United States and the Developing Countries: An
Economic Perspective , National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., 1986.)
It is true that policy reform and policy liberalization in developing countries can
have negative effects on U.S. agricultural markets. The recent World Bank loan to
Argentina, which encourages that country to phase out its export taxes, is a case in
point. But we need to focus on the larger picture and on the rise in per capita
incomes such reforms generate in making our final judgment.
More generally, we need to remind ourselves that the largest importers of
agricultural grains among the developing countries in the 1970s were those countries
who were also the largest exporters of agricultural commodities. Moreover, imports
of grains grew most rapidly in those countries whose agricultural exports also grew
most rapidly.
The moral to be drawn from this experience is clear. It is called international
specialization and the division of labor. Such specialization is possible when the
economic pie is growing. But at the same time, international specialization also
helps make the economic pie grow at a faster rate as each country specializes in
those commodities for which it has a comparative advantage. The World Bank and the
U.S. Agency for International Development are working for that kind of world. We
need your support in these efforts. After all, economic development in low- income
countries is in your best interests.
Our economic world has changed dramatically these last twenty to thirty years,
driven by unprecedented technological revolutions in communication and transpor-
tation. These changes have rapidly advanced our international economic integration,
making the linkages between countries through international capital markets as
important as the linkages through international trade, and monetary disturbances,
which create large swings in exchange rates, as important or more important to U.S.
agriculture than weather disturbances.
This changed world is not easy to understand, but we must make the effort. Part of
that effort must be dedicated to sorting out where our true economic interests lie.
The economic world is often not what it seems to be. We need to dig below the
surface and try to identify and understand the underlying relationships.
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87-5/Integrating Production and Marketing Decisions
The nature of agricultural production has changed in recent years. Increased vola-
tility in grain prices, livestock prices, and interest rates have been important
driving forces of change. Today's producers are larger, more efficient, and tend
to view production as a year-round activity. Few seasonal producers remain because
low returns in recent years have essentially forced significant capital investments
and continuous production in order to survive.
As these changes have occurred, producer interest in marketing, and specifically
reducing price risk, have increased. No longer is marketing viewed as simply the
final step in the production process. The successful producers are taking a more
business-oriented approach to marketing and considering marketing opportunities
when the production decision is made. The key to the success of such a marketing
strategy lies in the use of forward-pricing tools to lock in profits on expected
production prior to making the production commitment.
This short article suggests an appropriate production-marketing horizon for agri-
cultural producers, briefly examines the types of risks faced by producers and sug-
gests methods for systematically evaluating these risks, and offers examples of
these methods for grain and livestock production and marketing. The article con-
cludes with remarks about the uses of these methods in managing the modern-day
farming operation.
THE PRODUCTION-MARKETING HORIZON
Traditionally, production and marketing decisions were treated separately by grain
and livestock producers. Grain was planted in the spring and harvested in the
fall; marketing opportunities were examined only at harvest. Livestock producers
often would breed and feed livestock seasonally, with little concern over marketing
opportunities until the livestock approached market weight. The recent increases
in price volatility are leading producers to seek alternative approaches to pro-
duction and marketing decisions.
Increases in on-farm storage are emphasizing marketing of grain crops, as storage
I
extends the selling period. Forward markets, including futures and options, for
livestock are also being considered as a means of locking in profitable prices.
Developing an appropriate production-marketing horizon is an essential first step
in such a management plan.
k| The top portion of Figure 1 depicts the production and marketing horizon faced by
the livestock producer. During the contemplation phase, the producer can rely on
the price discovery function of futures markets to provide a daily consensus
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Figure 1. Product ion -Marketing horizon for livestock and grain.
estimate of the future value of expected production. When incorporated with
accurate estimates of production costs, the producer can then evaluate the breeding
decision, based on expected profitability when the hogs are sold. If the decision
to breed is made, based on expected profits, the producer can then follow through
and forward price the output to lock in the profit level, subject to changes in the
(cash-futures) basis. We note, however, that locking in only the livestock price
prior to placement still leaves the producer open to the risk of rising input
costs, that is, corn and soybean meal. The producer may seek to use some sort of
multiple hedging strategy to lock in both input and output prices, thereby locking
in a profit margin.
Following the breeding decision, the producer can continue to monitor profit oppor-
tunities until placement. If a satisfactory profit level prior to placement has
not been locked in, the animals can be placed on feed and the market monitored for
profit opportunities during the feeding period. If the profit margin is realized
while the livestock are being fed, a single hedge on the livestock is placed to
lock in the margin. Research results suggest, however, that many of the best
pricing opportunities often occur prior to placement.
A similar production-marketing horizon can be used by grain producers as shown in
Figure 1. Decisions about planting intentions, crop mix, and other factors are
made during the contemplation of planting phase, which follows the previous har-
vest. Following planting, the crop is monitored through the growth stage, and
appropriate production and marketing strategies are evaluated. The crop is then
either sold at harvest or stored for later sale. At all points along this
production-marketing horizon the producer can take advantage of prices quoted in
the futures market and the price outlook during the months to come to identify
optimal selling opportunities. At this point measures of the probability of
expected prices and yields can be integrated into the marketing plan. The next
section briefly summarizes the concepts of using probabilities in production and
marketing decision-making.
MEASURING RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
The preceding section alluded to the price-related risks faced by today's agricul-
tural producer. In developing an integrated production and marketing strategy,
input price risk, market price risk, and production risk all need to be considered.
Because agricultural production processes are biological, they can be characterized
by uncertainty or production risk. Success in planting and breeding, growing the
crop, and achieving desired rates of grain all depend on a set of probabilities tha'
the producer cannot completely control. Through good management, which incorporate;
an understanding of the types of risks faced, the producer can minimize the risks.
The Concept of Probabilities
Before discussing these risks, let us look at the concept of probability, an impor-
tant way of evaluating risk. Probabilities are generally classified as either
subjective or objective. Objective probabilities are computed from historical
observations or data. Subjective probabilities are beliefs held by the decision
maker about the degree of uncertainty of the occurrence of an event. Subjective
probabilities usually vary among decision makers and over time as different
information is available. Three major rules or axioms of probabilities can be
defined as follows:
1. Probabilities must be in the range of through 1.
2. The probability that two or more mutually exclusive events will occur is the
sum of their respective probabilities.
3. The probability of the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive events
must equal 1.
The first rule simply means that an event will not occur with certainty, will occur
with certainty, or has some fractional chance (between and 1) of occurring. An
example of the second rule is that the probability of a swine producer producing
hogs at a cost of $42 or $43/cwt equals the probability that the producer can pro-
duce hogs at $42/cwt plus the probability that the producer can produce hogs at
$43/cwt. The third rule simply means that the sum of the probabilities of all
ranges of production costs considered must equal 1.
Two Simple Methods
The conviction weights method and the triangular distribution method are two simple
methods of developing estimates of probabilities. The conviction weights method
involves subdividing the range of possible outcomes Into intervals. The decision
maker is then asked to weigh each interval relative to the conviction with which it
is expected to occur.
An example of the conviction weights method is illustrated below. Based upon
historical data, subjective beliefs, and other Information, a decision maker can
construct a probability distribution for hog prices as shown In Table 1. Six equal
Intervals are selected over the range of prices from $35 to $70/cwt. The midpoint
is calculated for each Interval, and the decision maker assigns a weight based on
the belief that hog prices will fall in that interval. The weights for each Inter-
val are then summed, and the weight for each interval is divided by the sum to ob-
tain the decision maker's personal probability for each Interval. The final step
is to multiply the midpoints of each interval by the personal probabilities, whose
sum will equal the mean price.
The triangular distribution method is another method of developing a subjective
probability distribution. This method has the decision maker define three points
of the distribution of possible outomes: the lower and the upper endpoints and the
mode (most likely point). In other words, the decision maker specifies the "lowest
possible," "highest possible," and "most likely" outcomes for the uncertain event.
Figure 2 shows a triangular distribution for corn prices constructed using a low
price of $1.30/bu, a high price of $2.80/bu, and a mode price of $1.75/bu. The
mean or expected price can be calculated as the sura of the low (L) , high (H) , and
mode (M) prices divided by 3.
Table 1. Conviction Weights Methods for Calculating Subjective Hog Prices I
_Prl££_
Inip^rvftl t^ldpotn^: Weights
Personal
probability
Midpoint
times
probability
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
Total weights
37.5
42.5
47.5
52.5
57.5
62.5
67.5
10
30
40
80
25
10
__5
200
05 1.875
15 6.375
20 9.5
40 21.0
125 7.1875
05 3.125
025 1.6875
Mean price 50.75
1.30 1.75 2.80
Corn Price
Figure 2. Triangular distribution for com prices.
Although the triangular distribution method requires less information than the con-
viction weights method, the probabilities are more difficult to compute. However,
they can readily be calculated on a hand calculator or with a microcomputer. The
graph provides a general representation of probabilities, but the actual prob-
ability of a price (Pj) being less than some level is calculated with one of the
following two formulas:
Probability
Probability
(Pi
1.0
L)^ / (H - L)(M -L) for P^ < the mode
(Pi - H)2 / (H - L)(H - M) for P^ > the mode
Using the first formula, we can readily calculate the probability of
than or equal to the mode as 0.3. as shown In Figure 2.
Probability
- (1.75 - 1.30)2 / (2.80 - 1.30)(1.75 - 1.30) - 0.3
a price less
i
.80 times .60 - .48
.80 times .40 - .32
.80 times .40 - .08
.80 times .60 - .12
A method of eliciting subjective probabilities, such as one of the two described
} above, can also estimate distributions for production, production costs, and input
prices. Historical data will be much more valuable for obtaining probabilities of
cost of production.
An Example
If the decision maker knows production costs and has a subjective estimate of
prices, he or she can then set some rules for production and marketing decisions.
For example, let us assume that the subjective probability for production costs
tell him or her that there is an 80 percent chance (.80 probability) feeder pigs
can be produced for $47 . 50/cwt or less. From the example in Table 1 we see that
the decision maker believes there is 60 percent chance of locking in a market price
above $50/cwt. If we assume that production costs are independent of market
prices, four scenarios and their subjective probabilities exist:
1. Cost < $47.5 and Price < $50.0
2. Cost < $47.5 and Price < $50.0
3. Cost < $47.5 and Price < $50.0
4. Cost < $47.5 and Price < $50.0
From this example we see that the probability of market prices above $50/cwt and
costs below $47. 50/cwt is 48 percent. Thus, we have subjectively estimated, with a
probability of .48, that we can lock in a profit of at least $1. 50/cwt before the
beginning of our production period. The decision maker then may develop a rule to
. lock in this profit margin on, say, 30 percent of production whenever possible, and
'l design a pricing strategy that scales up the position as prices improve.
We can also use the same type of information for corn production and marketing.
Corn prices, less government payments, may be expected to be distributed as in
Figure 2. The probability that the price will be below $2.00/bu is calculated as
follows
:
Probability - 1.0 - (2.0 - 2.8)2 / (2.8 - 1.3)(2.8 - 1.8) - .5733
1 The chance of receiving a price above $2.00/bu is therefore about 42.7 percent
' (1 - .573). A subjective estimate of per bushel production costs can be calcu-
lated, based on historical yield and cost information, as well as information on
! future input costs. With this information the decision maker's subjection prob-
abilities may indicate only a 20 percent chance that total per bushel production
costs will fall below $2.00. In this case the producer has only a probability of
\
.085 (.20 X .427) of covering the cost of production. A preplanting decision would
. then be to participate in the government set-aside program with an expected defi-
I
clency payment of approximately $1.20/bu.
I
Similar analyses can be performed to estimate and control input costs. We note
I
that the goal of the decision maker, who wishes to manage risk, should not be to
' sell at the highest price, but to control input costs and insure a profit on as
many units as possible.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Integrating production and marketing decisions using probabilities has been shown
as a means of managing or controlling risk. Although risk is often thought of as a
negative factor, it should be considered as an opportunity. Risk allows good man-
agers to take advantage of price and output changes. The key is to manage risk in
the context of the goals of the producer and the particular production process.
A decision maker who has an understanding of the variability of physical production-
and volatility of input and output prices has more information to make both produc-
tion and marketing decisions. The effective management of the swine industry may
often lock in a profit before production commitments are made. The use of forward-
pricing, tools and the integration of probabilities into the planning process
deserve serious 'consideration in today's changing agricultural environment.
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87-6/The Cost of Growing Corn and Soybeans, 1986
In 1986, the total cost per acre for growing corn in Illinois averaged $362 in the
northern section, $368 in the central section with the higher soil ratings, $332 in
the central section with the lower soil ratings, and $268 in the southern section.
The soybean costs per acre were $285, $287, $256, and $213, respectively. The
total crop costs per acre were lower in southern Illinois because that region, as
the accompanying table indicates, has the lowest land cost in the state. The total
costs per bushel ranged from $2.08 to $2.55 for corn and from $5.20 to $6.33 for
soybeans. Variations in total costs were related to weather factors, yields, and
the quality of the land.
These figures were obtained from Illinois Farm Business Records that are kept by
|| farmers enrolled in the Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association. The
samples included only farms of more than 260 acres on the more productive and
'[ nearly level soils in each area of the state; these farms are without livestock.
Farms located in 22 counties north and northwest of the Illinois River are included
in the sample for northern Illinois. Farms from 36 counties below a line from
about Mattoon to Alton are in the sample for southern Illinois. The remaining 44
counties make up the sample for central Illinois. The sample farms averaged 612
tillable acres in northern Illinois, 642 acres in the central section with high
soil ratings, 669 acres in the central section with lower soil ratings, and 850
acres in southern Illinois.
This summary includes some factors that farmers, unlike some other sole-proprietor
I
businesses, consider the cost of doing business. These factors are not used as
i| expense items on income tax returns. Examples include the charge for labor on work
done by the farm operator, a rental charge for the use of owned and rented land,
and an interest charge on equity in the inventories.
NONIAND COSTS
For soybeans, soil- fertility costs were allocated on the basis of phosphorus,
potassium, and lime removals, with the residual cost allocated to corn. The seed,
[
crop, chemical, and drying expenses also included some commercial drying and
:i storage and the estimated value of home-raised seed. The costs of fuel, machine
' hire, and repairing machinery were reduced for income received from custom work.
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The labor costs included the cash value of hired labor, plus a charge for available
operator labor at a rate of $1,150 per month. The building and storage costs used
were for repairs and depreciation only. The nonland interest charge in 1986 was
ten percent on the average of half the inventory value of crops at the beginning
and end of the year, plus the depreciated value of machinery and buildings, plus
half the total operating expenses. Overhead costs included insurance, utilities,
the farm share of automobile expenses, and miscellaneous items. No charge has been
made in this analysis for management. This charge might normally be about five
percent of the total cost per bushel: ten to fifteen cents per bushel for corn and
twenty -five to thirty cents per bushel for soybeans.
LAND COSTS
These costs included the adjusted net rent and the real estate taxes. Net rent was
represented as the average received by crop-share landlords as reported on record-
keeping farms for the four-year period from 1982 to 1985. Caution is needed in
interpreting differences in land costs between areas. In the long run, the changes
in the net rent residual return to landowners should tend to equalize the total
costs of production between areas.
COST PER BUSHEL
Production costs per bushel of corn increased slightly in 1986 from 1985 in all
areas of the state except for southern Illinois. Although total costs decreased
three to eight percent, yields in central and northern Illinois were also lower
from the record levels of 1985, resulting in higher costs of production. Corn
yields in southern Illinois increased fourteen bushels per acre compared to 1985.
Corn yields in central and northern Illinois were six to fifteen bushels per acre
lower. Overall, corn yields were still from ten to twenty- seven bushels per acre
higher than the average for the period from 1983 to 1986.
Production costs per bushel of soybeans increased in 1986 from 1985 in all areas of
the state except for southern Illinois. Total costs decreased two to five percent,
while yields decreased two to nine bushels per acre in the northern and central
sections. Soybean yields increased three bushels per acre in southern Illinois.
With the lower costs, this increase resulted in a 69-cent per bushel drop in the
cost of production. Soybean yields were from one to eight bushels per acre higher
than the average for the period from 1983 to 1986.
Current corn and soybean selling prices continue to stay below the average total
cost of production, using 1986 total costs and average yields for the period from
1983 to 1986. For an owner-operator with these yields, it would take from $.99 to
$1.16 a bushel for corn, and from $1.69 to $2.21 a bushel for soybeans to cover the
variable costs listed in the table. But to recover total costs, it would take from
$2.57 to $2.74 a bushel for corn and from $6.24 to $6.63 a bushel for soybeans.
In 1986, yields in many parts of the state were only slightly below the record
yields set in 1985. Yields in southern Illinois were higher in 1986 than in 1985.
Even with these good yields, the total cost of production was above the market
price for corn and soybeans. Looking ahead, projected market prices are con-
siderably lower than the total cost of production, based on average yields for the
period from 1983 to 1986. Producers are planning on participating in the 1987 Feed
Grain Program to a high degree. This participation will provide producers with a
certain level of price support for feed grains. There will continue to be
pressure, however, to adjust production costs where possible. There could continue
to be downward pressure on land values and cash rent because land is the residual
claimant of returns over the most relevant costs.
To compute the break-even cost per bushel for growing corn and soybeans, individual
tenants and landowners need to divide the costs and yields shown in the table as
they are shared by the terms of the lease. As land values drop, the charge for the
use of land tends to drop until the total production costs of corn and soybeans are
in line with expected price levels.
%Jb7{.
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Concern with soil erosion has placed great emphasis on changing tillage methods so
that more crop residue will be left on the field. Farmers have indicated that they
are supportive of the need to reduce soil erosion and that they are aware that many
changes have been made in tillage practices. However, the new tillage practices are
not well defined and there is much uncertainty among farmers about the
effectiveness of their actions in maintaining residue cover and reducing soil
erosion.
In this report we present results from research on farmer estimates of residue
levels. The research was conducted in the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986,
involving personal interviews and the taking of field measurements for a sample of
farmers located throughout Illinois. Farmers were asked to describe their cropping
and tillage practices, and to give an estimate of the percent residue cover for one
particular field. Following the interviews, four residue cover measurements were
taken in that same field using the line-transect ("rope") method. These paired
sets of farmer-field data were collected by fourteen groups of trained Future
Farmers of America (FFA) teachers with their students, and three trained farmers.
The research in the fall of 1985 took place at a time when the farmers had
completed their harvest and had not yet begun their spring tillage. The fall of
1985 was particularly wet, preventing many farmers from carrying out field work
they might have contemplated for the fall. As a result, residue levels in the fall
of 1985 were generally quite high.
After the spring 1986 crop had been planted, data were obtained once again on
farmer estimates and field measurement of residue levels for the same field that
had been measured in the spring. A total of 75 farmers and their fields from the
93 in the fall survey were surveyed again. The attrition of eighteen cases was due
mainly to lack of cooperation by some FFA chapters or occasionally because farmers
refused to be interviewed a second time. Because of requirements to obtain paired
sets of farmer estimates and field data for both fall and spring, a total of 67
sets of data was sufficiently complete to be analyzed.
Although there was a loss of 29 cases from the fall 1985 sample, the farmers and
farm fields resampled in the spring of 1986 were considered to be representative of
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the fall sample. A majority of the fields were in corn or soybeans (72 percent);
the remainder were in hay or small grain. This is comparable to the fall sample,
in which 74 percent of the farms were corn and soybean, and 26 percent were hay am
small grain.
In Figure 1 we characterize farmers according to the tillage practices they
reported. Two-thirds of the farmers performed no fall tillage, while the other
third disked, chisel plowed, moldboard plowed, or field cultivated. While the fall
data would indicate a rather high occurrence of "no- till" farmers, we found that
many had not been able to get into the fields during the fall of 1985 to perform
their intended tillage because of wet field conditions, or deliberately delaying
their tillage to the next spring. Figure 1 indicates that after planting the next
spring, only 10 percent of the respondents have not carried out some type of field
work. In the spring, 60 percent of the farmers disked their fields, a practice thai
has largely replaced moldboard plowing and is frequently equated with "conservatioi
tillage.
"
Figure
Spring
1. Tillage Practices Used by Farmers in Fall 1985 and
1986.
As Figure 2 indicates, there Is a substantial decrease in residue levels after
spring field work has been completed. For all fields in the study, the average
percentage of residue coverage was reduced by 30 percent. However, these reductions
are more substantial for soybean and corn fields, where the average residue cover
after planting is around 25 percent; for many individual fields the coverage is
much lower.
I
Figure
All Fields Soybeans Com Hay
2. Average Field Measured Residue Level by Crop.
We were concerned with knowing how well farmers knew the conditions of their
fields. Therefore, we asked farmers to estimate the residue levels in their fields.
If farmers' estimates were within 10 percent of the value measured in the field, we
declared their estimates to be "accurate." The fall estimates were more likely to
be accurate than the spring estimates. The reason for this can be seen in Figure 3.
Because many farmers had not been able to do field work in the fall, residue levels
were higher on many fields and estimates were found to be more accurate. In the
spring, few fields had high levels of residue and, in general, the estimates were
much less accurate.
The relationship between the residue level and the farmer's ability to accurately
estimate is especially important because at lower levels of residue, when farmers
make the least accurate estimates, the greatest gains in erosion control are found
for small increases in residue cover. Other analyses, not shown here, indicate that
those farmers who have the lowest residue levels on their fields are most likely to
overesCimace the residue levels. The fact that they overestimate means that if
soil erosion values are estimated from these reported values, the amount of annual
soil loss due to erosion is considerably underestimated. Thus, misjudgments of
residue levels at the lower levels of cover may give farmers seriously misleading
ideas on how well they are controlling soil erosion.
Measured Residue Level
Figure 3. Percent of Farmers Estimating Accurately by
Measured Level of Residue.
Finally, Figure 4 illustrates in a different way the troubles farmers have in
accurately estimating the residue left in their fields after fall and/or spring
tillage operations. Nearly half (43 percent) of the farmers did not accurately
estimate in either the spring or the fall, and only 16 percent of the farmers
accurately estimated on both occasions.
The present analysis indicates that farmers' residue estimates are quite
unreliable, especially at the lower levels of residue. These findings
are of concern in light of the considerable effort that has been made by the
Cooperative Extension Service, the Soil Conservation Service, and Soil and Water
Conservation Districts to familiarize farmers with the need to maintain adequate
cover on their fields. The concept of residue cover, as associated with different
tillage systems, is relatively new to most farmers, and the data indicate their
inexperience with the concepts associated with tillage systems. Other research
also indicates that, although a considerable effort has been made in Illinois to
acquaint farmers with ways to do the necessary measurements to calculate USLE
values, very few farmers actually carry out such field measurements. As a result,
farmers are not in a position to compare their estimates with actual field
measurements and therefore, they are unable to improve their skills at judging
residue levels.
Figure 4. Consistency of Farmers' Residue
Estimates in Fall 1985 and Spring 1986.
The results have implications for farmers' abilities to make decisions to use soil
conservation practices on their fields. Especially those farmers using tillage
systems- -or growing crops- -that leave low levels of residue; they are likely to
overestimate the residue levels and underestimate the amount of soil loss on their
fields. Given the necessity for many farmers to develop farm conservation plans in
order to comply with provisions of Title XII of the 1985 Food Security Act, this
lack of ability by farmers to make judgments on the potential for erosion on their
own fields will make the construction of plans and their implementation more
difficult.
This report was prepared by J.C. van Es , Professor of Rural Sociology and E.H.
Makowski , Graduate Student in Geography. The research is supported in part by the
Monsanto Corporation and the Institute of Environmental Studies at the University
of Illinois, Urbana- Champaign. The researchers wish to thank the fourteen Future
Farmers of America (FFA) chapters and the individual farmers throughout Illinois
who participated in the data collection.
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87-8/The Financial Position of Illinois Farm OpeM«»»HURF librari'
Cost and Returns from Crop and Livestock Enter^see . |Qon
STABLE NET INCOMES RESITLT IN SMALL CHANGE IN NET WORTH
UNivtRSiiy uf- laiNOis
Data on net farm income, as summarized from records kept by farmers enrolled in the
Illinois Farm Business Farm Management Association (FBFM) record-keeping program,
can be used to estimate changes in net worth. On a cost basis, without considering
inflation or deflation of capital asset values, the change is calculated by adding
net farm and net nonfarm income (Table 1) and then subtracting withdrawals for fam-
ily living and for income and Social Security taxes. Using this procedure, the net
worth of the average Illinois farm operator declined by $4,174 in 1983, dropped an-
other $10,551 in 1984, increased by $2,333 in 1985, and increased $2,075 in 1986.
The total decline in net worth on a balance sheet based on fair market value would
be much greater if that decline were to include the change in land values during
the period from 1983 to 1986; changes in net worth would vary greatly among farms
and areas in the state. This report is based on a summary of 3,531 Illinois farm
business records that are kept in cooperation with the Illinois FBFM Association
and the Illinois Cooperative Extension Service.
Net farm income is the accrued value of the operator's share of farm production
less total operating expenses, including the amount of interest paid and deprecia-
tion, plus gain or loss on machinery or buildings sold. Net farm income added to
net nonfarm income is the income available to pay for family living expenses and
income and Social Security taxes. Total net income is also the source of income
used to pay the principal on long-term debt, to invest into savings, or for both
purposes. Estimates used in Table 1 for net nonfarm income and withdrawals for
living expenses and taxes were based on a sample of 285 central Illinois farm fam-
ilies. These families balanced all sources of farm and nonfarm funds with the uses
of funds to identify precise expenditures for these withdrawals. These expendi-
tures were then adjusted downward by 10 percent to reflect the larger- than-average
farms in central Illinois.
CAPACITY FOR REPAYMENT OF CAPITAL DEBT
The average funds available for repayment of capital debt per farm family for all
3,531 farm operators was estimated at $20,152 in 1983, $13,851 in 1984. $26,136 in
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1985. and $23,376 in 1986 (Table 1). Each amount, respectively, was the funds
estimated to be available that year for capital purchases and principal payments or
long-term debt. The table shows actual dollar commitments per farm that were made
for capital purchases of machinery, equipment, or buildings. Note that in 1983
these commitments would have almost depleted all of these funds, and in 1984 these
commitments were greater than funds available for capital debt repayment. Improve-
ment was made in 1985 and 1986, with the amount of capital purchases less than the
funds available for capital debt repayment. For the period from 1983 to 1986, 1985,
was the year in which capital purchases were lowest and funds available for repay-
ment of capital debt the highest. As a result, the more funds were available in
1985 for repayment of long-term debt than in other years during this four-year
period. When commitments to capital purchases deplete all of the funds available
for repayment of long-term debt, the average farm with long-term debt repayments
would probably borrow funds to finance the new capital purchases, as long as there
is adequate collateral in the business.
The records show that funds available for repayment of debts have varied greatly
among areas in the state. Estimated changes in net worth in 1986 were positive for
central and western Illinois and negative for eastern, northern, and southernmost
Illinois. Western and southern Illinois showed positive changes in net worth as
compared to 1985.
Table 1. Estimated Change in Net Worth and Capacity for Repayment of Capital Debt
for 3,531 Illinois Farm Operators
All Illinois counties
1983 1984 1985 1986
Net farm income $16,627 $ 8,624 $22,037 $21,575
-t- Net nonfarm income^ 6,873 9,208 8,721 8,500
- Family living expenses^ 23,845 24,042 24,503 24,000
- Income and Social Security
taxes^ 3.829 4.341 3.922 4.000
Change in net worth $-4,174 $-10,551 $2,333 $2,075
+ Depreciation 24.326 24.402 23.803 21.301
Funds available for capital
debt repayment $20,152 $13,851 $26,136 $23,376
Capital purchases $19,325 $15,741 $13,875 $14,674
Cash interest paid $19,127 $18,491 $18,863 $17,107
^Actual amounts identified from a central Illinois sample of 285 farms for 1983,
1984, and 1985; amounts for 1986 are estimated.
"Actual amounts identified from a central Illinois sample of 285 farms for 1983,
1984, and 1985- -reduced by 10 percent; amounts for 1986 are estimated.
INTEREST PAID AS A PFJICENT OF GROSS
In 1985, 86 percent of the FBFM farm operators had positive net farm incomes, with
cash interest payments less than 25 percent of the gross farm returns. The 14
percent of the operators with interest payments exceeding 25 percent of the gross
had negative net farm incomes and could be expected to have problems with cash
flow. The 5 percent paying more than 35 percent of the gross for interest had
negative net farm incomes averaging $26,242 per farm. This last group could be
expected to have difficulty maintaining a farm business without nonfarm income.
The percentage of operators having negative farm incomes in 1986 will be similar to
that of 1985. The average operator's net farm income dropped slightly in 1986 as
compared to 1985; incomes, however, varied substantially between different areas of
the state and among types of farms. The largest increase in incomes occurred in
western and southern Illinois and on hog farms. Incomes decreased on grain farms,
most noticeably in central and east-central Illinois. Operators' net farm incomes
were highest in the western, west-central, and south-central areas of Illinois.
COST AND RETURNS FROM CROPS
Corn and soybeans are crops that make important contributions to net farm incomes
and the current financial status of farm operators. See Figures 1 and 2 for the
cost and return per bushel of both corn and soybeans produced each year from 1976
to 1986 on 500 central Illinois grain farms with high-quality soils and no
livestock. In Figure 1, note that the total-cost line for growing a bushel of corn
exceeded the average annual Illinois corn price line in six of the ten years since
1977. The difference between the total of all cost and the total nonland cost line
is the charge for the use of land. The deficits indicate that profits (returns for
risk and management) had to come from equities in capital, primarily land, or other
unpaid inputs, such as operator labor or debt-free facilities. These low returns
continue to bring down land values and force lower cash rents
.
The variable-cost line reflects the total of cash expenditures for fertilizer,
pesticides, seed, and drying- -expenses that are normally shared according to the
terms of the lease on rented farms- -plus the cost of fuel, machine hire, and
repairing machinery. Other nonland costs include labor, depreciation, interest,
buildings, and overhead.
Total costs per acre in 1986 decreased slightly from costs in 1985. Lower yields
on these farms resulted, however, in a slightly higher cost of production in 1986
than in 1985. Using the past four-year average corn yield of 143 bushels per acre,
costs per bushel of corn produced are now averaging about $1.00 for the variable
-
cost line, $1.75 for the total nonland cost line, and $2.57 for the total-cost
line.
Figure 2 shows the cost and return per bushel of soybeans produced on these same
farms from 1976 to 1986. The total-cost line has exceeded returns as shown by the
average annual price line each year since 1980 with the exception of 1985. This
development reflects continued large soybean supplies and weak demand. With a
normal yield of 45 bushels per acre, costs per bushel are now averaging about $1.70
for the variable cost, $3.78 for the total nonland costs, and $6.38 for the total
costs. Total cost per bushel can be expected to go down as rent for the use of
land goes down.
COSTS AND RETURNS FROM LIVESTOCK
Livestock also has been important to the current financial status of farm
operators. Figure 3 shows the cost and returns per hundred pounds of pork produced
annually from 1976 to 1986 on a sample of 89 farrow-to-finish enterprises with an
average of 154 litters per year. Higher prices for pork and lower feed costs
resulted in total returns exceeding total costs in 1986. The only other year since
1978 that total returns exceeded total costs was 1982. Average producers using
large amounts of borrowed capital and hired labor would have found it difficult to
survive since 1979 without utilizing savings, borrowing from equities in the crop
enterprise, or borrowing from a lender.
Costs and Returns— Corn, Soybeans, and Pork
(Shade indicates a deficit below costs on all charts.)
Figure 1. Cost and returns per
bushel of corn produced on
central Illinois grain farnns
from 1976 to 1986. Soil pro-
ductivity rating. 86-100.
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Table 2 shows the average returns above the cost of feed and purchased animals from
about 1,400 individual annual livestock enterprise records from 1982 to 1986.
Returns above feed and purchased livestock is the amount available to pay for
labor, machinery, equipment and building repairs, depreciation, livestock expense,
taxes, overhead, and an interest charge on all capital used. There is no profit
until these costs are covered. The two enterprises for which returns covered total
costs the last five years were the farrow- to- finish hog and feeder-pig finishing
enterprises.
Table 2. Returns above Cost of Feed and Purchased Animals Co Livestock
Enterprise Units from 1982 to 1986
Farrow- Feeder-
to-finish pig Feeder Dairy Beef
Year hogs finishing cattle cattle herd^
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
5
-year average $20.61 $11.14 $16.57 $1,008 42
Nonfeed costs, 1982-1986
Direct cash $6.40^ $4.00^ $12. 50^ $ 350<= $30^
Other cost 12.35 ^ 7.00^ 15.85^ 7 50^ ^85^
Total $18.75 $11.00 $28.35 $1,100 $215
^The feed cost for beef herds includes up to $60 of hay equivalent from salvage
roughage
.
^Includes veterinary costs, utilities, fuel, equipment and building repair costs,
depreciation, labor, and other nonfeed costs, including interest on feeder live-
stock, from Table 6, Farm Management Manual, 1982 to 1986.
'^Estimates of annual nonfeed costs are based on enterprise cost studies of opera-
tive units from 1982 to 1985.
Based on the estimates of nonfeed costs in Table 2, the average returns above all
costs from 1982 to 1986 for hogs (farrow-to-finish) was $20.61 (returns above feed
and purchased animals) minus $18.75 (nonfeed costs), or a positive $1.86 per
hundred pounds produced. For feeder-pig finishing enterprises, returns above all
costs averaged $0.14 per one hundred pounds produced. Feeder cattle show returns
per one hundred pounds produced that are $11.78 short of covering all costs; dairy
returns averaged $92.00 per cow below all costs; whereas beef cow herds are $173.00
short per cow.
Although livestock returns improved in 1986, primarily due to lower feed costs,
returns to management were still negative, with the exception of the hog
enterprises. Lower feed costs, combined with strong prices for pork in the second
half of the year, made 1986 a profitable year for pork producers. Livestock
producers who use their own capital without borrowed funds have large amounts of
non- salable labor, feeds, or building space; and those producers who are more
efficient than the average farmer have been in the best position to take advantage
of the lower feed costs.
This report based on the sununaries of Illinois farm business records reviews the
financial status of Illinois farm operators over the past four years. Earnings th
past two years have shown some improvement from the previous four years. Generall
excellent yields, along with some basic income support provided by the Feed Grain
Program, have been major reasons for this. Although earnings have improved,
j
fundamental adjustments are taking place as the agricultural sector adjusts to
relatively low returns. Selected costs have decreased. Land values have fallen 5
percent from their peak. The better managers operating in a good equity position
have been able to survive the current economic pressures.
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In 1986, the total, noncapital, family -living expenses of farm operators within a
group of 324 record-keeping farms averaged $24,965, or $2,080 per month per family
(Table 1). The farms were located primarily in central Illinois. This average was
3.0 percent higher than in 1985, 3.0 percent higher than in 1984, and 6.9 percent
higher than in 1983. Another $3,777 was used to purchase capital items such as the
personal share of the family automobile, furniture, and household equipment. Thus
the grand total for living expenditures averaged $28,742 for 1986, compared with
$27,226 for 1985, or a $1,516 increase per family. Expenditures for capital items
increased $786 per family, while noncapital expenses increased $730 per family.
How these families use their funds depends somewhat on the levels of net farm and
nonfarm incomes and the priority of the expenditure. In this sample, the 1986 net
farm and net nonfarm incomes decreased slightly from 1985. The net farm income
decreased $122 per farm and nee nonfarm income decreased $195 per farm when
compared to 1985. Most of the farms in the sample were classified as grain farms
and were located in a 15-county area bounded by Jacksonville, Peoria, Champaign,
and Mattoon. Although grain yields decreased slightly from the record levels of
1985, grain yields in 1986 were again excellent, with many corn yields averaging
155 to 170 bushels per acre.
The amount of interest paid per farm decreased from $22,144 in 1985 to $20,421 in
1986. Interest paid as a percent on farm receipts dropped from 14.1 percent in
1985 to 12.2 percent in 1986. As a percent of cash operating expenses, interest
paid dropped from 18.6 percent in 1985 to 16.8 percent in 1986. Farm receipts per
tillable acre increased $8; cash operating expenses, including interest, decreased
$3. Interest payments per tillable acre decreased from $35 to $31, while noncapi-
tal living expenditures decreased from $39 to $38 per tillable acre. Machinery and
building purchases increased somewhat, from $15,589 in 1985 to $16,603 in 1986.
Based on data recorded by the farmers and then edited by the Farm Business Farm
Management (FBFM) Association field staff, the sample of farms showed an average
debt of 63 cents for each $1 of farm assets as of December 31, 1986; machinery was
valued on a cost-less-depreciation basis. The amount of debt for each $1 of assets
was the same as a year earlier. Although the value of farm assets has declined,
the amount of debt per farm also declined. This debt-to-asset ratio would be lower
with machinery valued at a current market value. Including nonfarm assets would
also lower the ratio.
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The farms in this sample were 73 acres larger than the average for the 7,500 farms
in the FBFM program. Crop yields averaged about 5 percent above those reported by
the Illinois Crop Reporting Service. These factors, combined with the fact that
the area sampled had the highest corn yields in Illinois in 1986, resulted in the
net farm income averaging $3,980 above the average of all Illinois record-keeping
farms. As long as this income level persists, average living expenditures for
farms in this sample are estimated to be 15 to 20 percent above the average of all
Illinois farm operators having more than $40,000 gross sales per farm.
In 1986 the operators of these 324 farms averaged 43 years of age. The family
averaged 3.6 members, with the age of the oldest dependent child being 9 years.
The average operator farmed 651 tillable acres and owned 124 of these acres (19
percent of this land). The operators kept records so that all sources of funds,
both farm and nonfarm, balanced with all uses of funds in a complete monthly cash-
flow accounting system.
In the table, the averages per farm for total family living expenses are divided
into five categories for 1983 through 1986. The "expendables" category includes
cash spent for food, operating expenses, clothing, personal items, recreation,
entertainment, education, and transportation. Cash spent for capital improvements
exceeding $250 is not included. The use of a rented house on an estimated 40 to 50
percent of the farms in this sample is not included, because these data cover only
cash outlays
.
The excess on nonfarm taxable income over nonfarm business expense was $8,526 in
1986, or 30 percent of the total living expense; in 1985 the excess was 32 percent.
Nonfarm income includes dividends on stocks, interest on savings and money-market
funds, income from other nonfarm investments, and income from off- farm labor per-
formed by family members. Interest earned and left in savings accounts not
included in the cash flow is not reflected in the nonfarm income.
While the value of farm assets for this sample of 324 farms continues to decline,
the amount of liabilities also decreased when compared to a year earlier. The
value of farm assets on December 31, 1986, was $38,946 less than a year earlier.
The decline reflects the continued drop in land values. At the same time,
liabilities decreased by $22,091. These farms borrowed $13,620 less and made
$11,174 more principal payments than a year earlier. The $16,603, or $26 per
tillable acre, spent on capital purchases for machinery and equipment remained at
about one -half the level of capital purchases common before 1980.
Although interest payments continue to be one of the highest farm expense items,
declines in interest paid did occur. Interest includes that paid on operating,
intermediate, and real estate debt. Interest paid increased from 12 percent of
total farm operating expense in 1979 to 21 percent in 1983 and dropped to 17
percent in 1986. The $20,421 interest payment in 1986 was 12 percent of total cash
farm receipts, down from 14 percent in 1985.
The records from farm families with three to five persons were sorted into two
categories, the high-third and the low- third, according to their noncapital living
expenses. The total living expenses for the high- third group averaged $37,821,
compared with $20,827 for the low- third group. The high- third group farmed 196
more acres than the other group and owned 20 percent of the land farmed; the low-
third group owned 21 percent of the land farmed. The larger farms in the first
group had more income for living expenses and income tax. Net farm plus nonfarm
income was $40,029 for the high-third group compared with $26,485 for the low-third
group. The average age of operators in the high- third group was 42 and the number
i
of family members was 4.2, compared with 39 years of age and 3.9 family members foi
the other group.
Projected for the next few years are low commodity prices, which result in narrow
profit margins that require farm operators to closely monitor all receipts and
expenditures. It is therefore important that more farmers learn how to balance an
monitor their cash flow each month. Computer program assistance is now becoming
available in more service centers, such as some FBFM district offices. These
centers are prepared to offer services to help farmers project monthly cash flow o
computer printouts so that they can compare projections to their actual results.
For the farm operators with low equity or very high debt -to -asset ratios, this typ
of accounting is essential. These operators need to account for all of their
sources and uses of funds to assist them in making sound financial management
decisions.
Thie data summarized in this process may also serve as a guide in budgeting allow-
ances for family living expenses. For families in this sample, the family living
expenses totaled $44 for each tillable acre farmed. If the net nonfarm income of
$13 per tillable acre is used for living, $31 per tillable acre will have to be
generated from the farm business to meet family living requirements. Each family
must determine how much each acre of crop or each litter of hogs should contribute
to their family living. This amount, when added to production costs and other
obligations, can help to determine break-even prices needed for products sold.
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Property tax relief was raised again in the Illinois General Assembly this summer
as debate over Governor Thompson's proposed state tax increases began losing
momentum. Agricultural interests and interests from suburban Chicago placed
property tax relief on the table during tax increase discussions. Property tax
relief continues to be a policy issue for agriculture because of the relatively
heavy burden of property taxes on agriculture as compared to agricultural incomes.
The weakened condition of the farm economy in the 1980s has placed downward
pressure on the Illinois farm property tax base putting the budgets of rural
schools and other rural governments at risk. Since 1981, the taxable value of farm
real estate in Illinois (outside Cook County) has declined 21 percent. In some
counties, lower assessments have resulted in lower average per acre taxes. In
other areas, tax rates have increased to offset any reductions in assessed values
resulting in limited reductions in per acre farm property taxes. The average tax
rate on farm property increased 17 percent between 1981 and 1985. The average in
1985 (the most recent year with complete data) was 5.52 percent.
The reversal of the long-standing trend of ever increasing property taxes on
Illinois farmland that began in 1984, continued in 1986. Property taxes on Illinois
grain farms declined an average of 43 cents per acre, from $15.14 per acre in 1985,
to $14.71 per acre in 1986. Since their peak in 1983, average per acre taxes have
declined $1.04.
The per acre property taxes for a sample of Illinois grain farms for 1975 to 1986
are shown in Figure la. Data for the sample farms in the 68 northern and central
Illinois counties and the 34 southern Illinois counties are also included (Figures
lb and Ic) . In 1986, the sample included 2,046 grain farms, which totaled 1.5
million acres of land. Higher building assessments on some livestock farms will
result in higher per acre taxes than those presented in Figures la, lb, and Ic.
The historical difference between per acre taxes in southern Illinois and those in
northern and central Illinois continues. The 1986 per acre property taxes on
northern and central Illinois grain farms were $18.49, compared to an average of
$8.72 reported for southern Illinois. Historically, property taxes on northern
Illinois farms have been about double the level of taxes on southern Illinois
farms. This difference reflects, in part, different soil productivity between the
two parts of the state.
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Per acre property taxes on southern Illinois
grain farms, 1975 to 1986.
Although lower taxes may be a welcome change for farmland owners, reduced property
tax revenues are placing fiscal pressures on rural schools, townships, road
districts, and county governments. Lower property tax revenues will eventually
force rural government spending down unless revenues from other sources are found.
Counties, townships, and road districts are also having to adjust to the loss of
federal revenue sharing while rural schools stand to lose state school aid because
taxes were not increased by the General Assembly. The culmination of forces will
severely stress the financial position of some rural schools, townships, road
districts, and counties.
EFFECTIVE TAX RATES AND THE CONTINUING FARM PROPERTY TAX PARADOX
One way to measure the property tax burden on Illinois farms is to use the
effective property tax rate that compares property taxes to land values. These
rates for the last twelve years are presented in Table 1. Between 1981 and 1986,
effective tax rates for Illinois farmland increased 91 percent (from 0.56 percent
to 1.07 percent). This increase reflects slightly lower property taxes combined
with a substantial reduction in Illinois farmland values. Without significantly
larger reductions in per acre property taxes, the effective tax rate for Illinois
farmland can be expected to continue to climb over the next few years.
The rate at which per acre taxes have declined since 1983 will not significantly
reverse the trend toward ever higher farm property tax burdens, as measured by the
effective tax rate. Policies that change the way schools are financed (or "tax
swaps," as these proposals have been labeled) or targeted property tax reforms,
such as circuit breaker programs, are two options that would help stabilize the
increasing farm property tax burden in Illinois.
Table 1. Effective Property Tax Rates on Illinois Farms, 1975 to 1986
Effective tax rate. percent^
Property taxes
Northern Southern as percent of
Tax Year Illinois Illinois Illinois land rent^
1975 1.12 0.99 1.11 13.49
1976 1.02 0.88 0.96 11.74
1977 0.93 0.75 0.86 15.00
1978 0.74 0.62 0.72 15.29
1979 0.72 0.59 0.68 14.18
1980 0.69 0.54 0.65 15.11
1981 0.60 0.49 0.56 17.41
1982 0.58 0.51 0.56 18.66
1983 0.66 0.56 0.64 17.06
1984 0.85 0.72 0.82 19.04
1985 0.99 0.84 0.95 15.81
1986^= 1.11 0.94 1.07 18.23
fl
^Effective tax rate is property taxes as percent of farmland, computed using
only grain farms
.
"This percentage refers to a group of northern and central Illinois grain
farms. Land rent is the landlord's crop-share rent and includes property
taxes
.
*^Land rent for 1986 is estimated.
Declining per acre average property taxes and increasing effective property tax
rates present Illinois agriculture with a property tax paradox: a higher tax
burden and lower per acre taxes. This paradox is illustrated in Figure 2. The
solid line represents an index of per acre farm property taxes and the dotted line
represents an index of effective farm property tax rates. From 1975 through 1981,
the farm property tax burden in Illinois was declining as evidenced by the dotted
line. During this same period, per acre farm property taxes were increasing.
However, property taxes increased at a slower rate than the market value of
Illinois farmland, resulting in a drop in the effective property tax rate.
The farm property tax paradox became apparent in 1983. The poor performance of the
farm economy and the limited ability of rural governments to increase tax rates
without referendum reversed the long-standing trend of ever higher per acre taxes.
The poorly performing farm economy also drove the bottom out of the farmland market
and reversed the long-standing trend of declining effective property tax rates for
farmland. The significant increase in effective farm property tax rates is
illustrated by the steep increase in the dotted line since 1983 (Figure 2). Herein
lies the farm property tax paradox: lower per acre farm property taxes and a
higher property tax burden on agriculture.
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Figure 2. Index of per acre farm property taxes and effective farm
property tax rates, 1975 to 1986- -the farm property tax paradox.
Resolution of the farm property tax paradox could come from the farm economy, local
taxing bodies, state policymakers, or some combination thereof. Significant
increases in the price of Illinois farmland would lower the effective property tax
rate. However, this does not seem likely to happen in the near future. Local
taxing bodies, rural schools in particular, could dramatically cut spending, but
this would be inefficient and would cause substantial hardship. Increased
investment in education is probably necessary to remain economically competitive.
This leaves resolution of the paradox to state policymakers. However, the
political economy of spending and taxation in Illinois suggests that state
policymakers will only address the paradox if more revenues from state tax
increases are available. Of course, one option is to ignore the paradox and the
imbalance that it may be causing.
SCHOOLS AND FARM PROPERTY TAXES
A major determinant of farm property taxes is the spending of rural schools and the
availability of state school aid. About 75 cents out of every farm property tax
dollar goes to rural schools; and of that 75 cents, about 60 cents is for teacher
salaries. There is an obvious link between teacher contracts and farm property tax
levels
.
State taxpayers and local property taxpayers combine to spend more than $7 billion
each year on primary and secondary schools in Illinois. In 1985, the Illinois
General Assembly enacted a broad set of educational improvement initiatives and
since 1984, state appropriations for public schools have increased at unprecedented
magnitudes. During this period, more than $800 million in additional state support
was provided to schools. Illinois property taxpayers contributed an additional
$600 million new dollars. This increase of over $1.4 billion far exceeded the rate
of inflation and the growth in tax revenues from increased economic activity across
the state. It also represented a significant increase in commitment to public
education. However, it is becoming more apparent that new state revenues are
required if this trend of increased real school spending, at or above the 3 to 5
percent per year range, is to continue.
Spending $7 billion on schools represents an outlay of $4,120 per student.
Increased interstate competition for economic activity has encouraged most states
to increase school spending. Table 2 presents several items on school finance for
Illinois and neighboring Great Lakes states. Comparing per pupil spending,
Illinois ($4,120) ranked second behind Wisconsin ($4,512) in 1986-87. The U.S.
average was $4,043. The second column represents school revenue growth between
1983 and 1987. During this period, Illinois ranked seventh with revenue growth of
11.1 percent. Other information in the table includes the percentage of state
support, 1986-87 average teacher salaries, and average teacher raises in 1986.
Table 2. Per Pupil School Revenues, Teacher Salaries and Salary Increases , and
Percent SLa.te School Support: Illinois Versus Great Lakes States
Great Lakes Revenues Per
States Pupil, 1986-87
Revenue Growth
1983 to 1987
(percent)
State Support
1985-86
(percent)
Teacher Salaries
Average Average
1986-87 Raise in
1986
(percent)
ILLINOIS
Indiana
Iowa
Kentucky
Michigan
Minnesota
Missouri
Ohio
Wisconsin
U.S. Average
$4,120
3,752
3,671
3,029
3,918
4,358
3.454
3,719
4,512
4,043
11.1
29.0
-0.3
15.9
0.3
13.9
18.1
14.4
19.4
17.2
39.2 $28,430 4.6
58.2 25,684 5.6
40.7 22,603 4.2
68.6 22,612 8.0
36.6 31,500 4.4
54.4 29,140 8.0
38.9 23,468 7.2
46.3 26,317 7.4
39.8 28,206 5.3
50.1 26,704 5.7
Source: Compiled by author from several sources.
It can be inferred from Table 2 that while Illinois is currently competitive with
neighboring Great Lakes states on several aspects of support for education, if past
trends continue, Illinois will drop below its current ranking and become less
competitive. Maintaining the current ranking and competitive position will require
revenue enhancements and more state money for Illinois schools. These competitive
pressures will complicate any effort to address the farm property tax paradox.
SUMMARY
Although average per acre farm property taxes in Illinois declined for the third
straight year, the effective property tax rate for farmland continued to climb.
This property tax paradox will continue to challenge state policymakers as the
interaction of declining rural property tax bases, increased rural school financial
stress, and the need to remain competitive in primary and secondary education
spending complicate matters. In the months ahead, tax policy initiative and
leadership will be required to deal with these important state and local government
finance policy matters. One thing is certain: the farm property tax capacity now
being lost will most likely not be recaptured. Economic renascence in rural
Illinois will provide but limited relief to the farm property tax paradox and only
a partial solution to rural school finance problems and will not be the salvation
for state policymakers as they deal with these important issues.
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This newsletter deals with two
aspects of land rent. It will
introduce regulations related to the
Conservation Reserve Program
Regulations of the 1985 Farm
Security Act. Then it will describe
the overage lease agreement, a cash
rent lease designed to allocate risk
to both tenant and landowner.
During this period, the landowner
could probably terminate the lease
only through litigation for cause--
that is , abandonment or poor
husbandry practices by the tenant.
Poor husbandry is difficult to
prove. The tenant is likely able to
terminate only if he or she goes out
of business or moves away.
CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM (CRP)
REGULATIONS
Questions and controversies have
developed between landowners,
tenants, and third parties about
property rights in the CRP program.
If CRP regulations are read with
care, it is clear that tenants'
rights are extended substantially
beyond the normal property rights
now held by most tenants in the land
they farm.
Most crop share leases are annual
leases or have renewal clauses. My
interpretation is that signing into
the CRP program with an existing
crop share lease tenant extends that
lease for ten years. If the farm
was subsequently devised by gift,
inheritance, or sold, the lease
would still be in force.
The tenant and landlord should both
sign and file form CRP-1, which
indicates the share received by both
parties under the agreement. If no
form is filed or if there is
disagreement as to the share , CRP
proceeds shall be divided in the
same way as the crops are divided
under the existing lease.
The CRP regulations under cash rent
are less specific. Most cash rent
leases are for a definite period
generally from one to three years.
A new lease must be negotiated at
the end of a lease period and
tenants may change. (My
interpretation is that if a farm
being cash rented or a part thereof
is bid into the CRP, proceeds would
go to the tenant, at least under
most existing cash rent leases.)
Two CRP regulations affecting the
cash lease are that the land must
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have no fewer tenants than it had
before and that the producer's unit
shall be no smaller than it was
before the farm was bid into the
CRP. Therefore, when a cash lease
terminates, the landowner must
continue to rent the land- -he or she
cannot start farming the land or any
smaller part of it that might be in
the CRP.
These regulations clearly reduce the
landowner's property rights and
increase the tenant's rights.
However, it may still be to the
landowner's advantage to bid land
into the CRP. Each landowner will
need to assess their land and lease
situation and act accordingly.
It is my opinion that the
regulations are likely to receive
more lenient interpretation by local
ASCS offices and boards. With a
crop share lease, it seems
reasonable to divide the income in
the first year as the share lease
indicates: in the first year of the
CRP the tenant must expend more
machine time and labor to establish
the conserving crop. Following
establishment, less time and labor
will be needed to maintain the crop.
So the tenant might then accept an
amount that would cover a custom
rate on mowing or whatever was
needed for maintenance, rather than
the crop lease share of the payment.
THE OVERAGE LEASE OR CASH RENT BONUS
LEASE
many tenants to go back to sharing
the risk with the landowner in a
crop share lease. Most landowners
who have enjoyed the convenience and
certainty of fixed annual cash rent
do not want to return to the crop
share lease.
There are compromise alternatives
for sharing risk within the cash
rent lease. A variable cash rent
could be designed, with adjustment
of a base or beginning cash rent
using alternatives such as an index
of land values, prices received by
farmers, average county yields and
average prices of corn and soybeans
at a local elevator. A state land
value index is published annually
(usually in May) and an index of
prices received by farmers is
published monthly by the USDA.
Average county yields are published
by the Illinois Agricultural
Statistical Service. Average prices
can be picked up where the grain is
marketed. The following equation
can be used to calculate the cash
rent on such a lease
:
Cash Rent for
Current Year - Base Cash Rent
jj Current Average County Yield
Average County Yield for Last 5 Yrs
.
X Current Grain Price
Average Grain Price for Last 5 Yrs.
In recent years the "traditional"
lease has varied. Cash leases
became popular during the decade
beginning in 1975. During the early
part of this period, many farmers,
because of high net farm income, bid
to obtain more land to farm. They
found they were more successful in
offering higher cash rent than
working within the traditional crop
share lease
.
Currently, lower farm income and
farmers' reluctance to assume all
the yield and price risk that is
Inherent in farming have convinced
The base rent should be the best
cash rent that can be negotiated as
a market or arm's-length rent
between the landowner and tenant.
Then that rent is adjusted up or
down based upon yields and commodity
prices in the market.
A few farmers are using the
"overage" lease, also called the
"cash rent bonus lease." This lease
guarantees the landowner a fixed
cash rent while protecting the
farmer from some of the yield and
price risk. The cash rent is set
lower than the market cash rent,
such as 10 to 20 percent, depending
on the variance of yields in the
area. The landowner receives a
bonus rent above the fixed cash rent
when prices or yields (such as the
gross value of production per acre)
go above a stipulated level.
This rent bonus could be a
percentage of the crop value when
yields are above the average yield
for the farm. For example, if the
usual corn yield was 140 bushels per
acre and the market cash rent was
$100 per acre, the base fixed rent
might be $90 per acre. When yield
is less than or equal to 140
bushels, the landowner receives $90
per acre. When yield is above 140
bushels per acre, the landowner
receives a share of the yield above
140 bushels per acre. That share
normally ranges from 25 to 40
percent (less than half, because the
farmer pays for the extra fertilizer
to produce the higher yield)
.
The base rent, yield levels, and
percentage of the overage must be
negotiated by the parties involved.
If a serious yield shortfall occurs
only once in 10 years on the
average, then a 10 percent reduction
in market cash rent to get the base
rent for the overage lease seems
reasonable. If the chances are 1 in
5, then a 20 percent reduction seems
appropriate. If records of yields
on the farm are not available, the
ASCS-designated yield for the farm
can be used as the bonus rent
threshold. Usually, the higher the
threshold yield, the higher the
percentage of the yield that should
be paid as the bonus rent to the
landowner. Another approach is to
stipulate a value per bushel as the
rent bonus --such as $.75 to $1 per
bushel on corn and $1.25 to $1.75
per bushel on soybeans produced
above the threshold.
out changes in a lease when there is
regular communication throughout the
year among all the parties involved.
Both parties need to discuss
problems as they happen rather than
allowing disagreements to build over
time to a confrontation. Even when
there is regular communication by
phone or over a cup of coffee, it is
still good to sit down at least once
a year around the kitchen table to
formally discuss the lease
arrangements. I strongly recommend
an updated written lease. A written
lease is a good memory crutch for
the landowner and tenant. The lease
may be important for relatives or an
executor if something should happen
to one of the parties directly
involved, or if a serious
disagreement developed over terms in
the lease
.
Prepared by John T. Scott, Jr.
Extension Economist
Land Economics and
Farm Management
To agree on some points in a lease
takes time, so it is good to begin
discussing changes in lease terms
now. Ample time is needed to work
out an agreement satisfactory to
both parties. It is easiest to work
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87-12/1988 Farmland Assessments: Down Ten Percent
Certified farmland assessed values for 1988, issued by the Illinois Department of
Revenue to county assessing officers, reflect the impact of continued downward
pressure from the poorly performing farm economy and assessment law amendments
adopted in 1986. The 1988 certified values will be used by assessors to determine
the taxable value of farms in 1988, the basis for tax bills paid by landowners in
1989 and revenues supporting rural schools and other local governments in fiscal
year 1990. The farmland property tax cycle is continuous and is more than two
years long. The property taxes paid by farmland owners this summer were based on
1986 assessments. The certified values used by assessors to set the 1986
assessments were issued by the State in May, 1985, and were determined using crop
price and production cost data from 1980 to 1984. Thus, tax bills paid in 1987 are
linked to the economic conditions in Illinois agriculture centered around 1982.
Lags in property tax assessments and associated tax bills are not unique to farm
property but are characteristic of the property tax. Unlike other forms of
taxation, such as the income tax and the sales tax, there is no market transaction
to determine the tax base. Property assessments established by local officials,
following procedures and approaches set forth in property tax law and State
administrative guidelines, determine the base for the property tax. Information
used in establishing assessments is always dated, which causes assessments and tax
bills to be related to past, not current, economic conditions.
1988 FARMLAND CERTIFIED VALUES AND COUNTY COMMITTEES
Local officials are provided a certified value (dollars per acre) for each soil
productivity index for soils that are cropped. Using these values and the soils
identified in a farm, assessors determine the assessed value for the farm.
Assessors consider slope and erosion factors and flood hazards in assessing
individual parcels of farmland. Unlike other real estate, which has to be
reassessed only once every four years, farmland is reassessed every year using the
appropriate certified values.
. important part of the local assessing process is the operations of County
iimland Assessment Review committees. Comprised of three farmers, someone from
•;he Property Tax Board of Review, and chaired by the Supervisor of Assessments, the
committee is responsible for working with assessing officials in the farmland
assessment process. This committee can play an important part in the assessment of
amland, but actual involvement varies from county to county. Counties having
; roblems" with their farmland assessments frequently have inactive committees.
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1988 Certified Average Farmland Assessed Values
(dollars per acre)
Source: Illinois Department of Revenue^ 63
Certification Memo. May 1. 1987
In addition to the certified values, the State issues the expected average per-acre
assessment for all farmland in each county. The variation in averages, from north
to south, in Illinois reflects differences in soil productivity and farmland use.
Better soils that grow corn and soybeans, as expected, are assessed higher than
poorer soils that are on a steep terrain and covered with trees. These are the
major factors underlying the differences in expected average farmland assessments
across counties
.
For many counties, the expected 1988 average assessments are significantly less
than in the past. Reductions of 30 and ^0 percent between 1984 and 1988 in average
assessments will be very common across the State. Without significantly higher tax
rates, per-acre tax payments in 1989 (and revenues for schools and other local
governments in fiscal year 1990) will follow assessments down.
FARMLAND ASSESSMENTS AND ASSESSMENT LEGISLATION
For the third consecutive year, the average per-acre property tax on Illinois farm-
land declined in 1986. The economic conditions in farming have placed downward
pressures on farm assessments since 1981, but average per-acre taxes did not begin
to slide until 1983. Between 1981 and 1985 the taxable value of farm real estate
in the State dropped 21 percent. The most current year with complete data is 1985;
and 1985 taxes were based on 1984 assessments. Expected continued reductions in
rural tax bases prompted legislative action in 1983 and again in 1986 as policy
makers sought to ease the adjustment of the rural tax base to the new economics of
Illinois agriculture. This easing protects rural local government and school
property tax revenues and insulates the State treasury from higher state school aid
payments to rural districts. The 1986 legislation essentially stretches out the
time that taxable values on farmland will take to adjust to the farm economy.
This was accomplished in the 1986 assessment amendments by
• not using 1987 certified values to set assessments for 1987, but using 1986
certified values in both 1986 and 1987 (1987 certified values were less than
1986 certified values);
• limiting the annual change in certified values to 10 percent, beginning with the
1988 certified values (1988 certified values are 10 percent less than 1986
certified values because calculated 1988 values using commodity prices and
production costs resulted in more than a 10 percent decline).
The 10-percent limitation will be the determining factor in farmland assessments
for several years as assessments decline gradually and accommodate the economic
conditions in the farm sector. Because of the lags in the assessment cycle and the
limitation legislation, it is possible to have a reasonably accurate picture of
future certified values. An illustration of past and expected future changes in
certified values is given in Figure 1. The illustration is for a soil type with a
productivity index of 120, and the base is 100 in 1981.
The index shows the slight downward pressures in 1982 and 1983 and the significant
drop in 1984, which triggered the 1983 assessment law amendments. The calculations
ielded some strengthening in certified values in 1985 and 1986 as the price
responses from the PIK program and the 1983 drought were picked up. Beginning In
1987, the index reflects the 1986 assessment law amendment and not the farm
economy. Using 1986 certified values in 1987 is evidenced by an index of 80 in
both years. The 10-percent limitation determined the index of 72 for 1988 and the
xpected indexes through 1990.
Index (%)
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Figure 1. Index of certified assessed value for soils with productivity
index of 120, 1981-1988 with projections to 1990.
An important point to draw from the illustration is the downward spiral in farmland
assessments as the tax base adjusts to the farm economy. By the end of the decade,
the assessed value for a soil type with an index of 120 will have declined 42
percent (index of 58). The 1986 changes in the farmland assessment law are easing
the poor economic conditions on Illinois farms into the farm property tax base.
Any reductions in property taxes associated with this phase -in will be welcomed by
farmland owners but will place fiscal pressures on rural schools, townships, road
districts and county governments.
SUMMARY
The 1988 certified values issued to assessing officers for use in setting 1988
assessments on farms reflect the 10-percent change limitation enacted into law in
1986. This legislation will phase the economic down- turn in the farm sector into
rural property tax bases. Variation in soil quality and farmland use underlies the
variation in 1988 average farmland assessments expected across Illinois counties.
Lower farmland assessments through the rest of the decade will challenge State
policy makers and raise important questions on the adequacy and method for
financing important local government services and rural schools. Everybody favors
property tar. reform, but reform means something different to almost everyone.
An Important policy goal- -and one that requires statemanship and effective
political leadership-
-is to achieve a state and local public finance system that is
judged fair, is balanced, and is adequate.
^a^ i d
Prepared by: David L. Chicoine, Extension Economist
State and Local Public Finance
and Tax Policy
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87-13/Fann Programs for 1988
THE 1988 FEED GRAIN PROGRAM
On September 29, 1987, the USDA made the first official announcement about the 1988
Feed Grain Program. Revisions are permitted by law until November 15 if there has
been a significant change in total supply since the first announcement.
The Food Security Act of 1985 established target prices for corn and for other feed
grains at a fair and reasonable relationship to corn. The target price for 1988
corn will be $2.97 per bushel, 2 percent below 1987. A reduction of 3 percent in
1989 and 5 percent in 1990 were also set by the 1985 Act. These target prices are
shown in Table 1
.
Table 1. Feed Grain Target Prices, 1985 90
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
(price per bushel)
Corn $3.03 $3.03 $3.03 $2.97 $2 88 $2 75
Oats 1.60 1.60 1.60 I.57I 1 52 1 44
Grain Sorghum 2.82 2.88 2.88 2.82 2 73 2 60
Barley 2.60 2.60 2.60 2.55 2 47 2 35
^Estimated for 1988, 1989 and 1990.
The loan rate for corn was set at $2.40 in 1986. After that, the loan rate was to
be 75 to 85 percent of the average market price for the past five years, dropping
the high and low years. However, the basic rate could not be decreased more than 5
percent per year. The Secretary is authorized to further reduce the loan rate from
the basic rate by up to 20 percent if the average market price was 110 percent or
less of the announced loan rate during the previous year or if the reduction is
necessary to maintain domestic and export markets.
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Consequently, the Secretary has used this authority for 1986, 1987, and 1988 to
reduce the actual loan rates as shown in Table 2. The actual rate announced for
1988 corn will be $1.74.
Acreage reduction. In order to be eligible for loans and other program payments
producers who participate in the program will be required to reduce their base
acreage by 20 percent. The entire amount required will be unpaid. However, USDA
officials believe a paid diversion may eventually be offered. A paid diversion may
be announced at any time.
Table 2. Feed Grain Loan Rates, Basic and Actual, 1985-1988
1985 1986 1987
Corn
Basic $2.55 2.40 2.28 2.17
Actual 2.55 1.92 1.82 1.74^
Grain Sorghum
Actual 2.42 1.82 1.74 1.65
Oats
Actual 1.31 .99 .94 .89
Barley
Actual 2.08 1.56 1.49 1.42
•'Maximum reduction possible.
Marketing loan. A marketing loan will not be allowed for the 1988 program.
Advance deficiency payments . No advance deficiency payments were announced for
1988. They were not included in the fiscal 1988 budget. However, legislation
mandating the early payments was pending in Congress in early October.
Cross compliance
. All feed grains except oats will be subject to limited cross
compliance.
Sign-up dates. Sign-up details will be announced later.
THE 1988 WHEAT PROGRAM
The Secretary of Agriculture announced on July 2 that an acreage reduction of 27.5
percent would be required for the 1988 wheat crop.
The loan rate will be $2.17 per bushel, a 20-percent reduction from the basic loan
rate of $2.71. The Secretary said the downward adjustment was determined necessary
to maintain U.S. wheat competitiveness in domestic and international markets. This
is the minimum allowed by law and is 5 percent below the 1987 loan rate.
The target price is $4.29 per bushel, the minimum set by law, 2 percent below the
1987 target price.
Paid land diversion. A paid land diversion program will not be implemented.
Marketing loan. No marketing loan or relative program provisions will be
implemented.
Conservation acres. Producers will be required to maintain in acreage conservation
reserve an area equal to 37.93 percent of the program payment acreage
Farmer-owned reserve. The upper limit on the farmer-owned reserve quantity will be
no more than 17 percent of estimated domestic and export use for the 1988-89
marketing year. If reserve quantities exceed the upper limit when 1988 crop wheat
loans mature, entry into the reserve will not be permitted.
The signup period for the 1988 wheat program was postponed from the announced date
of October 19, 1987. Signup will end on April 1, 1988.
In announcing the program. Secretary Lyng reserved the right to initiate later cost
reduction options as outlined in Section 1009 of the Food Security Act of 1985.
These options may include reopening or changing a program contract entered into by
producers if they voluntarily agree to the change.
Table 3. Wheat Target Prices and Loan Rates, Actual and Projected, 1985-90
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Target price. . . 4.38 4.38 4.38 4.29 4.16 4.00
4.00
Loan rate
:
Basic 3.30 3.00 2.85 2.71 2.57^ 2.44
Actual 3.30 2.40 2.28 2.17
^Projected based on a maximum reduction of 5 percent for 1989 and 1990.
The 1985 Food Security Act set the 1986 basic loan rate for wheat at $3 per bushel.
For 1988-90, the basic rates will be 75 to 85 percent of the simple average of the
season price received by producers using the five preceding marketing years, and
dropping the years with the high and low prices. This rate may not be lowered by
more than 5 percent from the basic rate in the previous year.
Loan rates may be further reduced from the basic rate by up to 20 percent if the
average market price was 110 percent or less of the announced loan rate during the
previous year or if the reduction is necessary to maintain domestic and export
markets
.
The USDA must announce an acreage reduction or set-aside program by June 1 for
wheat. Adjustments in the program can be made until July 31.
COMMON PROVISIONS OF 1988 FARM PROGRAMS
The following provisions will apply to feed grains, wheat, cotton and rice programs
in 1988.
Acreage planted for harvest on a farm may not exceed the crop acreage bases for
wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice if a producer is to be eligible for
price support loans, purchases, deficiency payments, or other program benefits.
Offsetting compliance will not apply. This means that eligibility for a progra™ •
payment or eligibility for a program commodity loan on one farm will not be
affected by actions taken with respect to that commodity on another farm.
50-92 Option. If a producer chooses to use the 50-92 option provision, production
of nonprogram crops will not be permitted. To be eligible to receive payments on
92 percent of the permitted acreage, producers must plant at least 50 percent of
the permitted acreage to the program crop and devote the remaining permitted
acreage to a conserving use.
Production of alternate crops on the designated Acreage Conservation Reserve (ACR)
will not be permitted. Grazing of ACR land will be permitted at the request of th'
state ASCS committee, except during any 5-consecutive-month period designated by
these committees. Haying of ACR land will not be permitted except under emergency
conditions.
Adjusting crop acreage bases. Farmers will not be permitted to adjust any crop
acreage base with a corresponding downward adjustment in other crop acreage bases
on the farm. However, adjustments in bases will be considered when producers must
change cropping practices in order to carry out conservation compliance
requirements on highly erodible land.
Generic connnodity certificates will continue to be a part of the 1988 farm
programs, if needed. The extent of their use will be determined as program
payments are made
.
Prepared by: Harold D. Guither
Extension Economist
Public Policy
Cooperative Extension Service
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87-14/Economics of Fertilizer Use
The economic choices regarding fertilizer involve evaluating the trade-offs among
crop choices, the amount of fertilizer to apply, why to apply it, and alternative
uses of limited funds for production expenses. To make economic choices, it is
important to recognize the relevant costs.
The economic rules for determining the quantity of nitrogen fertilizer to apply are
very simple. The first rule is that the value of added product (the value of extra
yield due to extra fertilizer) must be equal to or greater than the cost of the
added fertilizer (marginal revenue greater than marginal cost) . The second rule is
that because capital may be limited, the marginal return of the last dollar spent
on fertilizer must be equal to or greater than its return in other uses (equal mar-
ginal return or opportunity cost)
.
EVALUATING OPTIMUM NITROGEN FERTILIZATION RATES
The basic information needed to determine the most profitable nitrogen fertiliza-
tion rate is the physical production function, or the relation of crop yields to
varying rates of fertilizer application. By using output and input prices, the
most profitable application rate can be determined. The data in Table 1 shows the
net returns from various rates of nitrogen fertilization on continuous corn when
the price of corn is $1.80 per bushel, the cost of nitrogen is $0.12 per pound, and
the other direct costs related to yield are $0.45 per bushel harvested.
Applying nitrogen at a rate of 190 pounds per acre produces the maximum return of
$186.37 per acre. Applying 10 pounds less decreases net returns by $0.29. The
last 10 pounds applied gives an added return of $1.98 at an added cost of $1.70.
The net return over variable cost per dollar of nitrogen spent is $0.24. If the
$1.70 spent on the last 10 pounds of nitrogen could return more than $1.98 in some
other use, then total farm returns could be maximized bv stopping at the 180-pound
application level.
The optimum level of nitrogen use depends upon the tecnnicai relation of crop yield
and units of nitrogen applied, the price of the product, the cost of nitrogen, and
other direct costs related to yield. The data in Table 2 are derived from the
response curve used in Table 1. As the price of corn increases, the rate of nitro-
gen application should increase. On the other hand, when the cost of the nitrogen
fertilizer increases, fewer pounds of nitrogen should be applied. The amount of
the reduction depends upon the response function and the magnitude of the changes
in prices. For example, in Table 2, reducing of the corn price from $3.00 to $1.50
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Table 1. Returns from Nitrogen (N) Fertilization on Com
Cost of Total
Value added N returns Average
of plus over N net
Marginal marginal other and other return Marginal
N applied Yield increase increase direct direct per net return
(Ib/fii) (bu/A) fbu/A) & $1.80 costs $N per $N
100 135.1
110 138.4 3.31 5.96 2.69 173.62 13.15 2.73
120 141.4 3.04 5.47 2.57 176.52 12.26 2.42
130 144.2 2.76 4.97 2.44 179.05 11.48 2.11
140 146.7 2.48 4.47 2.32 181.24 10.79 1.79
150 148.9 2.21 3.97 2.19 182.98 10.17 1.48
160 150.8 1.93 3.48 2.07 184.39 9.60 1.17
170 152.5 1.65 2.98 1.94 185.42 9.09 0.86
180 153.8 1.38 2.48 1.82 186.08 8.61 0.55
190 154.9 1.10 1.98 1.70 186.37 8.17 0.24
200 155.8 0.83 1.49 1.57 186.28 7.76 -0.07
210 156.3 0.55 0.99 1.45 185.83 7.37 -0.38
220 156.6 0.27 0.49 1.32 184.99 7.01 -0.69
230 156.6 0.00 -0.01 1.20 183.79 6.66 -1.00
240 156.3 -0.28 -0.50 1.07 182.21 6.33 -1.32
*N at $0.12 per pound and other direct costs at $0.45 per bushel
Table 2. Optimum Rate of Nitrogen (N) on Com
Corn
price
( $/bu)
Price of nitrogen
8e(/lb 12tf/lb 16^/lb
$1.50
2.25
3.00
197
209
214
pounds of N per acre
184 180
201 193
208 202
and doubling the nitrogen price from $0.08 cents to $0.16 cents results in a 34-
pound or 16-percent reduction in the optimum application rate.
The optimum rates calculated in Table 2 are averages over four years. Depending
upon moisture conditions and other environmental factors, the optimum rate may vary
from year to year. There is a penalty of lost return when an application less than
the optimum amount is applied. The penalty for applying more than the optimum
amount is the cost of the extra fertilizer plus any loss of yield if production
begins to diminish. While the net profits are less in both cases, which has the
potential for greater losses?
Overshooting the optimal fertilizer rate violates the first rule of economic
choice- -the relation of marginal cost and marginal return. Producers who have
limited financial resources should also be applying the second rule- -equal marginal
returns. That is, they should compare the marginal return of the last dollar
invested in fertilizer with that dollar's potential return if spent on seed,
pesticides, machinery, or other uses.
Because of weather variation and other factors, the average optimum level of
nitrogen, identified in Table 2, may not be optimum each year. If nitrogen Is
applied at the average optimum level of 195 pounds in each of four years, under-
shooting and overshooting can be demonstrated by examining applications of 180 and
210 pounds per acre. Results for this particular nitrogen-yield response curve
indicate that applying 15 pounds per acre less than the average optimum level of
nitrogen yields higher returns than applying 15 pounds per acre over the average
optimum level. For example, at a market price of $1.80 per bushel and a nitrogen
application of 180 pounds per acre, average returns per acre (on the average over
the four years) are $1.95 less than the maximum returns per acre for the four
years, whereas an application of 210 pounds of nitrogen per acre returns $2.23 per
acre less than the maximum.
Target yields are useful to producers only if an appropriate target is used for the
particular region of the state and soil type. The average potential yield for a
given region can be estimated as the average maximum yield over a four- to ten-
year period. Four- to five-year estimates for Dekalb, Carthage, and Toledo,
Illinois, in the late 1960s are given in Table 3.
The amount of nitrogen (as a ratio) that should be applied to maximize yield is
1.22, 1.27, and 1.36 times the potential yield at Dekalb, Carthage, and Toledo,
respectively. The last two lines of Table 3 show the ratio of nitrogen fertilizer
to the potential yield for maximizing net returns for corn prices of $3.00 and
$1.80. For the Dekalb example, the nitrogen application rate which maximizes net
returns given an expected corn price of $1.80 per bushel is 149.7 pounds (1.09 X
137.3).
Table 3. Average Ratios of Che OpCimum Nitrogen Application
Rate to Potential or Maximum Yield^
Maximum Yield Ratio^
Optimum Yield Ratio'^
@ $3.00/bu
(a $1.80/bu
^N @ $0.12 per pound and other direct costs at $0.45 per bushel.
^The average maximum yield for an estimated response curve.
^The ratio of nitrogen fertilizer to the average maximum yield.
Perhaps as important as determining the rate of nitrogen application is the effec-
tive use of nitrogen for producers short of capital. Later applications of fer-
tilizer, allowing for fewer losses from denitrification, may be an effective way to
reduce costs rather than reducing amounts applied.
Dekalb Carthape Toledo
137.3 147.7 120.8
1.22 1.27 1.36
1.15 1.22 1.27
1.09 1.17 1.18
EVALUATING PHOSPHORUS AND POTASSIUM APPLICATION RATES
The evaluation of annual rates of application for phosphorus (P) and potassium (K)
differs from that for nitrogen. Nitrogen application rates are based upon the
nutrient needs of the crop to be grown each year. On the other hand, phosphorus
and potassium normally remain in the soil unless removed by a growing crop or b
erosion.
Traditionally, the recommendations from Illinois fertilizer specialists for phos-
phorus and potassium have been based on establishing the base soil test and adding
enough fertilizer nutrients to build the soil up to a test level at which the yield
of the most demanding crop would be maximized, plus enough to replace the amount
the crops remove
.
Generally, the low costs of P and K fertilizer have supported the economic ration-
ale for investment in a four-year build-up program. In the analysis of soil fer-
tility buildup, we find that response rate is very high at low test levels and
diminishes at higher test levels. For example, the change in yield with changes in
test level on low phosphorus -supplying soils is shown in Table 4. Corn yield
increases 14 percent, from 25 to 35 P]^ test levels. However, from 45 to 55, the
increase is only 1 percent.
The average yield increase is great enough to recover amortized investment cost in
four years or less, at least up to 45 ?i test level. Current prices for soybeans
will cover the costs of increasing the ?i test level to 35. However, if the farm
is in a corn-soybean rotation, the test level should be maintained at 45, so as not
to restrict the profitability of the corn enterprise. Even low prices for wheat
will support an increase in phosphorus to the 65 ?i test level.
Similarly, in Table 5, with $2.25 corn, the value of the expected yield increase
exceeds the four-year amortization payment required to pay off the initial build-up
Investment until the 240 K2O test level is reached. For soybeans and wheat, K test
levels are justified up to 200 and 160, respectively. A payoff period of more than
four years would be required to justify buildup to higher test levels of both phos-
phorus and potassium.
In recent years, many producers have faced financial limits on amounts of borrowed
funds available for production expenses. Consequently, the economic conditions for
build-up programs are less favorable. With limited working capital, many producers
are examining alternative options in making fertilizer applications of P and K for
their crops.
SUMMARY
Optimum fertilizer rates are determined by equating the value of the increased
yield of the crop to the cost of the additional fertilizers. Moreover, when
capital is limited the return for each additional dollar invested in fertilizer
must be equal to or greater than its return in other investments. Therefore, a
reduction in the ratio of commodity prices to fertilizer costs, with everything
else held constant, leads to lower optimum levels of fertilizer.
For nitrogen fertilizer recommendations, target yields are useful only if it is
possible to achieve the target level given soil conditions and other inputs. The
I
Table 4. Economics of Phosphorus (P) Buildup
Change in P ^ test level
25 to 35 35 to 45 45 to 55 55 to 65
Build-up quantity of
P2O5 required (lb/A) 90 90 90 90
Investment cost at $0.22/A $ 19.8 $ 19.8 $ 19.8 $ 19.8
percent of poCeuCial
Base yield of crop,
Corn 80 94 98 99
Soybean 86 97 99 99
Small grain 48 88 80 91
Expected yield after buildup,
Corn 94 98 99 100
Soybean 97 98 100 100
Small grain 66 80 91 97
Marginal increase in yields.
Corn 14 4 1 1
Soybean 11 2 1
Small grain 18 12 11 6
Years to reach build-up
level of yield 4 4 4 4
Average yield increase, per acre bushels
Corn (150-bu potential) 12.0 6.0 1.5 1.5
Soybeans (60-bu potential) 6.6 1.2 0.6 0.0
Wheat (80-bu potential) 14.4 9.6 8.8 4.8
Annual 4-year amortized cost of
build-up fertilizer investment
at 10% interest, per acre $6.25 $6.25 $6.25 $6.25
Breakeven increase
in yield of crop,
Corn at $3.00 (2.55)^
2.25 (1.80)^
1.50 (1.05)3
Soybeans at $6.00 (5.55)^
5.00 (4.55)3
4.00 (3.55)3
Wheat at $4.00 (3.40)3
3.00 (2.40)3
2.00 (1.40)3
•bushels'-
2.45 2.45
3.47 3.47
5.95 5.95
1.13 i.nl
1.37
1.76
1.37
1.76
2.45
3.47
5.92
1.13
1.37
1.76
2.45
3.47
5.95
1.13
1.37
1.76
1.87 1.87 1.87 1.87
2.60 2.60 2.60 2.60
4.46 4.46 4.46 4.46
3Net price equals market price less yield-related variable cash costs of
maintenance fertilizer, harvesting, drying, and marketing.
Whe boxed area represents the test levels of phosphorus where the value of
the increase yield exceeds the 4-year amortized cost.
Table 5. Economics of Potassium (K) Buildup
Change in K test level
80-120 120-160 160-200 200-240 2A0-300
Build-up quantity of
K2O required (lb per acre).
Investment cost at $0.125/lb.
Base yield of crop,
Corn
Soybean
Small grain
Expected yield after buildup,
Corn
Soybean
Small grain
Marginal increase in yield,
Corn
Soybean
Small grain
160 160 160 160 160
$ 20 $ 20 $ 20
of pot
$ 20 $ 20
71 81 88 93 97
75 85 92 96 98
87 95 98 99 100
81 88 93 97 99
85 92 96 98 99
95 98 99 99 99
10 7 5 4 2
10 7 4 2 1
8 3 1
Years to reach build-up
level of yield
Average yield increase, per acre
Corn (150-bu potential)
Soybean (60-bu potential)
Wheat (80-bu potential)
-bushels
15.0 10.5 7.5 6.0 3.0
6.9 4.2 2.4 1.2 0.6
6.4 2.4 1.8 0.0 0.0
Annual 4-year amortized cost of
build-up fertilizer investment
at 10% interest, per acre $6.31 $6.31 $6.31 $6.31 $6.31
Breakeven increase in
yield of crop,
Corn at $3.00 (2.55)^
2.25 (1.80)3
1.50 (1.05)3
Soybeans at $6.00 (5.55)^
5.00 (4.55)3
4.00 (3.55)3
Wheat at $4.00 (3.40)3
3.00 (2.40)a
2.00 (1.40)3
1.14
1.39
1.78
bushels^
1.14
1.39
1.78
1.86 1.86
1
2.63
4.51
2.63
4.51
1.14
1.39
1.78
1.86
2.63
4.51
2.47
3.51
6.00
2.47
3.51
6.00
2.47
3.51
6.00
2.47
3.51
6.00
2.47|
3.51
6.00
1.39
1.78
1.86
2.63
4.51
1.14
1.39
1.78
1.86
2.63
4.51
3Net price equals market price less yield-related variable cash costs of
maintenance fertilizer, harvesting, drying, and marketing.
The boxed area represents the test levels of phosphorus where the value of
the increase yield exceeds the 4-year amortized cost.
potential yield for a particular farm can be estimated based on historical infor-
mation from that farm. The economic optimal nitrogen application can be estimated
P based on the potential yield, along with fertilizer cost and commodity price
information.
Similarly, the decision to make any phosphorus and potassium application depends on
the difference in yield responses and upon the alternative return for scarce
operating dollars that would be required for the fertilizing expense. If the
producer can be sure that yields with no additional P and K fertilizer would not
decline, then that option is more profitable in the short run.
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87-15/Land Prices on the Way Up;
HISTORY IS THE PROLOGUE FOR THE
FUTURE
The low on land prices occurred
about the middle of October 1986.
This was when prices of some sales
began to be a little higher than
comparable sales only a month or
two earlier. Land prices have
continued to increase since then.
We have been supplementing the USDA
annual survey with a quarterly
survey. The annual USDA survey
showed a decline from April 1, 1986
(index number 73), to April 1, 1987
(index number 67), of 8 percent for
Illinois. We believe most of this
reported year-to-year decline
occurred in the summer of 1986.
Our surveys show land prices were
actually rising throughout 1987,
particularly on the higher quality
land. The average increase on the
better quality, better located land
since the low last October has been
in the 5- to 10 -percent range.
Some instances of individual sales
suggest larger increases. Usually
when these higher sales are
investigated, however, special
circumstances explaining the higher
values- -such as the whole crop
(without production expenses)
included in the sale, a good set of
buildings sold off (raising the
overall per acre value) or
investors forced to buy for tax
purposes
.
Land of mediocre and lower quality
has not enjoyed much price
resurgence. In fact, land of
mediocre quality has only held its
own or even declined slightly. The
price of lower quality land has
generally been stabilized and
supported by the government
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
.
in which the government is renting
land that should be planted in a
conserving crop for ten years. The
government is paying rents that are
comparable or higher than cash
rents a farmer might expect to pay
on the same land. There are
individual and groups of investors
looking for land to buy that is
already in the CRP or is eligible
to enter the CRP.
The year-to-year decline estimated
by USDA (1986-1987) for Iowa was 11
percent. According to the most
recent reports coming from Iowa,
land prices on the better land have
STATE -COUNTY- LOCAL GROUPS- US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
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turned around sharply by 10 percent
or more in the last 90 days. This
is not surprising because land
prices in Iowa increased the most
percentage -wise at the end of the
boom and declined the most from
spring 1981 to 1986. Prices
probably overshot on the downside
as well as on the upside. Iowa
also has the same situation as
Illinois with the mediocre or poor
land.
Illinois has a more stable
agricultural base because of the
nearness to market and lower
marketing costs, as well as a less
variable climate. A good example
is that the target price and loan
rate for corn in Iowa is 10 to 12
cents per bushel less than in
Illinois (except for Iowa counties
along the Mississippi) . Other
mitigating factors favoring
Illinois are the stronger urban
influences on land value and a
generally unrestricted land market.
Iowa restricts foreign investment
in farmland, as do several other
states. Illinois has a law passed
in the late 1800s restricting
foreign investment, but I cannot
find that it has been enforced in
modern times.
Land prices have increased this
year for a number of reasons.
Probably the two most important are
higher net incomes and lower rates
of interest. Interest rates on
three-month treasury bills reached
a low of 5.05 percent on October
10, 1986, which corresponded to the
time of the low in the land market.
Certificates of Deposit (CDs) were
under 5 percent. Five-year
governments were at 6.72 percent
and long term at 7.99 percent.
Interest rates remained low through
July of this year. Since July,
interest rates have been rising
partly to maintain foreign interest
in government securities in the
face of a falling dollar and partly
in anticipation of inflation.
Short-term rates have increased
about m percent and long- terra
rates have increased about 2
percent. This is a 25-percent
increase in rates. Since the stock
market crash rates have again
receded. How long rates can remain
low depend on the Federal Reserve
and on willingness for other
countries to accommodate us.
Farm income with substantial
government subsidies, high
livestock prices, and lower
operating costs (due partly to
lower input costs, less machinery
investment, and fewer planted
acres) has resulted in
significantly higher net farm
income. Most of the land sales
made this year have been to cash or
mostly cash buyers. The higher
income and higher rate earned on
land precipitated a shift from
government securities and CDs to
land by many people who were
conservative investors through the
land boom. This is true
particularly among farmers who
think land prices might be about as
low as they will go. The
psychology in agriculture has
changed over the past year to a
more optimistic viewpoint. This
affects the market.
The Federal Land Bank Districts in
the Midwest, with the help of some
concessional interest rates, have
been reducing their land inventory
at prices higher than most people
had expected. They have been able
to sell much of the better quality
land in their inventory. However,
lenders including the Farmers Home
Administration own about 11,000,000
acres.
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD ON LAND
VALUES?
A number of positive factors are
currently working in the market:
(1) no other major capital asset
has dropped more in value since
1981 than farmland- -except perhaps
gold, silver, and oil; and these
others are now going up in price;
(2) net rent has declined less than
land value, increasing the rate
earned; (3) mortgage interest rates
and rates on alternative
investments are lower than in 1981;
(4) net farm income has increased
since 1986; (5) land prices in
terms of gold are close to
Depression lows when 3 ounces of
gold would buy an acre of good
land, and now it can be bought for
3.5 to 4 ounces per acre; (6)
dollar devaluation against some
currencies should improve exports;
and (7) devaluation combined with
the large and continuing trade
deficit has put many times the
dollars in foreign hands as in the
1970s land boom. Foreigners
(particularly Japanese) have
already strongly invaded the U.S.
commercial real estate market. If
they should start buying land, land
prices would move higher. All
Illinois farmland is now valued at
about 29 billion dollars. This is
equal to two to three months of our
trade deficit.
The elements of downward risk
include (1) land is generally
illiquid, thereby increasing risk
on the downside; (2) Western
nations have agreed to eliminate
agricultural subsidies by the year
2000; (3) current agricultural
subsidies, along with the surplus
stocks overhanging the market, are
very significant; (4) higher
interest rates along with a higher
real rate (a larger difference
between inflation and rates of
interest) seems probable; (5) the
value of the dollar against
currencies of producing countries
has not declined, causing them to
continue as strong competitors in
the world market; (6) the new breed
of farmers are financially oriented
businessmen as well as production
specialists who are less likely to
bid up farmland prices, forcing
returns to land below competitive
alternatives; and (7) lenders still
own a large supply of land
overhanging the market.
In summary, an optimistic
psychology in the market (coupled
with lower interest rates and
higher farm incomes) has brought a
turnaround in the market. The main
negative forces are the politically
vulnerable government subsidies and
interest rates that are rising. In
my opinion, the land market will
continue at about its current
level, on a plateau about 5 to 10
percent above the October 1986
bottom. The direction from here
may not be clear for some time.
If government subsidies are reduced
significantly or the real rate of
interest increases significantly,
the October 1986 bottom could prove
to be a false bottom.
The stock and bond markets are now
taking a beating. This should not
affect land markets much unless it
turns into a real bear that affects
the whole economy. The current
pessimistic climate in the
financial markets could, of course,
slop over into the real estate
markets
.
If inflation does Increase
significantly or foreigners re-
enter the land market using their
large dollar balances, all bets are
off. Even then it is doubtful
whether land values will rise as
much as the inflation rate over the
long run, because agriculture is a
declining industry relative to the
total economy.
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87-16/Income Tax Planning for Farmers
Income tax planning is normally considered to be an exercise that a farmer goes
through late in the tax year to carefully assess the likely tax impact on his or
her business. Good tax management should be a year-round process because so many
transactions can have substantial tax consequences. More than 2 or 3 weeks late in
December may be required to make the necessary adjustments that will result in a
good tax plan.
Good tax planning through the remainder of 1987 will be important in minimizing
your income tax liability. Government program participation has reduced cash
expense and accelerated income through advance deficiency and diverted acre pay-
ments. Depreciation is running out on many capital purchases that were made during
the early 1980s. Grain inventories carried from 1986 to 1987 were above average
because of high 1986 yields. Finally, livestock producers have enjoyed above aver-
age returns the past year. Along with all of these economic factors, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 lowered rates for both 1987 and 1988 but also extended depreci-
able lives on capital purchases and disallowed many deductions that were taken in
prior years
.
The basis for tax planning is an accurate and comprehensive set of farm business
ecords. For most sole proprietors, this should include business transactions as
ell as personal expenditures that might qualify for itemized deductions. More
armers are moving toward a procedure of reconciling all funds flowing through the
ccount in order to verify mathematically that no items have been omitted or dupli-
ated.
in addition to summarizing year-to-date data for 1987, an awareness of the signifi-
cant changes created by the' Tax Reform Act of 1986 is essential. Our procedures
here will focus primarily on the cash-basis farmer, but most of the consideration
^f alternatives will apply to the accrual-basis person as well.
The goal of tax planning is to minimize the amount of income tax that has to be
aid over time. This is normally accomplished by leveling the taxable income to
ivoid the wide fluctuations that might cause you to be pushed into the higher tax
^rackets. Because of the magnitude of the self -employment tax rates, planning may
occasionally take another route. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 has widened the Inter-
val from one rate to the next so that you may not have to be quite as precise in
the planning in order to avoid higher tax rates.
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The first step, as suggested above, is to post to-date all transactions in your
farm record books, then run totals on all of the accounts. Record these totals on
a tax worksheet or on a blank copy of last year's schedule F and/or form 4797.
Many tax worksheets are designed with three columns:
Year -to -date,
Projections and/or adjustments, and
Total.
An example income tax projection worksheet from the North Central Regional Publica-
tion No. 2, Income Tax Management for Farmers, appears at the end of this article.
Next, list all income that you will be receiving before the end of the year and all
expenses that must be paid by the end of the year. Then list income that may be
received this year or carried over into next year and list expenses that can be
paid by the end of the year but are not due until the following year. This will
give you an idea of what your projected income will be for the year and to what
extent you can make adjustments to that projection.
Last year's depreciation may serve as a guide from which to make an estimate for
this year. With so many items having reached the end of their depreciable life
under the Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) , it would be best to review last
year's schedule rather thoroughly. The depreciation on current year purchases
should be included in an estimate. Some computer programs have the capability of
calculating next year's depreciation for items currently on the schedule.
A review of the previous year's tax return is normally the starting point for an
evaluation and relative comparison of the current year's income level. It is only
a guide, however, because the current year and the forthcoming year can still be
changed.
Several figures might help determine both the gross income and the net income
levels you want to attain. Many grain farmers follow a procedure of carrying over
a substantial portion of the crop into the next calendar year. Once this year's
gross income -to -date has been calculated, compare it with a projection of what next
year's sales may be, based on the current inventory. If there is price uncertainty
associated with next year's sales, plan on letting next year's gross run at least 5
percent higher than this year's.
If parts of two crops are sold in one year, it is a little more difficult to iden-
tify what gross income you want to report. It probably should approximate an
annual projected gross income for the farm.
For those individuals who have an accrual-basis income statement, the previous
years 's accrual net income may serve as a guideline for the current year's cash-
basis income. Projecting from such a figure should help to bring you close to the
net income that good tax planning would suggest you might want to achieve. In
gathering data for a comparison with last year, make sure that any significant non-
farm data is also included in your analysis.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 requires that you familiarize yourself with many new
facts and figures in doing tax planning. You may want to call on the assistance of
your accountant, Farm Business Farm Management (FBFM) field staff, or other tax
The Federal Income Tax Projection Worksheet
Use this vrarksheel Ihroughout the y'ear in planning farm business and tax management strategies. 1/ you do not use it throughout the
year, use it in No\-ember to plan tax sa\-ings in December.
Amount to Estimated Ettiroated
Date Res: of Year Year's Total
FARM RECEIPTS:
Sales of product raised' and miscellaneous receipts:
Cattle, hogs, sheep and wool, etc $
Poultry, eggs and dairy products S
All crop sales S
Custom work, prorations and refunds
agriculture program payments S
Total sales and other farm income (1) $_
Sales of purchased market livestock $ S_
Purchase cost (subtract) $ S_
Gross profits on sale of purchased livestock' (2) S_
Gross farm profits' (Item 1 + 2) (3) S_
FARM EXPENSES:
Labor hired S Veterinary, medicine S
Repairs, maintenance .... S Gasoline, fuel, ofl $
Interest S Storage, warehousing $
Rent of farm, pasture .... S Taxes S
Feed purchased S Insuramce S
Seed, plants purchased . . S Utilities S
Fertilizers, lime S Freight, trucking S
N!achine hire $ Conservation, expenses . . S
Supplies purchased S Other S
Breeding fees S Other S
Total cash farm expenses (4) S_
Depreciation on machinery impro\-ements, dairy and breeding stock (5) S_
Total deductions (Item 4 + 5) (6) S_
Self employment farm income (Item 3 less item 6) (7) S_
OTHER INCOME:
Net taxable gain from Schedule D (Sales of dairy and breeding stock,
machinery and other capital exchanges (8) S_
Taxable non-farm income (9) S_
Adjusted gross income (Item 7 + 8 + 9) 00) S_
Less: standard deduction or itemized deductions* S_
SI ,9(X) X personal exemptions^ S_
Total non-business deductions and exemptions (11) S_
Taxable income (Item 10 less item U) 02) S_
EstL-nated income tax (calculated from appbcable tax computation
table or rates) (13) $_
Estimated self-employment tax* (Item 7 x .123) 04) S_
TCriAL TAX Otem 13 + 14) 05) S_
Less Credits: allou-able investment credit and carT>wer, gas tax.
income tax withheld and estimated tax paid 06) S_
Estimated tax due Otem 15 less item 16) 07) S_
Last year's marginal tax bracket %
This year's estimated marginal tax bracket %
Next year's expected marginal tax bracket %
' For accura! method incbdt salts of »II tveslocV *Uie ittmued dedortiwu if Urfe'
20m,t for accrrjjj method. ^E^mpbon far »«7. see cunwK Uj regviUior
^For jccrjjl method idjust (or chir«e in mvenlory and new liv^suxk *Rilf far 19»7. »e« Oimtn tu regulitwn br wb»«juefi« ytm
pathases.

practitioners. Some of the more significant changes to keep in mind include the
following:
1. Tax rates have been reduced and the brackets have been expanded. For
example, the marginal income tax rate for a married couple filing a joint
return is 15 percent on taxable income between $3,000 and $28,000.
2. Personal exemptions have been increased from $1,080 to $1,900.
3. The standard deduction for a married couple filing a joint return has in-
creased by $90 to $3,760, but is scheduled to increase to $5,000 in 1988.
4. A self-employed individual is allowed to deduct 25 percent of what he or
she pays under an insured or self- insured family health plan. This is not
available if the self-employed person participates in a health plan
furnished by his or her spouse's employer.
5. Capital purchases of up to $10,000 on eligible property may be deducted in
the year of purchase.
6. Limits have been placed on the amount of prepaid farming expenses that can
currently be deducted if you use the cash-basis method of accounting. The
limitation applies to prepaid expenses in excess of 50 percent of the non-
prepaid farming expenses.
7. Deductions for IRA contributions are phased out for middle- and high-
income individuals who are covered under another qualified pension plan.
Items that have been eliminated by this legislation include the following:
1. Two -earner deduction for married couples.
2. Income averaging.
3. Capital gains exclusion- -note there are special rules for participants in
the dairy herd buy-out program.
4. Land clearing expense- -remember also that conservation expenses must be
part of an approved plan.
5. Dividend exclusion.
6. Charitable contributions- -now must be included with other itemized
deductions
.
Vhile most producers are concerned about ways to lower income before the end of the
•ear, there may be certain instances where net income needs to be increased before
the end of the year. Low crop yields the previous year, a change in the farm lease
from a crop share to cash rent, or farming increased acreage are some reasons farm
income may be low for a given year. At the minimum, net farm and nonfarra income
should be high enough to cover the taxpayer's standard deductions and personal
exemptions. Some ways to increase income include selling some new crop grain and
collecting before year end, and delaying payment of those expenses that are not
required to be paid until after the first of the year.
Farmers looking for ways to lower their income before the end of the year may defer
reporting income from fall grain sales by signing a delayed payment contract with
their elevator when the grain is sold. These contracts state that proceeds from
the grain sale cannot be collected until after the first of the year.
Another way to lower current year's income is to prepay next year's farm-operating
expenses. When doing this, be sure your purchase invoice states the quantity and
price of the supplies. Just a down payment toward next year's bills is not accept
able. There also should be an economic reason for prepaying expenses, such as
receiving a cash discount for paying ahead. Some of the more common expenses that
are prepaid include fertilizer, seed, feed, and chemicals. Also, you may want to
pay up any accrued interest or drying and storing charges. Prepayments of inter-
est, cash rent, or insurance are not deductible. When prepaying expenses, be sure
to pay those that yield the largest economic return first, that is, those that hav
the largest cash discount and those that will need to be paid soon after the first
of the year.
Producers who have purchased machinery or equipment during the year may elect to
expense those purchases in the current year instead of setting them up on deprecia
tion. Producers can expense up to $10,000 of eligible capital purchases. If few
capital purchases have been made this year and no more are planned, the prepayment
of cash-operating expenses should normally carry a higher priority for added deduc
tions than machinery and equipment purchases
.
|
Another method used to lower income is contributing to an IRA, Keogh plan, or both
Contributions to these plans generally reduce gross income. The Tax Reform Act ofj
1986, however, has placed some limitations on the deductibility of IRA contribu-
tions. It should be noted that although contributions can be made to Keogh plans
up to the due date of the tax return, the plan must be established by the end of
the tax year to allow a deduction for those contributions.
Changes in tax laws and relatively better incomes have increased the importance of
tax planning for farm operators. The key to tax planning is to start now to allow
time for adjustments to be made before the end of the year.
tUd^ tjLA&M %ih 7i. ^0
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87-17/The Financial Future of Illinois Cash-Grain Farms ^
Illinois cash-grain farms continue to face uncertainty about the future of
agriculture. Commodity prices remain at low levels and farm program support
prices are decreasing. Although land values appear to be stabilizing, a return
to the levels of the early eighties seems unlikely in the near future. This
report projects the financial performance of Illinois cash- grain farms under a
set of current coimiiodity prices and production costs. These projections are made
under different tenure patterns and initial debt- level assumptions. Farmers and
their advisers can use this information in evaluating the future financial
performance of farm firms.
The recent economic stress in agriculture has forced many farm firms to
reevaluate or restructure existing production, marketing, and financial plans and
practices. Some of the ways in which farm firms are dealing with financial
stress are by negotiating interest rate reductions and/or principal write-downs,
filing for Chapter 12 bankruptcy, or undertaking a full or partial liquidation.
In this report, the commodity price increases needed to maintain the initial
level of net worth are identified. If these price increases seem to be too high
to expect for a given type of farm operation, perhaps a change in the production,
marketing, or financial affairs of the farm should be considered.
PROJECTED ECONOMIC SITUATIONS OF NORTH AND CENTRAL ILLINOIS CASH-GRAIN FARMS
Net farm income is projected four years into the future for farms under three
tenure patterns (full owner, part owner, and full tenant) at three initial debt-
to-asset levels (20, 50, and 70 percent). Assumptions about farm size.
production costs, and capital asset values are based upon grain farms in northern
and central Illinois whose operators participasie in the Farm Business Farm
Management (FBFM) record keeping service
The farm scenario in these simulations consiscs ot 651 tillable acres. The
cropping pattern is 55 percent corn and set-aside (360 acres) and 45 percent
soybeans (291 acres) each year. We assume that the farm participates in the 20
1 Funds for this project were provided in part by the Illinois Farm Legal
Assistance Foundation.
^TATF . COUNTY LOCAL GROUPS • U S DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE COOPERATING
THE ILLINOIS COOptiAT^VE EXT^ENS^i SER JfcE PROVIDES EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN PROGRAMS
AND EMPLOYMENT
percent set-aside program^. This results in 288 acres of corn and 72 acres of
set-aside. The full ovmer is assumed to own all 651 acres. The part owner owns
325 acres and share-rents the rest on a 50-50 basis. The full tenant share-rents
the entire 651 acres.
Production costs and land values are assumed to remain constant over the four-
year period. Interest rates are assumed to be 10.5 percent on current- and
intermediate -term debt and 10 percent on long-term debt. Commodity yields are
143 and 45 bushels per acre for corn and soybeans, respectively. This corn yield
is also used to project government program benefits. The prices used to project
net farm income are summarized in Table 1. Corn target prices are assumed to
decline as set forth in the 1985 Farm Bill. Cash corn and soybean prices are
assumed to increase slightly over the four-year period.
Table 1. Conmodity Prices Used to Project the Financial
Situations of Illinois Cash-Grain Farms
Year
1988 1989 1990 1991
-dollars per bushel-
Cash soybeans 5.25 5.45 5.65 5.85
Cash corn 1.75 1.80 1.85 1.90
Target price 2.97 2.88 2.75 2.75
Loan price 1.74 1.65 1.56 1.56
Deficiency payment rate 1.22 1.08 0.90 0.85
In these simulations, net farm income is projected each year of the four-year
period. Off-farm income is $8,526 and family living expenses are $24,956 each
year. These amounts reflect FBFM averages. Initial and end-of-year operating
loan balances and net worth are reported for each farm, as is the ending debt-to-
asset ratio. If net worth declines over the four-year period, the commodity
price increases needed to maintain net worth are calculated. It is assumed that
an increase in the price of corn by one cent is associated with an increase in
the price of soybeans by 2.5 cents. Asset values are assumed to remain constant
even though increases (particularly in land values) would be expected with
increasing commodity prices.
North and Central Illinois Cash-Grain Farms with an Initial Debt- to-Asset
Ratio of 20 Percent
Results of the four-year financial projections for north and central Illinois
cash-grain farms with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent are summarized
in Table 2. Net farm income is strong and increasing for the full owner and part
owner. Net farm income is good for the full tenant but not enough to cover
family living expenses.
2 As we went to press, there was some question about whether commodity
price supports would be lowered or diverted acreage requirements
increased. Either action would tend to lower the net income and net
worth estimates conrained in this report.
Projected Financial Situations of Northern and Central Illinois Cash-
Grain Farms with an Initial Debt- to-Asset Ratio of 20 Percent
Tenure pattern
Full owner Part owner Full tenant
Net farm income
1988
1989
1990
1991
$38,794
40,876
40.194
44.585
$28,350
29,800
28.334
31,197
$17,537
17.994
16,402
17.808
Operating loan balance
Initial
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
$24,531
7,055
668
$18,898
55
$13,266
Net worth
Initial $1,314,421 $810,149 $305,877
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
1,324.899
1,337,460
1,348.433
1,364,094
813.965
819.232
822,589
829.258
302,181
298.941
293.971
290.892
.nding D/A ratio
onunodity price increases needed
to maintain initial net worth ($/bu)
Corn
Soybeans
0.16 0.22
$0.29
0.74
"he initial operating loans of the full owner, part owner, and full tenant are
liminated in the third, second, and first year, respectively. An operating loan
alance of zero indicates net farm income, non-farm income, and initial cash on
hand is sufficient during the year to meet assumed family living and tax
expenses, principal payments, and downpayments on capital purchases.
.et worth increases and the initial debt-to-asset ratio is reduced for the full
md part owners. Net worth declines approximately $15,000 for the full tenant
md the debt-to-asset ratio increases slightly. The commodity price increases
:eeded to maintain net worth for the full tenant are $0.29 and $0.74 per bushel
lor corn and soybeans, respectively, in each year of the four-year period.
The results of the simulations of northern and central Illinois cash-grain farms
with initial debt-to-asset ratios of 20 percent are very favorable for the full
and part owners. Net farm income is strong and net worth is increasing.
The
full tenant experiences lower but stable net farm income. Net worth declines
lightly and the debt-to-asset ratio increases to only 22 percent. These farms
can clearly survive and prosper for an extended period of time without any
significant changes in their farming operations.
North and Central Illinois Cash-Grain Farms with an Initial Debt-to-Asset
Ratio of 50 Percent
Results of the four-year financial projections for north and central Illinois
cash-grain farms with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 50 percent are summarized
in Table 3. Net farm income is negative each year for the full and part ovmers.
The full tenant has positive net farm income, but it is very low. The operating
loan balance increases each year of the four-year projection period regardless of
tenure pattern. The high interest costs associated with these operations forces
increased borrowing to meet family living expenses and scheduled principal
payments
.
Table 3. Projected Financial Situations of Northern and Central Illinois Cash-
Grain Farms with an Initial Debt-to-Asset Ratio of 50 Percent
Full owner
Tenure pattern
Part owner Full tenant
Net Farm income
1988
1989
1990
1991
($10,921)
( 12,947)
( 18,170)
( 18,631)
($ 2,413)
( 3,424)
( 6,868)
( 6,699)
$5,728
5,947
4,151
4,793
Operating loan balance
Initial
End-of -year
1988
1989
1990
1991
$61,329
118,493
190,855
271,903
357,196
$47,246
75,883
118,702
168,404
221.693
$33,164
34,725
49,238
69,077
91.558
Net worth
Initial
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
$821,512
794,152
764,766
730,157
695,087
Ending D/A ratio 0.57
Commodity price Increases needed
to maintain initial net worth ($/bu)
Corn $0.72
Soybeans 1.81
$506,342
487,437
467,522
444,187
421,049
0.57
$0.71
1.76
$191,173
179.271
167.589
154.044
141,641
0.60
$0.68
1.70
Table 5. Projected Financial Situations of Southern Illinois Cash-Grain Farms
20 percent
Initial debt-to-asset ratio
50 percent 70 percent
$6,849
6,980
5,153
5,952
$14,219
Net farm income
1988
1989
1990
1991
Operating loan balance
Initial
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth
Initial
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
Ending D/A ratio 0.24
Commodity price increases needed
to maintain initial net worth ($/bu)
Corn $0.64
Soybeans 1.60
($13,216)
(15,076)
(19,104)
(20,732)
$35,547
$1.08
2.71
($26,593)
(29.887)
(35.501)
(38.881)
$49,766
7,086 63,988 102.941
12.750 107,217 172.340
23,476 157,668 250.547
36,334 213,236 335,623
$526,931 $329,332 $197,599
515,808 299,676 154.568
504,817 268,161 108.242
491,958 232,618 56.302
480,456 195,447 982
0.998
$1.38
3.45
The results of the simulations of southern Illinois cash-grain farms show how net
farm income decreases as leverage increases. The farm with an initial debt-to-
asset ratio of 20 percent could survive for an extended period of time, although
net worth is decreasing. As the initial debt-to-asset ratio increases, this
analysis suggests that some type of change should be considered to increase net
farm income.
BUYING VERSUS LEASING LAND
Land values appear to be stabilizing and even increasing in some parts
of
Illinois. Some farm firms in good financial condition are beginning
to consider
land purchases. This section compares buying versus share leasing an
additional
160 acres for the north and central Illinois part-owner farm
scenario with an
initial debt-to-asset ratio of 20 percent. The additional land is
«"""«d
^° ^«
identical in value, yield, and crop mix as the existing farm. The
land purchase
is 70 percent financed with a 30-year mortgage at 10 percent.
There 1^ «1^° «
machinery purchase associated with the additional acreage ^"/ff^^°" ^° "°^"^
capital replacement). Table 6 summarizes results of the simulations
comparing
no change, share leasing, and purchasing land. These
projections are made
assuming constant land values.
Table 6. North and Central Illinois Part Owner Cash-Grain with Initial 20 Percent
Debt/Asset Ratio- -Share Lease versus Land Purchase
No -change Share lease Purchase
Net farm income
1988
1989
1990
1991
28,350
29,800
28,334
31,197
33,311
31,638
32,801
38.341
$22,102
18,789
19,684
25,147
Operating loan balance
Initial
End-of -year
1988
1989
1990
1991
$ 18,898
55
$ 18,898 $ 18,898
15,476
16,039
21,293
27,663
Net worth
Initial
End-of-year
1988
1989
1990
1991
$810,149
813,965
819,232
822,589
829,258
$810,149
818,926
824,517
831,781
844.230
$810,149
807,718
803,880
801,948
805,206
Ending D/A ratio 0.17 0.17
Land value inflation rate needed per year for ending net worth
of land-purchase scenario to equal ending net worth of:
No -change scenario .
Share- lease scenario
1.97%
3.14%
farm income is highest each year for the share-lease scenario and lowest for the
chase scenario. Net farm income increases from the no-change to the share- lease
narios because the income from the additional land is higher than the increases
variable crop costs and interest costs (from the machinery purchase). Net farm
come decreases from the no-change to the purchase scenarios because the additional
venue is not enough to meet additional variable crop costs and interest costs
sociated with the machinery and land purchases.
e operating loan balance is eliminated by the end of the first projection year In
e share -lease scenario. It increases slightly over the projection period for the
irchase scenario.
t worth increases at a faster rate for the share lease versus the no-change
scenario. The ending debt-to-asset ratio is the same at 17 percent. Net worth
decreases in the first three years of the purchase scenario. It then increases in
lie last year to approximately $5,000 below the initial level.
iid values would need to increase 1.97 percent per year (from the original level of
350 per acre) for the ending net worth of the purchase scenario to equal the
ding net worth of the no-change scenario. The land value increase needed per year
equate the ending net worth of the purchase and the share -lease scenarios is 3.14
rcent.
liie simulations in Table 6 indicate that share leasing additional acreage is
preferred to purchasing under the assumptions of this analysis. Net farm income Is
higher, the need for an operating line of credit is eliminated, net worth is higher,
and the ending debt-to-asset ratio is lower. However, share leasing provides little
security in the long run. It is shown that land would need to inflate approximately
^hree percent per year for the ending net worth of the purchase scenario to equal
ending net worth of the share lease scenario. The purchase decision may be
ferred if farm operators are willing to accept the risks associated with lower
t farm income, short-term borrowing, and increased leverage in order to gain the
scurity associated with land ownership and the opportunities of (possible) capital
Tins.
economic scenarios presented in this paper were developed with the use of the
rm Business and Financial Management Transition Planning model. The results pre-
;ted here are based largely upon FBFM averages, but the model can be easily
rlied to specific farms or to assumptions which differ from those used in this
per. The model can be used on a microcomputer and is available through the
liNet office. For more information call (217)333-9513.
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87-18/The Projected Economic Outlook for Illinois Livestock Farms^
Livestock prices have been relatively strong in the last year, particularly for
hogs and cattle. Resulting high returns to livestock enterprises have helped
many Illinois farmers reduce debt and increase equity. This report projects the
financial situation of typical Illinois hog, feeder-cattle finishing, and dairy
farms under three initial debt-to-asset ratios (0.20, 0.50, and 0.70) and three
different price scenarios (weak, moderate, and strong). Assumptions about farm
size, production costs, crop mix, and livestock enterprises are based upon
northern and central Illinois hog, beef, and dairy farms in the Farm Business
Farm Management (FBFM) Association.
The economic situation of Illinois livestock farms is projected for U years- -from
1988 through 1991. Production costs and land values are assumed to remain con-
stant over the 4-year period. Capital is replaced each year to maintain existing
capital stock. The interest rate on current and intermediate -term debt is assumed
to be 10.5 percent, and an interest rate of 11.0 percent is assumed on long-term
debt. In each scenario, off -farm income is assumed to be $8,526 and family living
expenses are $24,965. Crop yields are assumed to be 143 and 45 bushels per acre
for corn and soybeans, respectively, and 5 and 18 tons per acre for hay and corn
silage, respectively. Each farm is assumed to participate in the 20-percent set-
aside program^. The commodity, livestock, and feed prices used to project the
economic situations of Illinois livestock farms are summarized in Table 1. These
price estimates were chosen arbitrarily to reflect a range of possible outcomes
and should not be viewed as actual forecasts of the future.
The hog farm in these scenarios consists of 357 acres, of which 179 acres are
owned and 178 acres are rented on a 50-50 crop-share lease arrangement. The crop
production consists of 230 acres of corn and set-aside and 127 acres of soybeans.
The farm operator is assumed to own all livestock facilities and to farrow and
finish 174 litters per year, with an average of 7.68 pigs weaned per litter. The
results of the hog farm simulations are summarized in Table 2.
J-Funds for this project were provided in part by the Illinois Farm Legal
Assistance Foundation.
2as we went to press, there was some question if commodity price supports would
be lowered or diverted acreage requirements increased. Either action would tend
to lower the net income and net worth estimates contained In this report.
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Table 1. Commodity Prices Used Co Project the Financial Conditions of Illinois
Livestock Farms
Unit Scenario
Year
Coramoditv 1988 1989 1990 1991
Corn:
Target price bushel All $ 2.97 $2.88 $ 2.75 $ 2.75
Cash price bushel All 1.75 1.80 1.85 1.90
Loan price bushel All 1.74 1.65 1.56 1.56
Deficiency rate bushel All 1.22 1.08 0.90 0.85
Soybeans bushel All 5.25 5.45 5.65 5.85
Silage ton All 13.50 13.50 13.50 13.50
Hay ton All 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Supplement hundredweight All 11.00 11.00 11.00 11.00
Feeder cattle hundredweight All 70.00 70.00 70.00 70.00
Veal calves hundredweight All 84.80 84.80 84.80 84.80
Cull cows hundredweight All 46.90 46.90 46.90 46.90
Cull sews hundredweight All ---$5.00 less than market price-
-
Market hogs hundredweight Weak 36.00 36.00 36.00 36.00
Moderate 40.00 40.00 40.00 40.00
Strong 50.00 50.00 50.00 50.00
Live cattle hundredweight Weak 58.50 58.50 58.50 58.50
Moderate 65.00 65.00 65.00 65.00
Strong 71.50 71.50 71.50 71.50
Milk hundredweight Weak 10.82 10.82 10.82 10.82
Moderate 11.50 11.50 11.50 11.50
Strong 12.18 12.18 12.18 12.18
Weak Prices
Net farm income is good for the farm with an initial debt- to -asset ratio of 0.20.
The operating loan balance is eliminated in the first year, net worth is rela-
tively stable, and the debt-to-asset ratio decreases to 0.17. For the farms with
initial debt-to-asset ratios of 0.50 and 0.70, net farm income is low or nega-
tive; the operating loan balance increases; and net worth declines each year.
Moderate Prices
Net farm income is strong for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
0.20. The operating loan is repaid, net worth increases, and the ending debt-to-
asset ratio is lower. Net farm income is in the range of $13,000 to $14,000 for
the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.50. The operating loan balance
increases and net worth decreases because net farm and off- farm income are not
enough to meet family living expenses. The debt-to-asset ratio is still 50 per-
cent at the end of the 4-year period. Net farm income is negative for the farm
with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.70; net worth decreases; and the debt-
to-asset ratio increases.
Strong Prices
Net farm income is strong for the farms with initial debt-to-asset ratios of 0.20
and 0.50. The operating loan balance is eliminated in the first and third years
Tabic 2. Projected Financial Situations of Illinois Hog Farms
gcenario 0,20
WEAK PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $ 23,749
1989 24.253
1990 22,667
1991 23,926
Operating loan balance,
Initial $ 14,794
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth,
Initial $568,120
End-of-year. 1988 565.614
1989 567,238
1990 567.122
1991 568,749
Ending D/A ratio 0.17
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $ 35,356
1989 35,860
1990 34,274
1991 35,533
Operating loan balance,
Initial $ I''. 794
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth.
Initial $568,120
End-of-year. 1988 577.221
1989 586,827
1990 595,269
1991 606.258
Ending D/A ratio 0.17
STRONG PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $ 64,373
1989 64,877
1990 63,291
1991 64,550
Operating loan balance,
Initial $ 1^.794
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net Worth,
Initial $568,120
End-of-year, 1988 606.239
1989 635,526
1990 664,855
1991 ', \ [ 697.216
Ending D/A ratio °-l^
^1 d^bt/^??et (P/A) rflUg
Q,^9 Q.70
$ 2,093 ($12,345)
1.589 (14.085)
(608) (17.942)
(574) (19.743)
$ 36.985 $ 51.778
50.473 89.503
74.981 142.283
105,337 202.583
139,547 268,627
$355,074 $213,045
337.669 184,166
322.654 153.642
305.454 119.261
288.344 83.079
0.56 0.87
$ 13.700 ($738)
14.415 (1.259)
13.261 (3.779)
14,423 (4.102)
$ 36,985 $ 51.778
38.866 77.896
53.441 117.945
73.052 164.164
95,091 214.586
$355,074 $213,045
349.276 195,773
344 . 194 177.980
337.739 157,680
332.799 137.120
S 42.717 $ 28,280
46.479 30.805
47,663 30.890
51.111 33.364
$ 36.985 $ 51.778
9,849 48.879
2,159 64.115
83.700
104.781
$355,074 $213,045
378.293 224.790
395.476 231.810
412.206 238.144
431,869 246.926
0.35 0.63
for these farms, respectively. Net worth increases, and the debt-to-asset ratio
decreases. Net farm income is also strong for the highly leveraged farm. Net
worth increases, and the ending debt-to-asset ratio is reduced. However, the
operating loan balance increases to meet the scheduled principal payments assumed
in this scenario.
FEEDER-CATTLE FINISHING FARMS
The farm used to project the economic situations of Illinois feeder-cattle
finishing farms consists of 444 acres, of which one-half is owned and the other
half is rented on a 50-50 crop-share basis. Of this land, 345 acres are corn,
set-aside, and corn silage; and 99 acres are soybeans. The farm operator is
assumed to own all livestock facilities and to feed out 298 head of cattle per
year. The results of the feeder-cattle finishing farm simulations are presented
in Table 3.
Veak Prices
Net farm income is negative regardless of the initial debt-to-asset ratio. The
weak price scenario implies a large price spread of $11.50 between feeder-cattle
and fat-cattle prices. The operating loan balance increases, net worth
decreases, and the ending debt-to-asset ratio is increased for each farm
scenario. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.70 is insolvent at
the end of the fourth year under these weak prices
.
Moderate Prices
Net farm income is low for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.20.
The operating loan balance decreases slightly, but net worth declines over the 4-
year period. Net farm income is negative for the farms with initial debt-to-
asset ratios of 0.50 and 0.70. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
0.70 is nearly insolvent by the end of the fourth year.
Strong Prices
Net farm income is strong and the operating loan balance is eliminated by the end
of the second year for the farm with initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.20. Net
worth increases and the debt-to-asset ratio is reduced. Net farm income is low
or negative for the farms with more debt. Net worth declines, and the debt-to-
asset ratio increases.
DAIRY FARMS
The farm used to project the economic situation of Illinois dairy operations
consists of 265 acres, of which 132 acres are owned and 133 acres are rented on a
50-50 basis. Of this land, 180 acres of corn, set-aside, and corn silage, 33
acres of soybeans, and 52 acres of hay are produced. The farm operator is
assumed to own all livestock facilities and to milk a herd of 56 cows per year,
with average annual milk production of 15,369 pounds per cow. Calves not kept
for replacement heifers are sold at 200 pounds as veal calves. Results of the
dairy farm simulations are presented in Table 4.
Weak Prices
Net farm income is strong for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
0.20. Net worth increases, and the debt-to-asset ratio is reduced. Net farm
income is low for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.50, and net
Table 3. Projected Financial Situations of Illinois Feeder-Cattle Farms
Initial <iebt/<i?g^t (P/A) ratjg
Scenario 0.20 0.50 0.70
VEAK PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 ($9,593) ($37,165) ($55,545)
1989 (12,400) (42,619) (62,963)
1990 (17,595) (51,036) (73,549)
1991 (19.424) (56.426) (81.337)
Operating loan balance.
Initial $46,381 $115,954 $162,335
End-of-year, 1988 48,747 163,129 241,273
1989 65.165 229.840 341,710
1990 91.182 309.372 457.137
1991 123.790 399.056 585.114
Net worth,
Initial $719,223 $449,513 $269,708
End-of-year. 1988 690.355 395.910 197.724
1989 661,516 336,852 118,322
1990 627.482 269.377 28,334
1991 591,620 196.512 (69,441)
Ending D/A ratio 0.31 0.77 1.08
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $11,116 ($16,456) ($34,836)
1989 10,483 (19.735) (40.079)
1990 7.394 (25.750) (48.263)
1991 7.911 (28.485) (53.395)
Operating loan balance,
Initial $46,381 $115,954 $162,335
End-of-year. 1988 28,038 142,421 220,564
1989 24,407 186.248 298,117
1990 28.077 240.494 388.258
1991 35,049 302.237 488,294
Net worth.
Initial $719,223 $449,513 $269,708
End-of-year, 1988 711,064 416,618 218,433
1989 402,274 380,444 161.915
1990 690.587 338,255 97.213
1991 680.361 293.331 27.379
Ending D/A Ratio 0.20 0.66 0.97
STRONG PRICES
Net farm income. 1988 $31,825 $4,253 ($14,127)
1989 33.367 3.148 (17.196)
1990 30.666 (545) (22.977)
1991 31.568 (697) (25.454)
Operating loan balance.
Initial $46,381 $115,954 $162,335
End-of-year, 1988 7,329 121,712 199.856
1989 143.429 254,526
1990 173,072 319.381
1991 ] ] 207.126 391.475
"^'l^Uui $719,223 $449,513 $269,708
End-of-year. 1988
'. 731.773 437.327 239.141
^ 1989 739.546 423.263 205.506
1990 .... 744.147 405.677 166.090
1991 .'......... 750.504 388.442 124.197
Ending D/A ratio 01^ ^J^ ^
Table 4. Projected Financial Sicuacions of Illinois Dairy Farms
In
Scenario 0-20
UEAK PRICES
Net farm Income, 1988 $37,079
1989 37,489
1990 35,445
1991 37,905
Operating loan balance.
Initial $8,835
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth.
Initial $562,142
End-of-year, 1988 570,558
1989 581,932
1990 591,384
1991 604,601
Ending D/A ratio 0.15
MODERATE PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $42,932
1989 43,342
1990 41,298
1991 43.757
Operating loan balance.
Initial $8,835
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth.
Initial $562,142
End-of-year, 1988 576,410
1989 591,089
1990 604,351
1991 621,432
Ending D/A ratio 0.15
STRONG PRICES
Net farm income, 1988 $48,784
1989 49,194
1990 47,150
1991 49,610
Operating loan balance,
Initial $8,835
End-of-year, 1988
1989
1990
1991
Net worth,
Initial $562,142
End-of-year, 1988 582,263
1989 600,393
1990 617,428
1991 638.378
Ending D/A ratio 0.15
tial debt/asset (D/A) ratio
0.50 0.70
$15,575 $1,239
16.163 698
14,092 (2.753)
15,931 (2,418)
$22,089 $30,924
33,864 68.330
56,435 118,909
84,656 176,323
114.057 236,967
$351,338 $210,803
345,945 194,919
342.927 179,033
337,658 159,711
334,861 140,811
$21,428 $7,091
22,630 7.165
21.051 4.337
23,413 5.357
$22,089 $30,924
28,011 62,477
45,901 107,128
69.137 158,018
93.180 211.065
$351,338 $210,803
351.798 200,772
353.461 190,814
353.177 178,016
355.738 166,713
$27,280 $12,944
29,097 13.632
28,009 11,351
30,895 12,955
$422,089 $30,924
22,159 56,625
35.368 96,065
53,619 141.394
72,303 188.050
$351,338 $210,803
357.650 206.624
363.994 201.877
368.695 194.640
376.614 189.728
worth declines slightly over the 4-year period. Net farm income is very low or
negative for the farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.70, and the ending
debt-to-asset ratio is higher.
Moderate Prices
Net farm income is strong, and the net worth increases for the farm with an
initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.20. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset
ratio of 0.50 has net farm income in the range of $21,000 to $23,000; and the net
worth increases slightly over the 4-year period. The farm with an Initial debt-
to-asset ratio of 0.70 has positive but very low net farm income, and the net
worth declines.
Strong Prices
The farms with initial debt-to-asset ratios of 0.20 and 0.50 have strong net farm
income and increase net worth over the 4-year period. However, the farm with an
initial debt-to-asset ratio of 0.50 increases the operating loan balance to meet
scheduled principal payments. The farm with an initial debt-to-asset ratio of
0.70 has low net farm income, and the net worth declines. The debt-to-asset
ratio increases slightly even with strong milk prices.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The economic scenarios presented in this paper were developed with the use of the
Farm Business and Financial Management Transition Planning model. The results
presented here are based largely upon FBFM averages, but the model can be easily
applied to specific farms or to assumptions that differ from those used in this
paper. The model can be used on a microcomputer and is available through the
IlliNet office.
For more information, call (217)333-9513.
Prepared by: David Neff, Agricultural Economist, and David Lins , Extension
Specialist, Farm Financial Management
Submitted by: David A. Lins
Cooperative Extension Service
United States Department of Agriculture
University of Illinois
At Urbana- Champaign
1301 W. Gregory Drive
Urbana, Illinois 61801
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